Seeing the Forest for the Trees: Finance and Managerial Control in the US Forest Products Industry, 1945-2008 by Gunnoe, Andrew Augustus
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School
5-2012
Seeing the Forest for the Trees: Finance and




This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more
information, please contact trace@utk.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gunnoe, Andrew Augustus, "Seeing the Forest for the Trees: Finance and Managerial Control in the US Forest Products Industry,
1945-2008. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2012.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/1299
To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Andrew Augustus Gunnoe entitled "Seeing the Forest
for the Trees: Finance and Managerial Control in the US Forest Products Industry, 1945-2008." I have
examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be
accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in
Sociology.
Paul K. Gellert, Major Professor
We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:
Jon Shefner, Sherry Cable, Donald D. Hodges
Accepted for the Council:
Dixie L. Thompson
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)
Seeing the Forest for the Trees:  
 
Finance and Managerial Control in the  








A Dissertation Presented for the 
Doctor of Philosophy Degree 






















Andrew Augustus Gunnoe 
May 2012 
 




This dissertation is dedicated to my family by blood, marriage, friendship, and spirit 
 
This one is for all of us 
 




This dissertation was made possible by the support, encouragement, and love of 
many people.  First, I would like to thank my dissertation committee.  Sherry Cable was 
the first person to introduce me to the discipline of sociology and without her 
encouragement it is doubtful that I would have ever pursued this degree.  Over the course 
of my graduate studies I ventured away from her field of expertise, but I am eternally 
grateful for all her unwavering support and encouragement.  Don Hodges provided me 
with an invaluable perspective from the field of forestry.  He deserves credit for his 
ongoing support and willingness to entertain perspectives that are foreign to his 
disciplinary background.  Jon Shefner was helpful to me in countless ways over the 
course of my graduate studies.  Although at times we have differences of opinion, his 
penetrating questions and no nonsense approach to social science will always remain a 
source of inspiration.  Finally, Paul Gellert’s support, intellect, encouragement, patience, 
and humor were more invaluable than words can express.  Paul never lost faith in me and 
always pushed me to articulate my questions and refine my arguments.  I hope this 
dissertation adequately reflects the time and energy that he put into it.   
In addition to my committee I would also like to thank the entire Department of 
Sociology at the University of Tennessee.  This department welcomed me from political 
science and gave me the freedom and institutional support to pursue questions in the 
dark, murky waters of political economy.  I would especially like to thank Harry Dahms, 
who left a far greater impact on me than he probably realized.  Learning social theory 
from Harry was one of the greatest intellectual experiences of my life and I will always 
be grateful for the splinter he lodged in my eye.  I was also fortunate enough to enter the 
sociology graduate program with a cohort of brilliant graduate students that shared my 
interests in Marxian political economy.  I would especially like to thank John Bradford, 
Ryan Wishart, and Shannon Williams. Together we waded through the complexities of 
Marxian value theory and political economy and without their support and insights I 
never could have advanced as far as I have.  Shannon Williams in particular deserves as 
much credit as anyone for sharing and shaping the intellectual journey that led to this 
  iv 
dissertation.  Our long conversations – from the earliest days of graduate school to the 
present – have been critical to my intellectual development over the years.  Shannon will 
always be a friend, colleague, and comrade.  
Several individuals outside of the sociology department also contributed to this 
project.  Paul Paolucci at Eastern Kentucky University has been an enormous intellectual 
inspiration and friend.  Paul’s mastery of Marxian dialectics has been a critical source of 
knowledge and insight for me and his influence can be seen throughout the pages of this 
dissertation.  Jim Rinehart, of R&A investment forestry, was a valuable source of 
information and I want to thank him for his many replies to my questions about 
timberland investment and for sharing with me his timberland transaction database.  Brad 
Smith from the US Forest Service answered many of my questions about timberland 
ownership and was extremely helpful in helping me locate data.  I would also like to 
thank Cathy Jenkins who works in graphic design at the University of Tennessee for 
helping me put together the merger figure in Chapter six of this dissertation.   
On a more personal note, I would like to thank the community of friends that I 
shared my time with while in Knoxville, TN.  In August of 2003, a month prior to my 
first semester of graduate school, I moved into an old log cabin in a community tucked 
away in the forests of South Knoxville known as Loghaven.  Loghaven has been at the 
center of my universe for the past nine years and the countless friends that shared this 
time with me are more important to me than they could ever know.  There are too many 
individuals to list, but they know who they are.  It is an honor to call you my friends and I 
want to thank you for all the inspiration, love, and support that you have given me over 
the years. 
I want to thank my wonderful family.  My brothers and sisters – Gary. Joanna, 
Meredith, and Justin – have provided support and friendship to me throughout my life.  
We have each gone our separate ways and pursued our own dreams, but our family bond 
has always kept us close and I love you all so much.  I also want to thank the McCormick 
family for all your love and support over the years.  My cousin Brian McCormick passed 
away four years ago to the day that I defended this dissertation and the feeling of his 
support and love the morning of my defense was overwhelming.  I love you and miss you 
  v 
Brian! And finally, I want to thank my incredible parents, Gerald and Judith Gunnoe, 
who worked their entire lives so that I might have the chance to succeed.  It was my 
father who told me as a distraught and confused young man that I should “question 
everything.”  Although following his advice led me far away from where he might have 
thought it would, his support and encouragement have been unwavering.  But it is my 
mother, more than anyone else, that is responsible for my success as a student.  In grade 
school she read the books I was supposed to read and stayed up late with me helping me 
write the papers I was reluctant to write.  For a teenager who had other things on his 
mind, she kept me focused and insisted that I work hard and study.  For this, and a 
million other things, I owe my mother a debt of gratitude that can never be repaid.  Thank 
you mom and dad, all of this was made possible because of you.   
Finally, I want to thank my sweet wife Stacy.  Stacy walked into my life just over 
three years ago and her love and support have nourished me throughout this dissertation 
project.  Thank you for believing in me and for showering me with love each and every 
day.  It is you that gives me confidence and hope in this world that is so often filled with 
despair.  The future always looks bright with you by my side.   




Over the past three decades a significant change has taken place in the ownership 
structure of industrial timberlands in the United States.  The once widely held belief that 
significant timberland ownership was a necessary ingredient for success in the forest 
products industry came to an end as millions of acres of productive land were sold from 
industrial forest products firms to institutional investment organizations, known as 
Timberland Investment Management Organizations (TIMOs) or Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REITs). This dissertation examines this large-scale transfer of timberland 
ownership through a multi-level analysis of financialization and the rise of shareholder 
value ideology in corporate management.  Part I of the dissertation provides a critical 
synthesis of these two literatures in order to construct a historical sociological framework 
for analyzing institutional change in modern corporations.  Financialization is defined as 
a gravitational shift from productive to financial forms of capital accumulation.  I then 
conceptualize the relationship between managers and shareholders as an institutional 
form of the broader social relation that exists between productive and financial 
capitalists. The shareholder value conception of managerial control is conceptualized as 
an ideological manifestation of the shift that took place in the relationship between these 
two sectors of the capitalist class that motivated and justified managerial decision-making 
in large non-financial corporations. Part II employs this framework to examine the 
historical development of the US forest products industry over the course of the second 
half of the 20th century.  This includes an analysis of corporate land ownership strategies 
during the postwar era of managerial capitalism, the impact of the hostile takeover 
movement, and the rise of shareholder capitalism in recent decades.  I argue that both the 
decision by managers to sell-off their timberland holdings and the growth of institutional 
investors seeking to expand their investment portfolios are directly related to the process 
of financialization. Furthermore, I conclude that the financialization of the US forest 
product industry led to favorable outcomes for financial interests, but has left the industry 
with higher levels of concentration, fewer employees, heightened risk, and declining 
profits.    
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Over the past three decades a significant change has taken place in the ownership 
structure of industrial timberlands in the United States.  The once widely held belief that 
significant timberland ownership was a necessary ingredient for success in the forest products 
industry came to an end as millions of acres of productive land were sold from industrial forest 
products firms to institutional investment organizations, known as Timberland Investment 
Management Organizations (TIMOs) or Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). These 
institutionally owned timberlands are geographically dispersed across the United States, with the 
most significant concentrations located in the pine plantations of the Southeast, conifer 
plantations of the Northwest, and mixed softwood and hardwood stands of the Northeast.  As of 
2009, over 43 million acres of timberland valued at $39.7 billion changed ownership type, 
making this one of the most significant transfers of land ownership in recent US history. (Harris 
2007; Hickman 2007; Bliss et al. 2009; Rinehart 2010).   
The decision to sell off industrial timberland is the latest in a series of “remarkable” 
changes to take place in the forest products industry in recent decades (Newman 2008).  Other 
notable changes include the gravitational shift in industrial forest production from the Pacific 
Northwest to the South, the sharp decline in industry access to the federal timber supply, the 
sustained period of mergers and acquisitions in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Diamond, 
Chappelle, and Edwards 1999), and the widely publicized loss of US furniture manufacturing 
capacity to overseas competition (Bumgardner et al. 2004).  In explaining these changes, many 
analysts have pointed to the pressures of neoliberal globalization, which diminished state 
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protectionist policies and produced a rapid increase in foreign competition (Marchak 1995; Ince 
et al. 2007).  
There is no doubt that the competitive pressures associated with neoliberal globalization 
are critical drivers of change in the US forest product industry.  However, there has been 
relatively little attention paid to the transformations that took place in the governing logic of 
American corporations and how these changes affected the management and operation of firms 
in the forest products industry.  If we are to understand change in the US forest products 
industry, then we must account for the behavior of those individuals that have direct control over 
the day-to-day operations of the firm.  We need to understand how the motivations and priorities 
of corporate managers were altered in recent decades and how these changes affect various 
aspects of the firm.   
In an article published in the Forest Products Journal, Michael and Ray (2008) argue that 
many of the problems confronting the forest products industry are the product of “self-imposed 
disasters.” Poor decision-making by senior managers in the industry, they contend, have “caused 
much of the misfortune that has beset our producers” (Michael and Ray 2008: 6).  They list a 
number of examples of poor managerial decision-making, including managerial tinkering with 
emissions monitors, failure to capture important emerging markets, and the widespread failure of 
wood-based companies.  In the end, Michael and Ray submit that their solutions to this tendency 
towards poor decision-making may go unheeded by managers because of “cognitive reasons.”  In 
this dissertation I provide a sociological analysis that may offer clues as to why managers in the 
forest products industry make the decisions that they do.  This analysis goes beyond simply 
blaming managers for poor decision-making to examine the socio-historical context in which 
those decisions are made.     
 3 
 
The need for a sociological account of managerial decision-making in the industry is 
particularly pressing for explaining the puzzle of why corporate managers decided to sell-off 
millions of acres of valuable timberland.  What were the motivations that compelled managers to 
increase their timberland holdings over the course of the 20th century, only to sell them off in 
rapid succession in recent decades? How was this decision related to other changes in the 
industry, such the decision to sell-off unrelated product lines in order to focus on “core 
competencies,” or the decade-long merger wave that continues to increase industry 
concentration?  Furthermore, what are institutional investors and why would they be interested in 
investing in timberland?  Is there a relationship between the growth of institutional investors and 
the managerial decision to divest their timberland assets?   
This dissertation seeks to examine these questions through a multi-layered analysis that 
focuses on the financialization of the US economy and the rise of shareholder value conceptions 
of control in corporate governance.  The substantial growth of the financial sector in the US and 
global economy has resulted in a steady increase of academic interest in issues related to finance 
(Foster and Magdoff 2009; Krippner 2011; Brenner 2006; Dumenil and Levy 2004; 2011; 
Orhangazi 2008).  I argue that many of the transformations that have taken place in the US forest 
products industry can be traced directly to the increasing influence of financial interests over the 
management of American corporations.  At the same time, I argue that we must go beyond 
simply describing the effects of financial interests over the firm to understand the logic that 
propelled the financialization process in the first place.  This tracing back enables us to 
understand both the transformation of timberland ownership in particular and the restructuring of 
the US forest products industry in general within the context of a broader historical dynamic.   
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This introduction begins with a brief overview of the US forest products industry, its 
basic constituent parts and their overall place within the broader US economy.  I then provide an 
overview of the principle data sources that were used in the course of my research.  The bulk of 
the chapter consists of a statement on the methodological framework and theoretical foundations 
that inform this study.  This review of the methodological and theoretical foundations is then 
used to outline the framework that will be employed to examine how the historical dynamics of 
capital accumulation were manifested in the decision-making priorities of corporate managers 
and ultimately led to the transformations of timberland ownership in the United States.   
 
The Forest Products Industry: Definition and Overview 
 
 The empirical focus of this dissertation is the US forest products industry.  Demarcating 
this industry is a formidable task in itself: few industries are as complex and multifaceted.  
Within the US forest products industry there are variety of products and markets, many of which 
are highly divergent and counter cyclical.  The industry also experiences rapid rates of change as 
firms commonly enter and exit particular markets, engage in mergers and acquisitions, and 
change their mix of products (Ellefson and Stone 1984). For all of these reasons, there are 
unavoidable pitfalls in any attempt to discuss the industry as a whole.     
In this study, however, I proceed under the assumption that there is enough commonality 
between the individual firms in the industry to warrant a broader analysis of the effects of 
financialization and shareholder value.  This assumption is buttressed by the fact that the 
industry shares a common resource base for their raw material needs: the nation’s 514 million 
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acres of productive timberland.1  It is further supported by the fact that financial analyses of the 
industry are conducted under the common grouping of the “Paper and Forest Products Industry” 
and the industry is represented by a common trade association (The American Forest and Paper 
Association).     
The two main sectors of the forest products industry are the wood products and paper 
products sectors.2  Both sectors are highly heterogeneous, consisting of numerous subsectors 
with their own market dynamics.  The wood products sector (North American Industrial 
Classification System; NAICS 321) consists of those industries engaged in sawing, shaping and 
assembling wood into a variety of products (U.S. Census Bureau 2007).  Included in the wood 
products sector are a wide array of product markets, including basic sawmills, veneer and 
plywood, engineered wood products, prefabricated wood products, and the like.   
The second primary sector is paper products (NAICS 322).  This sector consists of 
various manufacturers of pulp, paper, and other converted paper products (U.S Census Bureau 
2007).  The products developed in this sector are highly diverse and range from the manufacture 
of newsprint and paperboard to tissue paper and disposable diapers. The pulp and paper sector is 
considerably more capital intensive than the wood products sector, with economies of scale 
reaching gargantuan proportions during the late 20th century: the cost of constructing a modern 
pulp and paper plant is now commonly in excess of one billion dollars, making it one of the most 
capital-intensive industries in the world (Carrere and Lohmann 1996).   In the United States, the 
largest firms in the industry typically have operations in both sectors, with their relative 
                                                 
 
1
 The US Forest Service defines productive timberland as those forests that are capable of producing 20 cubic feet 
per acre of industrial wood annually and not legally reserved from timber harvest (Smith et al. 2010).  
2
 The wood furniture sector is often included in studies of wood-based industries, however, due to the rapid decline 
of this industry in recent decades and the marginal role that it plays for the large forest product firms under 
investigation, I do not include it my analysis.   
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contribution to each firm varying widely and although these two sectors both rely on the same 
raw material for production; their respective markets fluctuate tremendously and rarely move in 
concert.    
 For the purposes of this study, I focus primarily on the large publicly-owned 
corporations.  There remain a considerable number of privately owned forest product firms, but, 
for the industry as a whole, the corporate form dominates.  In the early 1980s, Ellefson and Stone 
(1984) estimated that roughly 95 percent of forest products establishments with 20 or more 
employees were corporate in form.  Today the vast majority of leading firms in the industry are 
publicly owned corporations.3 Furthermore, it was the large corporate firms that came to own 
and manage the millions of acres of timberland that this study is particularly concerned with.   
To avoid misunderstandings, I want to clarify my justification for focusing on US-based 
firms in an industry that is highly integrated on the international level, especially between the 
United States and Canada.  The justification stems from the fact that my primary focus is on the 
structural and ideological components of corporate actors, both of which are highly sensitive to 
the national economy and their respective culture of corporate governance.  There remains a 
considerable degree of variance between different nations and the corporate cultures they 
engender (see Mäntysaari 2005).  Nevertheless, many firms included in the analysis have 
operations in both the United States, Canada, and around the world.  For example, Abitibi-
Bowater, following the merger of Abitibi-Consolidated (Canadian) and Bowater Inc. (US) is now 
                                                 
 
3
 The most prominent exception to this general rule is Georgia-Pacific, which was purchased then promptly 
privatized by Koch Industries in 2005.  Koch Industries paid a total of $21 billion to purchase the firm, which 
included compensating the company’s shareholders $48 per share.   
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headquartered in Montreal, even though they maintain extensive operations across the United 
States.4   
Despite over a decade of downsizing, the forest products industry remains an important 
component of the US manufacturing economy.  As shown in Table 1.1, the value of the 
industry’s 2008 shipments exceeded $266 billion, which accounts for almost 5 percent of the five 
trillion dollars of shipment values that took place in the nation’s manufacturing sector.  Over 
two-thirds of the total value of shipments ($178 billlion) took place in the paper manufacturing 
sector alone, making it the 10th largest sector in the US manufacturing.  Capital expenditures in 
the forest products industry totaled $8.8 billion, or roughly five percent of all capital 
1expenditures in the US manufacturing sector.  Again, the capital intensive paper sector 
accounted for the vast majority of total capital expenditures in the industry.  
 The forest products industry also continues to be an important source of employment in 
the US economy.  In 2008 the industry employed 864,821 people, which accounted for almost 7 
percent of the nation’s total manufacturing employment.  These employees were split relatively 
evenly between the two sectors, with the wood products sector accounting for slightly more than 
the paper products sector.  Despite accounting for more employees, the total payroll in the paper 
products sector surpassed the wood products sector by almost $5 billion.  This most likely 
reflects the higher degree of education and specialization that is necessary to operate modern 
pulping mills.  In all, total employee payroll in the forest products industry accounts for almost 6 
percent of the nation’s total manufacturing payroll.   
 
 
                                                 
 
4
 For information about corporate ties between US and Canadian firms see (Ellefson and Stone 1984: 61-66). 
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Shipments       
($ million) 
88,004 178,749 266,753 5,486,266 
Capital 
Expenditures    
($ million) 
2,518 6,268 8,786 168,505 




15,619 20,546 36,165 607,446 
Source: U.S Census Bureau 2008, Annual Survey of Manufacturers  
 The forest products industry operates in many – though not all – areas of the United 
States.  The most productive region for the forest products industry today is the South.  The 
Southern United States is also the region where institutional land ownership has increased the 
most. The forest products industry continues to have a large presence in the Pacific Northwest, 
Midwest, and Northeastern regions of the United States as well, making it one of the most 
geographically dispersed industries in the US economy today.  The fact that the industry is wide-
spread also speaks to its importance as a source of employment and production in the larger US 
economy.   
 
Data Collection and Sources 
 
Data for this study come from a wide array of sources, including government and private 
industry databases.  For certain measures, aggregate data was available for both the wood 
products and paper product sectors.  These include data collected from both the US Census 
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Bureau and the Bureau of Economic analysis.  Data on capacity and capacity utilization was 
gathered from the Federal Reserve.   
Much of the data necessary for this analysis, however, was not available for the industry 
as a whole.  In these cases, I had to rely on data collected at the level of the firm.  This data 
includes data mined from corporate proxy statements on both shareholder concentration and 
executive compensation.  Much of the financial data, and aggregate data on institutional stock 
ownership were obtained from Mergent Online.  Mergent Online is a wonderful source of 
information and provides access to data on company’s financials, history, ownership, and 
structure, among others.  For practical reasons, I chose not to include every firm in the industry 
but to focus on the top ten firms in the industry at any given time.  Table 1.2 shows the top ten 
firms in the forest products industry ranked by total revenues for each decade since the 1970s.  
International Paper held the lead in total revenues for in the industry for most of the 20th century, 
however, for most firms there was substantial variation in their overall position within the 
industry.  This is a reflection of the turbulence that beset the industry over this time period.  
When necessary, the top ten firms in the industry will serve as a proxy for the industry as a 
whole during any given time period.5   
Much of the historical data was found using Lexus Nexus Academic and ProQuest.  
These search engines were invaluable for providing concrete examples of the social relations that 
this dissertation seeks to illuminate.  The Standard & Poor’s Industrial Surveys, which are 
published twice a year, also provided a critical source for viewing the evolution of the industry 
from the perspective of the financial community.  These surveys, dating back to the early 1970s, 
                                                 
 
5
 This is particularly the case with data collected from corporate proxy statements, such a stock ownership and 
executive compensation.  Due to the time necessary to collect this data from individual proxy statements I did not 
include data from every firm in the industry.   
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Table 1.2 Top Ten US Forest Product Firms for Selected Years, by Total Revenue 
1970 1980 1990 2000 2009 
1. International Paper  1. International Paper 1. International Paper 1. International Paper 1. International Paper 
2. Mead Corp.  2. Georgia-Pacific  2. James River 2. Georgia-Pacific 2. MeadWestvaco 
3. Crown Zellerbach 3. Weyerhaeuser 3. Kimberly-Clark 3. Weyerhaeuser 3. Smurfit-Stone 
4. St. Regis 4. Champion  4. Stone Container 4. Kimberly-Clark 4. Weyerhaeuser  
5. Kimberly-Clark 5. Boise Cascade 5. Scott Paper 5. Smurfit-Stone 5. Domtar 
6. Scott Paper 6. Kimberly-Clark 6. Georgia-Pacific 6. Boise Cascade 6. AbitibiBowater 
7. Westvaco 7. St. Regis 7. Champion  7. Willamettte  7. Temple-Inland 
8. Great Northern Nekoosa 8. Crown Zellerbach 8. Weyerhaeuser  8. Mead Corp.  8. Greif Inc.  
9. Hammermill Paper Co.  9. Scott Paper 9. Boise Cascade 9. Temple-Inland 9. Packaging Corp.  
10. Saxon 10. Mead Corp.   10. Union Camp 10. Westvaco 10. Plum Creek 
Source: Data compiled from Standard & Poor Industry Survey’s   
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provided invaluable annual overviews of the industry and its incessant fluctuations.  And 
the International Directory of Company Histories was a wonderful source of historical 
information on particular firms in the industry.  Additional historical information was 
mined from the extensive secondary literature on the US forest products industry.   
 
Methodological Framework and Theoretical Foundations 
 
Sociologists have a long history of using comparative historical methods to 
explain how dynamic processes unfold over time (Mahoney 2004).  The methodology 
employed in this study is most accurately described as a dialectical historical sociology.  
My rationale for adopting this method is due, in large part, to the nature of the questions 
being pursued: my primary concern is with exploring the relationship between the 
structural dynamics of financialization, the shareholder value conceptions of control in 
corporate management, and the transformation of timberland ownership in the United 
States.  It follows that I must adopt a method that privileges process and change over 
more static interpretations and that is flexible enough to allow me to account for both 
structural dynamics and historically situated actors.  In this section, I provide a broad 
overview of this method, as well as a discussion of several related methodological 
approaches. I find that Marx’s method, although underdeveloped by Marx himself, 





Marxian Dialectics and the General Theory of Accumulation 
 
In employing the concept of dialectic, I refer to the dialectical method as it was 
utilized by Marx in his economic studies.  Although Marx himself never wrote detailed 
text on his methodology, a number of scholars have begun to outline the basic contours of 
what may be called a “Marxian methodology” based on a close reading of his voluminous 
work (Sweezy 1970[1942]; Ollman 1971; 2003, Sayer 1979; 1987, Paolucci 2009[2007]).   
The dialectical method is at the heart of this Marxian methodology.  Ollman 
(2003) provides perhaps the clearest exposition of the meaning of dialectics.  He begins 
by explaining what it is not:   
[d]ialectics is not a rock-ribbed triad of thesis-antithesis-synthesis that 
serves as an all-purpose explanation; nor does it provide a formula that 
enables us to prove or predict anything; nor is it the motor force of history.  
The dialectic, as such, explains nothing, proves nothing, predicts nothing, 
and causes nothing to happen (2003: 12).   
 
It is, on the contrary, a method for studying change.  If we concede that capitalism is an 
inherently dynamic social and economic system – as both critics and supporters would 
readily agree – than it would seem necessary that we adopt a method that can make sense 
of this ever-changing system as it evolves over time.  This is particularly the case with 
the forest products industry which, as we will see, is notoriously dynamic and cyclical.   
A dialectical method achieves this by providing a relational and process oriented 
perspective for studying change in complex systems. As Ollman (2003: 13) explains, 
“understanding anything in our everyday experience requires that we know something 
about how it arose and developed and how it fits into the larger context or system of 
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which it is a part.”  That is to say, a dialectical method usually begins with a 
conceptualization of the whole, before proceeding to examine its various parts, their 
functions, and relations to the whole.  In doing so, it provides valuable insights into both 
the complexity of particulars, and a greater understanding of the whole of which they are 
a part (Ollman 2003).   
Dialectics emphasizes how process and change result from the interaction, or 
conflict, of contradictory forces. Contradiction, in this sense, refers to “the incompatible 
development of different elements within the same relations, which is to say between 
elements that are dependent on one another” (Ollman 2003: 17). Marx’s use of the 
dialectic was strongly influenced by his reading of Hegel.  However, whereas Hegel used 
dialectics to uncover the historical development of ideas, Marx used this method to 
examine the dynamics of social change as they are rooted in class struggles taking place 
in the mode of production.  Thus he famously charged that in Hegel the dialectic “is 
standing on its head, and “must be turned right side up again…” (Marx 1967a: 20). 
Critical to Marx’s use of the dialectical method was his use of abstractions 
(Sweezy 1942; Ollman 2003).  This method, also known as a method of successive 
approximations, was used by Marx and other classical thinkers (most notably by Ricardo 
and Durkheim,) in their effort to understand and analyze complex social processes.  It is, 
in short, a way of narrowing one’s field of view in order to focus on particular features of 
an object while minimizing the influence of others.  In the preface to Capital, Marx 
(1967a: 8) explains that “[i]n the analysis of economic forms…neither microscopes nor 
chemical reagents are of use.  The force of abstraction must replace both.”  In practice, 
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Marx’s method of abstraction begins with the world as it presents itself to us (the “real 
concrete”) and then proceeds to break this whole down into workable parts (the 
“abstraction”) so that they can be conceptualized and analyzed in the mind (the “thought 
concrete”). The method of presentation, however, is often quite different in that it tends 
to move from the abstract to the concrete, removing simplifying assumptions at 
successive stages of the investigation in order to highlight complexity and historical 
circumstance (see Ollman 2003).   
In Volume I of Capital, Marx begins with an analysis of the commodity, thus 
using his microscope of abstraction to reveal how the commodity form under capitalism 
embodied the contradictory social relations of capitalism as a whole.  In doing so, he 
begins the construction of his general theory of capital accumulation.  Marx’s general 
theory is a dynamic theory of social change that highlights a number of tendencies that 
derive from a social structure premised on a particular social relation of production.  This 
relation of production – private property and wage labor – gives rise to an economic 
system that requires ceaseless accumulation in order to survive.  Thus Marx’s 
conceptualization of capital was not as a thing, but as a process; a process of self-
expanding value.  In Volume II of Capital, Marx (1967b: 105) explains that  
[c]apital as self-expanding value embraces not only class relations, a 
society of a definite character resting on the existence of labour in the 
form of wage-labor.  It is a movement, a circuit-describing process going 
through various stages, which itself comprises three different forms of the 
circuit-describing process.  Therefore it can be understood only as a 
motion, not as a thing at rest.   
 
Once in place, this movement (commonly expressed in Marx’s general formula of 
capitalism: M-C-M´) becomes a structural necessity for capitalist economies and compels 
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them, on the pain of extinction, to pursue ceaseless accumulation.  Furthermore, this 
dynamic becomes a critical (though not the only, of course) engine of social and 
economic change in capitalist societies.   
  From this perspective individual actors are dealt with primarily as 
“personifications of economic categories” and “embodiments of particular class-relations 
and class-interests” (Marx 1967a: 10).  Compelled by both competition in the market, and 
the accumulation of abstract power (in the form of wealth) in general, capitalists must 
constantly seek to expand their money capital.  In pursuing their own self-interests, 
capitalists collectively produce a “law of motion,” which in turn reacts back on them, 
compelling them towards ever greater accumulation.  This desire for accumulation cannot 
be reduced to mere greed – for greed is a human affliction that dates to time immemorial 
– but as a necessity that arises from this particular mode of production.  “[T]hat which in 
the miser is a mere idiosyncrasy” Marx reminds us, “is, in the capitalist, the effect of the 
social mechanism…(1967a: 592).”6 
In conceptualizing capital as a process, Marx is at the same time highlighting the 
tendency for capitalists to confront various barriers in their efforts to expand.  The study 
of these barriers and their various manifestations is the prevue of Marxian crisis theory, 
one of the most vigorous areas of Marxian political economy (see Harvey 2006; Shaikh 
1978; Howard and King 1988).  For our present purposes it is only necessary that we 
                                                 
 
6
 It is worth noting that Marx was not alone in his desire to establish central tendencies that derive 
from the establishment of capitalist markets.  Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” was another attempt to 
deduce various tendencies from the abstract processes of capitalist markets.  Although their conclusions are 
widely divergent, both Marx and Smith’s theories were premised on this idea of a stratified reality that 




grasp Marx’s general conceptualization of capitalism as a dynamic system that requires 
growth for survival and at the same time tends to periodically confront barriers to that 
growth.  These barriers arise from contradictions that arise both internally (ie. Marx’s 
theory of the falling rate of profit) and externally (ie. natural limits to growth) to the 
capitalist system and must resolved if accumulations is to resume (Lebowitz 1982).  
Capitalism can thus be understood as a system of ever-expanding value that is punctuated 
by periodic crises.  These crises appear as particular “barriers to be overcome” (Marx 
1973: 408).    
Because it is so often misunderstood, it is necessary to take a brief moment to 
confront the notion that Marx was an economic reductionist.  Marx’s method was 
employed to investigate his particular interest in laying “bare the economic law of motion 
of modern society” (Marx 1967a: 10)  His conclusions are no panacea, but they do 
provide a theoretically coherent interpretation of capitalism as a particular mode of 
production based upon a definite social relation, with its own tendencies and dynamics.  
It is difficult to deny the fundamental role that that economic imperatives play in the 
shaping of history in modern society.  Furthermore, my subject matter warrants a focus 
on change taking place in the realm of the economy.  If this was a study of teen smoking 
habits, such a launching point might not be necessary; however, this study is concerned 
with analyzing various transformations taking place within large corporations, surely an 
institution that is shaped, in large part, by an economic logic.  Nevertheless, this study is 
not an attempt to reduce everything to economic terms, but an affirmation that one cannot 
understand the shift in timberland ownership, and the concomitant shifts in corporate 
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structure and ideology outside of the development of historical capitalism.  In the end, 
Marx was not trying to reduce everything to economic terms.  “He was rather,” as 
Sweezy (1942: 15) explained “attempting to uncover the true interrelation between the 
economic and the non-economic factors in the totality of social existence.”   
 
Institutional Neo-Marxism and Periodization  
 
 Recognizing the existence of barriers, however, tells us little about the process 
whereby they are overcome.  According to Marx (1973: 410),  
[t]he fact that capital posits every such limit as a barrier and hence gets 
ideally beyond it, it does not by any means follow that it has really 
overcome it, and since every such barrier contradicts its character, its 
production moves in contradictions which are constantly overcome but 
just as constantly posited (italics in original).  
 
The method and manner in which a particular crisis is overcome is the outcome of a 
various historical contingencies, including class struggle, the given level of technology, 
and the availability of resources, to name but a few.  But the general goal remains the 
same: in order to overcome crises, capitalism requires a reconfiguration of the 
institutional and ideological underpinning of society in order to establish the conditions 
for continued capital accumulation (see Marx 1973; Harvey 2010).   
 Theorizing the various configurations of historical capitalism lies at the heart of 
contemporary political economy.  These theories seek to embed capitalist social relations 
within the various social, economic, and political structures that provide the necessary 
framework for capital accumulation to take place (Polanyi 1957[1944]).  Accompanying 
these various institutions is a host of norms and ideologies that not only serve to 
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legitimate a given mode of accumulation, but to also provide the regulatory and legal 
framework necessary for a capital accumulation to take place.  Yet these institutions that 
are at once necessary for capital accumulation can also become so many barriers to 
continued accumulation.   
 A prominent example of this approach can be found in the work of theorists 
associated with Social Structures of Accumulation (SSA).  The SSA approach to 
analyzing historical configurations of capital accumulation is associated with David 
Gordon and his early work on the institutional and social basis of capital accumulation 
(Gordon 1978; 1980).  Gordon criticized other cyclical theories of capital accumulation 
for their lack of attention to the relationship between the “purely economic dynamics” of 
capital accumulation and the “structure and contradictions of the social relations 
conditioning capital accumulation” (Gordon 1980: 10).  Two years later, SSA received its 
definitive exposition in Gordon, Edwards, and Reich’s Segmented Work, Divided 
Workers (1982), which applied the theory to the capital-labor relations in the US during 
the twentieth century and began to bring into focus the process of innovation, 
consolidation, and decay in the construction of various SSA (Kotz, McDonough, and 
Reich 1994).   
 In its most basic sense, the concept SSA “refers to the complex of institutions 
which support the process of capital accumulation” (Kotz, McDonough, and Reich 1994: 
12).  The basic premise being that capital accumulation requires a whole host of 
institutions – ranging from the political and economic to the cultural and ideological – in 
order to establish the necessary conditions for the “existence and reproduction of 
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capitalist economies.”  The SSA perspective draws attention the embedded nature of 
capital accumulation and emphasizes the social and cultural context in which 
accumulation takes place.  This includes not only domestic institutions such as labor-
management relations, industrial organization, and the role of the state, but also 
international institutions such trade as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.  
Yet the need for institutional stability is contradicted by the inherently dynamic nature of 
capital accumulation; therefore those institutions that are at once necessary for 
accumulation ultimately serve as barriers to continued accumulation at some 
indeterminate point.  As a result, capitalism proceeds through various periods of stability 
and crisis, driven constantly by the dynamic interaction of the dual forces of inter-
capitalist competition and class struggle (Kotz, McDonough, and Reich 1994).   
 The basic framework of SSA perspective entails a periodization of capital 
accumulation that enables a historical and comparative analysis of how particular 
institutional configurations are established, institutionalized, and, ultimately, 
disassembled over time.  By periodization, I refer to the attempt to divide time into 
specified blocks, or stages, in order to abstract particular characteristics that distinguish 
one block of time from another (Haydu 1998).  These periods are punctuated by 
economic crises, which mark the necessity of dissolving or transforming an existing 
mode of accumulation for another.  One may also conceive of a newly established SSA as 
a critical juncture in a path dependent historical process (Mahoney 2000): once stable 
conditions for accumulation are in place, these conditions become the “rules of the game” 
for a time.  What is critical to both the SSA perspective and Marx’s is the notion that this 
 20 
 
new mode of accumulation will necessarily confront its own barrier at some 
indeterminate point in the future.   
 The concept of SSA is sufficiently broad to incorporate a seemingly endless array 
of institutions and ideologies within its purview, but for our present purposes, we want to 
bring the modern corporation into focus in order to examine the relationship between 
changing SSA and corporate organization.  Harland Prechel (2000) employed a variant of 
the SSA framework in his analysis of historical transitions and changing corporate forms.  
Prechel conceptualizes the corporation as a historical phenomenon that was established 
under particular historical circumstances, but has continued to evolve and change within 
the larger dynamic of capitalist development.  In doing so, he analyzes corporate 
behavior within a three-tiered structure consisting of a micro, meso, and macro levels.  
The micro level consists of corporate managers and other social actors operating within 
context of a given corporate entity and their interest and behavior is largely shaped within 
that environment.  The meso level brings into focus the corporation in general, its 
political and economic interests as well as its relationship to other corporations.  And 
finally, the macro level, which consists of the political and economic environment that 
corporations are embedded in.  Prechel then uses this framework to analyze how 
historical transitions in the development of capitalism have led to recurrent 
transformations of corporate structures.   
 This method adopted in this study borrows a number of insights from both the 
SSA perspective and Prechel’s analysis of historical transformations of corporate 
structures.  The first concerns the issue of periodization.  The SSA perspective 
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distinguishes two definite SSAs during the postwar period.  The first was the “regulated 
capitalism of the postwar period. This SSA (also referred to as Fordist, Keynsian, etc) 
was constructed in the aftermath of the Great Depression and was characterized by the 
development of the welfare state, active state intervention in the economy (particularly 
with regard to financial regulation), and a unionized labor force.  The postwar SSA 
experienced a crisis in the early 1970s and was replaced with the neoliberal SSA (also 
referred to as post-Fordist, neoliberal globalization, and financialization) in the early 
1980s.  The neoliberal SSA was characterized by a roll-back of the welfare state, laissze 
faire economics, and an active assault on unions.  For our present purposes, we can say 
that this SSA was in place until the financial crisis of 2008.  This gives us two distinct 
SSAs: one lasting from approximately 1945-1974 and the other from 1975-2008.7  
 These two periods roughly correspond to the periodization that will be employed 
in this study.  However, for theoretical reasons I prefer to adopt the Monopoly-Finance 
perspective of John Bellamy Foster and Fred Magdoff (Foster and Magdoff 2009).  This 
perspective builds off of the theory of Monopoly Capital as developed by Baran and 
Sweezy and views financialization not so much as a distinct period, but as a stage in the 
development of Monopoly Capitalism itself.  There will be more to say about the theory 
of Monopoly-Finance capital in Chapter 2.  For now, it is primarily important that we are 
able to distinguish between these two periods.  In the end, there is no one-size-fits-all 
                                                 
 
7
 According to SSA theory, the financial crisis of 2008 should mark the beginning of the dissolution of the 
neoliberal SSA and the construction of its successor.  However, the fact that much of the institutional and 
ideological apparatus of the neoliberal SSA remains in place calls this this formulation into question.  For 
now we must be contented with that fact that it is probably too soon to know the final outcome of this crisis 
and the prolonged period of stagnation that the US economy continues to experience.   
 22 
 
approach to periodization; it depends most directly upon the questions being pursued and 
theoretical emphasis employed.  And in this dissertation I am interested in explaining 
institutional change in the US forest products as part of a broader historical development.  
In Marx (1967a: 371) word’s, “[w]e are only concerned here with striking and general 
characteristics; for epochs in the history of society are no more separated from each other 
by hard and fast lines of demarcation, than are geological epochs.”   
A second insight I gain from the SSA literature concerns my own interpretation of 
the concept of a managerial conception of control (Fligstein 1990; 2001).  From my 
perspective a conception of control can also be interpreted as one of the various 
ideological structures that come into being in order to enable and legitimate managerial 
behavior for a particular period of time.  In fact, I believe there is substantial area of 
overlap between these two perspectives that would provide fruitful insights for future 
researchers.   
From Prechel (2000), I borrow his general conceptualization of the corporation as 
a historical institution that undergoes various transformations over the course of its 
development.  There are many similarities between my own perspective and the one 
employed by Prechel.  A critical difference, however, lies in how we theorize these 
changes: whereas Prechel examines particular corporate transformations as they occur in 
response to crisis, I theorize capitalism as a historical system that maintains a historical 
trajectory that transcends and includes its various institutional manifestations – thus 
while some things changes, others remain the same.  An additional difference stems from 
my own emphasis on financialization and the rise of the shareholder value ideology as the 
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outcome of a particular crisis of accumulation.  While these outcomes were not 
preordained, they do embody a certain logic in that they were pursued in an effort to 
overcome a particular barrier to capital accumulation.   
 
Critical Realism, Ontology, and Strategic Action Fields 
 
The methodology adopted in this study also shares a number of parallels with a 
number of other schools of thought.  Although a complete review of these literatures is 
not possible here, a brief overview of two of the most relevant approaches will help 
situate this perspective within the broader literature.  The first and perhaps most 
compelling method for contemporary social science can be found in Roy Bhaskar’s 
development of “Critical Realism” (see Bhaskar 1998; Collier 1994).  A basic premise of 
Critical Realism is that we live in a stratified reality that contains both an actually 
existing empirical reality of observable events and an equally real world of mechanisms, 
powers, and tendencies.  In opposition to strict empiricists, or positivists, critical realists 
argue that reality is not limited to observable events, but consists of tendencies that derive 
from relatively enduring patterns of social interaction.  Indeed, according to critical 
realists it is the discovery of these tendencies and their various mechanisms that social 
science is most directly concerned.   
Critical Realism also sheds some light on the confounding relationship between 
structures and human agency.  Bhaskar argues that social structures are both the 
conditions and outcomes of human agency: both society and individuals are “real” 
however they occupy different levels in his ontological perspective.  Structures, for 
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Bhaskar, are “conceived as relations between social agents in virtue of their occupancy of 
social positions (Benton and Craib 2001: 132). These structures arise out of the regular 
interaction of these social agents and at the same time react back upon them, both 
enabling and constraining human action.  In this sense, human agency is responsible for 
both reproducing social structure and at the same time contains the possibility of 
transforming it through both intended and united social action.   
Critical Realism shares a number of similarities with a Marxian perspective: both 
are “realist” in the sense that are committed to the belief that there is a real, objective, 
world that exists and operates independently of our knowledge or beliefs about it; both 
retain a general view of a stratified reality in which there are both observable events and 
unobservable social structures; and both maintain a philosophical commitment to the 
notion that there is a link between science and emancipatory politics (see Ollman 2003; 
Benton and Craib 2001; Paolucci 2009[2007]).  Their primary differences lie in the 
emphasis they lay on the process of abstraction in explaining how they move between 
various layers of social reality and in their adoption of a philosophy of internal relations 
(Ollman 2003, Ch. 10).  For our current purposes, however, they should be viewed as 
complimentary in that they both inform the perspective adopted in this study.   
An additional perspective that speaks to the general framework of this study can 
be found in an emerging framework that is being developed in the theory of fields.  In an 
effort to construct a general theory of strategic action fields, Fligstein and McAdam 
(2011), outline a theory that has some striking similarities to the theoretical framework 
employed in this study.  Fligstein and McAdam (2011: 2) base their general theory on “a 
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view of social life as dominated by a complex web of strategic action fields.”  The 
concept of a strategic action fields is here used to denote any form of collective action 
between individuals and groups taking place within various meso-level social orders.  
Fligstein and McAdam’s (2011: 2) argue that a general theory is necessary if we are to 
integrate disparate theories of collective action within the “overall structure of 
contemporary society and the forms of action endemic to that structure.”  
In outlining their general theory of strategic action, Fligstein and McAdam 
describe a structure in which each strategic action fields is itself embedded within larger 
fields.  They liken this structure to a Russian Doll, within each strategic action field there 
are multiple other action fields.  So, for example, a university department may be 
described as its own strategic action field that exists within the larger field of the 
university.  Likewise, various committees within a department could be conceived as 
fields in themselves.  Fligstein and McAdam distinguish the relationships that exist 
between these fields either in terms of being “distant” or “proximate,” depending on the 
degree to which they are linked, or as “vertical” and “ horizontal” based on the amount of 
authority that one field might have over another.  Theirs is also a dynamic theory in that 
they describe strategic action fields as only relatively enduring, highlighting how each 
field consist of  “emergence, stability, and transformation” (Fligstein and McAdam 2011: 
20).   
There are some obvious similarities between Fligstein and McAdam’s general 
theory of strategic action and Marx’s own ontological underpinnings.  However, the 
critical difference between these two perspectives lies in their use of history.  In outlining 
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their general theory of strategic action Fligstein and McAdams abstract strategic action 
fields beyond the historically specific social relations of capitalism.  In other words, 
theirs is a general theory of social action that applies to all times and places, regardless of 
context.  This may or may not be a rational abstraction, depending on how general of a 
theory they wish to construct and the question to which it is directed.  However, once this 
theory enters the realm of history it becomes necessary that they specify the historically 
specific set of social relations that predominate in any given epoch.   
A Marxian perspective, on the other hand, is premised on the notion that there is 
an internal relationship between structure and history.  Marx’s ontology, as Paolucci 
(2009: 116) explains, is based on the notion that “all objects of social science have 
historical features internal to their essence” and “[t]his means that the history included in 
creating a social phenomenon is as much part of its definition as its structure.” 
Determining how much history is involved in the construction of a particular social 
phenomenon is dependent on the object under investigation and the questions one is 
seeking to address.  In Marx’s case, he was concerned with the dynamics of capitalism as 
a whole.  Therefore, in the language of Fligstein and McAdams, we could say that Marx 
was making a theoretical argument about the strategic action field that is the capitalist 
mode of production.  Within this strategic action field there are countless others fields, 
which are each, in varying degrees, constrained and enabled by the processes of 
capitalism as a whole.   
As Fligstein and McAdams note, their general theory of fields bares a strong 
resemblance and is directly influenced by the work of others.  These include new 
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institutional theory in organizational theory, Anthony Giddens’s theory of 
“structuration,” and Bourdieu’s concept of habitus.  I would add Marx to this list as well.  
Each of these approaches to social science are concerned with explaining how the 
underlying structures of social life establish the conditions for both stability and change 
in modern society.  At the same time I would add that Marx’s dialectical method and his 
philosophy of internal relations continues to be one of the most flexible and nuanced 




In his overview of Marx’s method of abstraction, Sweezy (1942: 12) reminds us 
that “the use of abstractions itself is not a key to accurate knowledge, but merely a means 
towards organizing one’s inquiry.  The real difficultly lies in the “manner of its 
application” and “how to decide what to abstract from and what not to abstract from.”  
Sweezy continues, “[h]ere at least two issues arise: First, what problem is being 
investigated? And, second, what are the essential elements of the problem?”    
In the current study, the primary question to be examined is how are we to 
understand political-economic dynamics that resulted in the large-scale transformation of 
timberland ownership in the US from industrial forest product firms to institutional 
investment organizations?  From this premise, one could begin with an analysis of the 
corporate form and examine how ideological changes associated with the rise of 
shareholder value were instrumental in transforming managers’ belief that owning 
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substantial timberlands was a necessary ingredient for success in the forest product 
industry.   
Once an investigation into corporations begins, however, two things immediately 
become apparent.  First, the corporation itself is a historical institution that cannot be 
understood in isolation, but must be contextualized within the historical development of 
capitalism itself.  Marx did not live to see the rise of the modern corporation; however, 
his theory proved to be a valuable guide for interpreting and analyzing the emergence and 
evolution of the modern corporations over the course of the 20th century (see Hilferding 
1981[1910]; Veblen 1958[1904]; Baran and Sweezy 1966). Second, the rise of 
institutional investors itself requires explanation, because without this willing buyer, 
forest product managers would not have been so willing to divest of their timberland 
holdings.  The rise of institutional investors has been highlighted as one of the central 
pillars of the financialization of the US economy.   In recent decades, as institutional 
investors gained control over large portions of publicly traded stocks, they were able steer 
managerial priorities towards the interests of the shareholding community. This process 
reversed the trend towards increasing separation of ownership from control that 
characterized American capitalism for most of the twentieth century.  
From these two observations it becomes immediately apparent that the essential 
elements to the question of causality in the transfer of timberland ownership cannot be 
limited to changes within corporations, but must be found in the larger macro-economic 
transformation of the US capitalism, namely the shift towards financialization.   
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However, at the same time, a second question of this dissertation is how does 
financialization occur and to what effect in a specific sector such as the forest product 
sector? In addressing this question, I argue that financialization could not have occurred 
without a reorganization of the institutional and ideological underpinnings of corporate 
America.  Here we begin to see how the abstract notion of financialization as a macro-
structural phenomenon can be grounded within the concrete instances of managerial 
decision-making.  Thus we reveal the internal relationship that exists between 
financialization at the structural level and the rise of a shareholder value conception of 
control among corporate managers.   By integrating political-economic perspectives on 
financialization with economic sociology’s focus on managerial orientation, I aim to 
construct a theoretical framework for analyzing change in the US forest products 
industry.   
Furthermore, in situating the rise of the shareholder value conception of control 
within the totality of historical capitalism we are better able to appreciate and understand 
the dynamic processes that both produce and destroy existing managerial orientations.  
The existence of a discernible ideology among corporate managers has been a topic of 
study for sociologists for over a half-century (Bendix 1956).  In recent years, economic 
sociologists have come to the conclusion that managerial orientations are ephemeral in 
nature – they are hegemonic for a definite period time, only to be challenged and replaced 
by an alternative managerial orientation (Fligstein 1990; 2001; Prechel 2000).  The 
cause(s) of this shift in managerial orientations, their timing and meaning, however, 
continue to be debated within the literature.  In this dissertation I use a theory of 
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historical capitalism to highlight a critical historical thread that runs through and binds 
these ever-changing conceptions of managerial control.     
The literature on financialization and shareholder value has thus far tended to 
produce only national generalizations, focusing on various changes in the relationship 
between states, corporations, and managers.  This analysis will provide a much-needed 
industry-based analysis of financialization and shareholder value, examining how the 
financialization of the forest product firm was accomplished, in part, through the spread 
of a shareholder value ideology among top managers.   
This dissertation will proceed as follows: Part I, consisting of Chapter 1 and 2, 
provides an overview and synthesis of the literatures on both financialization and the 
shareholder value conception of control.  Chapter 2 will focus on issues of finance and 
financialization and their development within historical capitalism.  In order to highlight 
the essential elements of financialization this chapter will necessarily proceed from a 
fairly high level of abstraction.  In Chapter 3 I will lower the level of abstraction in order 
to examine how the modern corporation emerged within the context of historical 
capitalism.  In doing so, I am able to highlight how changes within corporate institutions 
have been shaped by, and constitutive of, the development of capitalism as a whole.  The 
goal of Part I is to provide a critical synthesis of these two literatures in order to construct 
a historical sociological framework for analyzing institutional change in modern 
corporations.     
Part II will use this framework to examine the historical development of the US 
forest products industry over the course of the second half of the 20th century.  This 
 31 
 
analysis will include a broad overview of the US forest products industry during three 
distinct periods.  The first period (Chapter 4) will cover the industry during the era of 
“managerial capitalism.” During this period, which lasted roughly from 1945 to 1980, 
manager’s operated under a “retain and reinvest” conception of control that compelled 
them to reinvest their large surpluses into expanded capacity.  I examine how this 
strategy affected various aspects of managerial decision-making, including investments, 
mergers and acquisitions, and timberland ownership.  The second period (Chapter 5), 
lasting from 1980 to 1990, is a transitional period for managers in the forest products 
industry.  This period is marked by the hostile takeover movement of the 1980s and the 
protracted struggle that took place between finance (ie. shareholders) and management.  
The third period (Chapter 6) is the era of shareholder capitalism.  This period lasts from 
the early 1990s until the financial crisis of 2008 and is marked by the ascendancy of 
finance in the US economy along with a transformation of the relationship that exists 
between corporate managers and shareholders.  I examine how the realignment of 
managerial interests towards the interests of shareholder changed managerial strategies 
with regard to the same aspects of the firm listed above, including investment, mergers 
and acquisitions, and, most importantly, timberland ownership. I argue that both the 
decision by managers to sell-off their timberland holdings and the growth of institutional 
investors seeking to expand their investment portfolios are directly related to the process 
of financialization.   
In the end, this dissertation seeks to show how a number of seemingly isolated 
variables – including the rise of institutional investors, shifting managerial ideologies, 
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changes in ownership structure of the firm, etc. – were each in their interrelation 
responsible for the changing structure of timberland ownership in the United States.  
None of these factors, when understood in isolation, explains the fundamental logic at 
work that first established manager’s desire to increase timberland holdings, only to see 
them sell them off wholesale over the course of three decades.  Furthermore, each of 
them were driven by developments that were external to the forest products industry and 
are therefore incapable of theoretical explanation in terms of the logic of the industry’s 
development alone.  For these reasons that I argue that these changes are best understood, 

















FINANCE AND FINANCIALIZATION:  
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE  
 
 
This dissertation seeks to examine how the financialization of the US economy 
and the rise of the shareholder value conception of control led to a number of changes in 
the US forest products industry, most notably a large-scale transfer of timberland 
ownership from vertically integrated forest product corporations to financial investment 
instruments.  The primary aim of this chapter is to provide a historical overview of 
finance and financialization in order to construct a theoretical framework through which 
to examine such changes in the US forest products industry.  Since the financialization 
process did not emerge within a particular industry, I begin my analysis with an overview 
of financialization in general.  This will provide us with a basic understanding of the 
phenomenon, its principle features and historical origins.  It will also allow me to 
highlight some important questions that stem from the financialization literature that will 
be important for my analysis of the US forest products industry.   
I begin with an examination of how financialization is defined in the literature.  
Next, I provide a brief sketch of the general and contradictory relationship between 
financial capital and industrial, or productive, capital sectors.  I then examine how 
financial capital emerged in response to the contradictory forces within historical 
capitalism’s evolution.  I also provide an overview of several of the more prominent 
theoretical interpretations of the financialization phenomenon.  This chapter establishes a 
historical and theoretical context for following chapter, where I lower my level of 
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abstraction in order to examine how dynamics of capital accumulation were manifested 




As a concept, financialization has been employed to describe an array of 
phenomena, ranging from the dynamics of international financial institutions (Soederberg 
2005) to the political economy of everyday life (Martin 2002).  With such a wide array of 
concerns, the concept is beginning to experience “conceptual stretching” as more and 
more researchers employ the concept to describe various, seemingly disparate, 
phenomenon (Sartori 1984).  As Orhangazi (2010: 3) notes, the concept is now evolving 
in a similar manner as “globalization,” which is “a widely used term without a clear, 
agreed-upon definition.” To avoid this trend, it is imperative that we provide a clear and 
concise definition of financialization, while at the same time being explicit about the 
relationship between the concept and the phenomenon it is referring to.   
Unfortunately, some analysts have dealt with the complexity of financialization 
by broadening their definition of the concept.  Epstein (2006: 3), for example, defines 
financialization as “the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial 
actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international 
economies.” This definition, though widely cited in the literature, is pitched so wide that 
it lacks the specificity needed for facilitating a detailed exposition. This difficulty is 
apparent in many treatments that attempt to include financialization’s multiple and varied 
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articulations.  For instance, Dore (2002: 116-17), who is interested in analyzing the 
institutional changes that accompany financialization, defines it as 
[T]he increasing dominance of the financial industry in the sum total of 
economic activity, of financial controllers in the management of 
corporations, of financial assets among total assets, of marketed securities, 
and particularly of equities, among financial assets, of the stock market as 
a market for corporate control in determining corporate strategies, and of 
fluctuations in the stock market as a determinant of business cycles. 
 
In trying to capture the multifaceted nature of financialization, it is easy to fall into the 
trap of attempting to explain everything, and thus explaining nothing.  Definitions of this 
sort tend to be ambiguous and often lead to confusion over the subject matter under 
investigation.   
 In this study I conceptualize financialization at two levels, corresponding to the 
two levels of abstraction that I will employ.8 The first refers to financialization in 
general.  At this broad level of abstraction what is most important is that we retain the 
central features of the concept that are necessary for its exposition.  In keeping with my 
focus on the process of capital accumulation, I define financialization in general as the 
gravitational shift in economic activity from the productive to the financial sphere of the 
economy (Foster and Magdoff 2009).  This definition of financialization is fundamentally 
the same as that employed by Krippner (2005), which she based, in turn, on Arrighi 
(1994).  These authors define financialization as a “pattern of accumulation in which 
                                                 
 
8
 This approach was inspired by Orhangazi’s (2010) study on financialization and non-financial 
corporation.  At the general level, Orhangazi defines financialization as “an increase in the size and 
significance of financial markets, transactions, and institutions.”  At a lower level he uses “financialization 
to designate changes in the relationship between the non-financial corporate sector and financial markets.” 
In this study I maintain his use of a two-tiered definition of financialization, however my method of 
analysis and definitions are different.   
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profit-making occurs increasingly through financial channels rather than through trade 
and commodity production” (Krippner 2005: 181). A more narrow definition will be 
employed in the next chapter, when I examine the institutional and ideological 
transformations that occurred within non-financial corporations. 
 There are several advantages that stem from this “accumulation-centered” 
definition of financialization.  First of all, the definition is parsimonious and contains a 
clear reference point.  As Krippner (2005: 176) notes, an “accumulation-centered” 
approach to financialization focuses our attention “on changing patterns of profitability,” 
which is the “key development in the US economy in recent decades.” Secondly, by 
situating financialization within the process of capital accumulation there is a direct link 
to the historical patterns of capital accumulation that preceded it, thereby providing a 
historically bounded interpretation of the phenomenon.   A third and closely related 
advantage of locating financialization within the process of capital accumulation is that 
the concept retains a clear theoretical orientation.  Marx’s emphasis on the process of 
accumulation as the engine of capitalist society and all its attendant contradictions 
contains a systematic theory of social change that continues to provide a coherent and 
flexible interpretation of the historical evolution of the capitalist system.   
 Pursuing this multi-level approach to a study of financialization also enables me 
to highlight the relationships that exist between the structural features of financialization 
occurring at the macro-economic level and more substantive changes within particular 
social institutions, namely non-financial corporations. This method of exposition not only 
provides a more nuanced approach to analyzing financialization, but also encourages us 
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to examine how financialization is articulated through various social institutions.  Thus 
another benefit of this approach is that it provides the means for establishing common 
ground between political-economic theories of financialization and more narrowly 
focused theories of corporate and institutional change, commonly found in economic 
sociology.9   
Two additional comments concerning my approach to financialization are 
necessary at the outset.  First, my perspective on financialization will be developed 
primarily within the context of the US economy.  I have chosen to do so for two reasons: 
first, this dissertation’s focus is on the relationship between financialization and the US 
forest products industry, which makes the development of financialization within the 
context of the US economy an obvious starting point.  Second, and more importantly, I 
am in agreement with Foster and Magdoff (2009: 21) that “the contradictions of 
capitalism are still best perceived, as Marx emphasized in the nineteenth century, from 
the standpoint of the preeminent capitalist economy at a given stage of its development.” 
It is from this vantage point that the dynamics of capital accumulation and class struggle, 
particularly with regard to the state and regulation, are most clearly articulated.  This is 
not to say that there were important international and world systemic forces at work in 
the development of financialization (indeed, there certainly were), but only that the key 
dynamics relating to the US forest products industry were likely taking place within the 
United States.   
                                                 
 
9
 See Krippner (2005) for additional discussion of the advantages of approaching financialization from 
what she calls an “accumulation centered” view of economic change.    
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Secondly, I argue that financialization is most fruitfully and accurately understood 
when situated within a historical perspective that emphasizes the contradictory 
development of historical capitalism.  I contend that while our current era of 
financialization is a unique development of contemporary capitalism, it is not without 
historical antecedents.  That is to say the dynamics that produced our current bout of 
financialization are rooted in the development of historical capitalism itself.  There will 
be more to say about this in my discussion of the financialization literature below.   
Marx’s general conception of capitalism is that of a system that experiences 
periodic crises because of contradictory relationships that are inherent in its constitution.  
These contradictions are rooted in the social relations of productions that, for various 
reasons, tend to produce economic crises.  However, as Marx (1973: 408) explained in 
his economic notebooks (commonly referred to as The Grundrisse), “Every limit appears 
as a barrier to be overcome.” Overcoming the barriers to capital accumulation requires 
novel solutions to the barriers facing capital at any given moment.  These solutions are 
not preordained, but are subject to historical contingencies, including those that are 
internal to capitalism (ie. class struggle) and those that arise from external conditions (ie. 
nature).  The solution to capitalist crisis is not provided by Marx’s theory of capital 
accumulation, only their necessity.   
The point here is not to attribute agency to some abstract structural process, but to 
locate financialization as part and parcel of capitalism and its contradictory development 
- from its early and relatively competitive past, through the development of the modern 
corporation, and ultimately to the globalized capitalism of the late twentieth century.  In 
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doing so we can begin to appreciate the logic of an economic system through which 
finance first arose in order to address problems of concentration and competition in the 
late 19th century, only to be subsumed under the socio-political restraints that emerged in 
the wake of the New Deal, and then finally develop into its modern form after three 
decades of deregulation and technological innovation.    
 
Finance and Production in General 
 
Before addressing the history of finance capital it worth taking some time to 
discuss the general relationship that exists between the financial and the productive 
sectors of a capitalist economy.  The often remarked upon distinction between the “real” 
and the “financial” economy comes to us from classical political economy, where the 
“monetary” or “financial” economy was typically dismissed as a veil that obscures the 
more fundamental  process taking place in the production and sale of commodities.  Not 
merely an ideological omission, this dismissal was premised on the fact that prior to the 
1850’s, the production and sale of commodities took place primarily between relatively 
small firms, or partnerships producing for a relatively competitive market.  Under these 
circumstances finance was relatively insignificant and could justifiably be excluded in 
most economic analyses (Magdoff and Sweezy 1987).  But in the closing decades of the 
19th century a series of changes took place in both the structure and operation of 
American capitalism that would require political-economists to pay increased attention to 
the role of finance capital.         
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 The division of the economy into a real and financial sector often leads to 
confusion.  As Magdoff and Sweezy (1987: 94) point out,   
The trouble with this approach is that there is in fact no separation 
between the real and the monetary: in a developed capitalist economy 
practically all transactions are expressed in monetary terms and require the 
mediation of actual amounts of (cash or credit) money. 
 
A more appropriate distinction, they conclude, “is not between real and monetary (all are 
both real and monetary) but between productive and financial” (Magdoff and Sweezy: 
94).10 This distinction is justified on analytical grounds in that it provides valuable 
insights into the contradictory relationship that exists between these “two poles of 
capitalism” (Gowan 1999).  
 The first pole consists of productive capitalist engaged in the production and sale 
of commodities.  Productive capitalists enter the market with a given sum of money 
(some, or all of which is often borrowed from the financial capitalist) in order to purchase 
equipment, raw materials, and labor power. These means of production are then 
employed in the production of commodities, which are then sold in the market in order to 
earn a profit.  This profit appears in the form of money and contains the surplus value 
extracted from the laborer in the act of production, minus whatever royalties that may be 
due to the financier.  This is the process highlighted in Marx’s general formula for 
capital, M-C-M’, where money is converted into commodities that are then sold for the 
original sum plus a profit.   
                                                 
 
10
 In keeping with the confusion of the discourse, in what follows I will use the terms “real” and 
“productive” interchangeably.   
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 Financial capitalists, or the second pole of capitalism, have a different perspective 
on the production process.  Financial capitalists start with a sum of money (or more 
appropriately a line of credit) that they then lend to the capitalist for certain period of 
time, with the expectation that this sum will be repaid in the future with interest.  The 
financial capitalist is less concerned with what commodity is produced and more 
concerned with the rate of return on their original investment.  In theory, capital invested 
in financial activities will ultimately, in one way or another, find its way into productive 
activity.  In reality, this is not necessarily the case.11 The shorthand for finance capital, 
therefore, is an abbreviated form of Marx’s equation, M-M’, where money begets more 
money and the production and sale of real, tangible commodities are thus a secondary 
consideration.   
Both of these general formulas of capital accumulation were employed by Marx 
in keeping with his understanding of capital as a process, not a thing; and by depicting 
the process of capital accumulation in this manner – as a processes driven by a 
contradictory polar relationship between two of its key structural functions – a number of 
critical insights for our understanding of modern capitalism arise (Harvey 2010).   
The first concerns their contradictory perspectives on the temporality of capital 
accumulation.  At its core, capitalism is concerned with the ceaseless accumulation of 
capital.  Commodities are not produced as an end in themselves, but are viewed as a 
necessary intermediary step in the pursuit of capital expansion.  For financial capitalists, 
the time between the employment of capital and the realization of the surplus value from 
                                                 
 
11
 A recent study by Lawrence Mitchell (2008) shows how the public stock market has rarely been a 
significant factor in financing industrial enterprise.   
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the sale of commodities represents a period of uncertainty and risk.  Therefore, financial 
capitalists have an inherent desire to see quick returns in order to keep capital in its most 
liquid and flexible form.  That is to say the perspective of financial capitalists is 
decidedly short-term.  Productive capitalists, on the other hand, are resigned to longer-
term view of capital accumulation because of their necessary concern with the production 
and sale of commodities.  This contradiction is further heightened by industry’s 
increasing reliance on substantial fixed costs, which only realize their original value over 
many years (Gowan 1999). 
A second insight concerns the contradictory social relation that exists between the 
productive and financial sector.  In his economic studies, Marx was primarily concerned 
with the social relations of production; therefore the primary relation under investigation 
was between capital and labor, the primary relation in the sphere of production.12  With 
the emergence of modern (monopoly) capitalism, however, the sphere of production 
became more complex and must now account for the role of modern finance capital 
(Dumenil and Levy 2011).13  Finance capital can also be understood as a social relation 
of production because of the critical role it plays in the hierarchical division of labor in 
modern capitalism.  The key social relation of finance capital, however, is that which 
exists between financial and productive capitalist; and the nature of this relationship is 
                                                 
 
12
 Following many of his classical predecessors, Marx believed that the ascendant industrial class would 
eventually subordinate finance capital to its needs (see Hudson 2010). 
13
 Dumenil and Levy (2011) present a model of modern capitalism based on a tripolar class configuration 
consisting of a capitalist class (ie, finance capital), managerial class, and the popular classes.   
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embodied in the contradictory relationship that exists between these two poles of capital 
accumulation.14   
Marx’s labor theory of value held that all new value is created by living labor at 
the point of production.  Financial processes, therefore, do not create any new value, but 
provide various functions for capitalists and receive royalties from these services.  
Financial capitalists, in other words, derive their income from the portion of surplus 
capital that was extracted at the point of production, but realized in exchange.  Because 
financial capitalists derive their income from the surplus value that is created in the 
production of commodities, they are necessarily reliant on productive capitalists.  On the 
basis of this relation, Gowan (1999: 13) argues that the productive sector is determinant 
but the financial sector is dominant.  
The productive sector is determinant because it produces the stream of 
value out of which the money-capitalists in the financial sector ultimately 
gain their royalties, directly or indirectly.  On the other hand the financial 
sector is dominant because it decides where it will channel the savings 
from the past and the new fictitious credit-money – who will get the 
streams of finance and who will not.15 
 
The dominance of the financial sector stems from its control over the money supply, 
which represents general social power under capitalism (Harvey 2006, 2010).  However, 
this general dominance is mediated by two important factors.   
                                                 
 
14
 To be clear, I am not saying that the relationship between finance and productive capital is now the 
primary, or even the most important, social relation of capitalism.  The fundamental social relation of 
capitalism continues to be the one that exists between capital and labor.  Here I am simply stating that after 
the development of modern, corporate, capitalism we can now justify the analytical distinction of a social 
relation between financial and productive capital.   
15
 This approach is presumably taken from Grahame Thompson whose definition of finance capital is “an 
articulated combination of commercial capital, industrial capital and banking capital within which banking 
capital is dominant but not determinant (Thompson 1977: 247).   
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The first is the business cycle.  During a boom, when productive capitalists are 
reaping high profits and are flush with capital, they are able to establish a degree of 
relative independence from finance capital because often they are able to finance their 
own investments from internal funds.  And when productive capitalists do rely on credit 
from finance, they are in a stronger position to dictate the terms of this line of credit 
because of the relative decline in credit demand.  But in a recession, or during a period of 
declining profit rates, the power shifts to finance capital because they control the credit 
that productive capitalists require in order to whether the economic downturn (Gowan 
1999; Harvey 2006).      
 The second mediating factor in the relationship between productive and financial 
capitalists is the state.  The state provides the institutional setting in which financial and 
productive capitalists operate - a setting that is highly contested and at the root of many 
political battles. Therefore, the state is not only responsible for mediating antagonisms 
between classes, but also within them. In this case, the conflict is between fractions of the 
capitalist class. It is the province of the state to determine what restrictions there may be 
on banking activities, how corporations are able to conduct business, and the conditions 
under which a market for corporate securities may exist – all of which are influenced by 
the existing state of class struggle.  In fact, in modern capitalism the interdependence of 
financial capitalists with the state is so salient that it is difficult to determine where the 
interests of one stops and the other begins, especially with regard to the policies of the 
central bank.  Therefore, it is most appropriate that we view the relation between finance 
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capital and the state as one that is “founded upon a contradiction within a unity” (see 
Harvey 2006: 321-324).    
 In sum, the general perspective that I have just outlined provides a starting point 
from which we can begin to understand the dynamics of finance and capital accumulation 
in modern society – however, this is merely a starting point.  To understand the real 
historical development of finance we must descend from the heights of broad abstractions 
and place finance capital within the historical evolution of capitalism itself.  This is the 
task to which I now turn.   
 
Finance and the Rise of the Giant Corporation 
 
As several commentators have noted, the prominence of finance in contemporary 
capitalism is not without historical precedent.16  In the late 19th and early 20th century a 
series of changes took place in the American economy that would forever change how 
finance functioned in a capitalist economy.  During this era, finance first evolved from its 
marginal role as a means of circulation within the economy to its modern incarnation 
hovering above, and often dominating, the “real” economy (Mitchell 2007).  This 
phenomenon turned out to be short-lived, but at the time it was widely interpreted as a 
permanent transformation of maturing capitalist economies (Veblen 1958[1904]).  The 
resurgence of finance in the late 20th century provoked a debate about the similarities and 
                                                 
 
16
 Indeed, the development of finance preceded capitalism.  However, Marx and many others believed that 
the ascendant industrial class would eventually subordinate financial interests to their needs (see footnote 
5).   This has led to a vigorous debate concerning the relationship between finance and capitalism.  For 
example, Braudel and Arrighi privilege finance capital over productive capital and therefore trace the 
origins of modern capitalism to the city-states of fifteenth century Italy (See Arrighi 1994).  
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differences of these two periods, and whether our contemporary moment represents a 
qualitatively different epoch, or merely a repeat of previous patterns.17 
 The perspective adopted in this study emphasizes the evolutionary character of 
capitalism as socio-historical system that develops through relations of both contradiction 
and contingency.  Therefore, setting aside the debate about the similarities and 
differences between these two “periods” of capitalism, I find it is, at present, most useful 
to examine the historically specific dynamics that produced these “periods of finance.”  
In doing so, we begin to develop an appreciation of the various “functions” of finance 
capital, how it emerged in particular periods in order to address the specific 
contradictions of capital accumulation, and how it relates to other periods of financial 
dominance as well as to the contradictory development of historical capitalism as a 
whole.   
Let us begin in the late 19th century with the rise of the Giant Corporation.18  
During this era a number of contradictions were developing within American capitalism; 
the very contradictions that Marx highlighted in his economic studies.  According to 
Marx (1967), the logic of capitalist competition produced a tendency for capital to 
accumulate in increasingly larger units.  In this discussion Marx draws a distinction 
between the concentration of capital and the centralization of capital.  The former refers 
to the increasing scale of individual capitals that necessarily results from the 
                                                 
 
17
 See Arrighi (1994); Kotz (2011) 
18
 To be clear, I am not arguing that finance was invented in the 19th century (it certainly was not), but only 
that its modern incarnation is directly linked to the rise of the giant corporation during the second half the 
19th century.  That is to say the emergence of modern corporate capitalism had a profound effect on the 
form that finance capital would take during the 20th century.   
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accumulation process; the latter, on the other hand, refers to the process of combining 
these existing capitals into a “single hand” by withdrawing it from the “many individual 
hands” and thereby bringing it under the control of a single unit.  Both the concentration 
and the centralization of capital would become defining features of the American 
economy in the closing decades of the 19th century.   
The destructive nature of market forces in late 19th century America first 
compelled capital to centralize under the auspices of finance (Mithchell 2007; Kerbo 
1963).  In the decades following the Civil War the American economy underwent a 
dramatic transformation from a largely agrarian economy to one of the world’s foremost 
industrial powers.   Under these circumstances competition became increasingly 
problematic, due in large part to the nature of industrialized economies and their need for 
increasingly large sums of capital to finance enormous industrial projects with significant 
sunk costs.  
 The railroads, more than any other industry, led the way in exposing this dynamic 
(see Perelman 2006; Chandler 1977).  Railroads require enormous investments up front 
in order to finance the laying of tracks.  Once the tracks have been laid they are “sunk” 
capital and thus cannot be liquidated or converted into alternative uses.  In order to 
maximize returns on this investment, there is pressure to operate at a high capacity, even 
if this means cutting prices.  In a competitive environment, this results in a vicious cycle 
in which competing firms continue to cut prices in order to maximize returns, even if 
these returns are below what is required to make a return on the original investment.  This 
was not only a problem for the railroads, but for other industries operating with enormous 
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sunk costs and a competitive market, including, as we will see, the forest products 
industry. 
In order to bring stability and order to the anarchy of market competition, 
industrialists sought protection through various forms of cooperation. Cooperation 
required a break from the free market orthodoxy that dominated economic and political 
elites (at least in practice, if not in ideology) and a move towards more collective and 
cooperative forms of business.  Leading the ideological support for this transformation 
were some of the most prominent economists of the day, including John Bates Clark and 
Richard Ely (Perelman 2006; Mitchell 2007).  According to them, laissez-faire was 
successful in a pre-industrial market environment, but was now wildly impractical.  The 
evolution of American society from its agrarian past to an industrial powerhouse required 
new economic principles that would stabilize the chaos of market forces.  The US 
economy was no longer characterized by Adam Smith’s small producer pursuing his self-
interest in a competitive market, but was dominated by large industrial firms, with 
enormous investments, controlling significant segments of the market.  Under these 
circumstances, cooperation, not competition, would be necessary for continued capital 
accumulation.   
 In addition to economists, financiers were growing increasingly impatient with 
the destructive competition of US markets.  As Mitchell (2007: 3) notes:  
Destructive competition had been a problem for years.  But it was only 
during the last few years of the nineteenth century that business distress 
combined with surplus capital searching for investment opportunities, 
changes in state corporation laws, and the creative greed of private 
bankers, trust promoters and the newly evolving investment banks created 
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the perfect storm that shifted the production goals of American industry 
from goods and services to manufacturing and selling stock.19  
 
Foremost among the financiers was J.P. Morgan, the father of modern finance and the 
person who, more than any other, was responsible for the financial takeover of industrial 
America.  Unlike the stalwart defenders of laissez faire economics today, J.P. Morgan 
was able to grasp the nature of destructive competition and considered himself a “sworn 
foe of free markets.” (Chernow, quoted in Perelman 2006: 116).  Morgan took it upon 
himself to rationalize the chaos of the market.  On several occasions, he sat down with 
leading representative from the railroad industry and promised that no new railroads 
would be financed if they would agree to stop cutting rates.  Yet the tension between 
cooperation and competition proved extremely difficult to overcome: the directors of the 
railroads understood that that competition was destructive to the group as a whole, but 
could not overcome the compulsion to cut rates and squeeze every dime out of their lines.   
As a result, one-third of all railroads were in receivership by 1893 (Perelman 2006: 116-
119).   
  Morgan was eventually successful in his efforts to consolidate the railroad 
industry.  In doing so, he set the stage for a wave of mergers that washed over the 
American economy in the closing decade of the 19th century.  According to Kerbo 
(1963), the merger wave was largely unsuccessful in its attempt to control excessive 
competition; however, it did succeed in enriching a handful of financiers and promoters 
who made fortunes by issuing watered and overcapitalized securities from the merged 
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 This process is similar to the developments taking place in Germany during the same time period, which 
formed the backdrop of Hilferding’s classic Marxist study, Finance Capital (Hilferding 1981) 
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companies.   But the critical development to emerge from this period was the Giant 
Corporation itself, an institutional form that would become the hallmark of American 
Capitalism in the 20th century.   
 It must be stressed that the modern corporation is itself a financial creature.  In its 
earliest incarnations, the corporation was a legal device that enabled various partners to 
pool their resources into an enterprise without each of them taking the risk of losing their 
entire fortune.  Yet as opposed to a partnership in which two or more individuals actually 
own the business and its assets, under the corporate form it is the corporation that owns 
the assets, while investors own shares that entail them certain legal rights, including the 
right to vote for directors, income from distributed dividends, etc.  For as Magdoff and 
Sweezy (1987: 101) point out, “The difference between owning real assets and owning a 
bundle of legal rights may at first sight seem unimportant, but…[i]t is in fact the root of 
the division of the economy into productive and financial sectors.” The fact that the 
corporation owns the assets, while shareholders own pieces of paper that grant them 
access to future revenue streams, means that shareholders can sell their shares on an open 
market.  In doing so, the ownership of corporate securities opens up a level of liquidity to 
capital formation that was previously impossible.  And once this stage was reached, and 
especially after corporations gained the right to buy stocks in other corporations, the 
flood gates were open for a virtually unlimited proliferation of holding companies, bond 
markets, and financial instruments.  
And thus through a steady evolution, consisting of much trial and error, American 
capitalism underwent a qualitative transformation that set the stage for monopoly, or 
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corporate capitalism, to develop and expand across the globe during the 20th century.20  
As Magdoff and Sweezy (1987: 95) put it,  
By the end of the nineteenth century, with the spread of larger and larger 
corporations as the typical form of business enterprise, the composition of 
the capitalist economy underwent a qualitative transformation.  The 
issuance of many types and quantities of corporate securities brought in its 
train the development of organized stock and bond markets, brokerage 
houses, new forms of banking, and a community of what Veblen called 
captains of finance who soon rose to the top of the capitalist hierarchy of 
wealth and power. 
 
The foregoing discussion serves to provide a brief overview of the dynamics 
taking place in late 19th and early 20th century America that resulted in the development 
of modern finance and, most importantly, the Giant Corporation.  I argue, along with 
Sweezy and his coauthors, that that these historical developments were the necessary 
precursors to the process of financialization that overtook the US economy in the closing 
decades of the same century.  But the question then becomes: if the necessary elements of 
a financialized economy were in place by the second decade of the 20th century, then why 
did it take more than a half century for financialization to become generalized?  That is to 
say, why did a latent financial sector remain subordinate to the industrial sector for over 
half a century, only to become manifest in the 1970s?  The answer, as always, must be 
found in the historical development of American capitalism and the contingencies of time 
and space.   
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 The developments I have just described were the same events that led Thorstein Veblen to conclude that 
“Industry is carried on for the sake of business, and not conversely” (Veblen 1958).  They were also the 
central dynamics under investigation in Hilferding’s Finance Capital (1981) and Lenin’s Imperialism 
(1966); where the latter concluded that finance capital was synonymous with monopoly and imperialism, 
the highest stage of capitalism.   This is not the place to describe these various theories in detail, but it will 
suffice to say that each of these observers, as well as many others, were convinced that a qualitative shift 
had taken place in the historical development of capitalism, a  shift that marked the transition from a 




War and the Resurgence of Production 
 
 As it turns out, the prominence of finance over industry in the early 20th century 
was short-lived.  A series of circumstances, most importantly the onset of the First World 
War, tilted the power relation between productive and financial capitalist back in favor of 
the former.  The War brought about a series of market regulations that coordinated the 
American economy towards the war effort.  The war also marked the turning point for the 
United States from a debtor nation to a creditor nation, and by war’s end, the American 
economy was poised for a decade of substantial growth.  Importantly, corporations, flush 
with cash, were able to finance their own investments instead of relying on credit from 
the financial community.  As a result, the relative power of finance capital continued to 
diminish throughout the 1920s (Perelman 2006).   
 The “roaring twenties” came to a screeching halt with the stock market crash of 
the 1929.21  The Great Depression that ensued produced extreme depravation for millions 
of workers and a reassessment of economic doctrine on the part of many in the propertied 
class.  It was in this environment that the ideas of John Maynard Keynes found fertile 
ground.  Keynes was extremely critical of financial excesses, calling for the “euthanasia 
of the rentier” (Keynes 2006[1936]: 345) in order to overcome their propensity to hoard 
in times of economic uncertainty. 
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 The fact that it was the stock market crash that triggered the Great Depression led many to place blame 
primarily on the banks.  However, it was the decline in traditional financial services associated with 
diminishing demand for outside financing that produced the speculative binge of the late 1920s. As 
Perelman notes, it was industrial capital rather than financial capital that was dominant during the 1920s 
(Perelman 2006: 149-152). 
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Keynes’ ideas found teeth in the regulatory changes of the New Deal.  According 
to Orhangazi (2008: 29), “[t]he new regulations had two major aims: to ensure the 
stability of the financial sector and to support the growth and capital accumulation 
agenda of the era.” Perhaps the most important regulation was contained in the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933 which called for a separation of commercial and investment banks. 
The primary aim of this legislation was to prevent deposit-taking institutions, which were 
newly guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporations (FDIC), from issuing 
securities.  There were also limits placed on the interest rates that banks were able to 
charge.  In sum, the US government enacted a policy of “financial repression,” severely 
limiting the banking sector’s ability to control industry and reorienting the economy 
towards a productivist agenda. 
But once again, the onset of war produced lasting change for the US economy.  
The Second World War brought the US economy out of depression and set the stage for 
what came to be called “the Golden Age of capitalism.” With all other major industrial 
powers still smoldering from the devastation of war, the US economy, led by the Giant 
Corporation, stood alone atop the capitalist world system.  Domestically, a series of 
federal programs in housing and highway construction, along with a glut of saved 
earnings from the war era, helped spur an unprecedented period of economic prosperity.  
In addition, a relatively powerful working class led by strong unions forced American 
corporations to include labor in profit sharing, thus providing increased purchasing power 
for a rising middle class.   
During this period Paul Sweezy (1953: 195) proclaimed that,  
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[t]he dominance of financial over industrial capital, which for a while was 
widely interpreted as a more or less permanent state of affairs, is thus seen 
to have been a temporary stage of capitalist production, a stage which was 
characterized above all else by the process of forming trusts, 
combinations, and huge corporations. 
 
Thus the banks and finance capital were resigned to a secondary position in American 
capitalism.  But as Sweezy’s comment suggests, nothing is permanent under capitalism.  
The enormous profits generated by US corporations in the decades following the war 
would confront their own contradictions.  By the late 1960s, creeping stagnation along 
with increased competition from abroad produced yet another crisis for American 
capitalism.  And out of this crisis came the unprecedented resurgence of finance capital in 
its current form, a phenomenon that is now commonly referred to as the 




 The prominence of finance in contemporary capitalism is now widely 
acknowledged.  The proximate cause of financial ascendancy, however, continues to be a 
point of debate.  The literature on the subject has grown quite large, with some attributing 
the revolution in finance to changes in technology (Davis 2009), others emphasizing the 
role of deregulation (Stiglitz 2010), and still others attributing it to the effects of 
globalization.22 In reality, each of these played their own part in shaping financialization 
to a degree.  None of these, when understood in isolation, provide an explanation of the 
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 See Krippner (2005) for a critique of the idea that financialization is simply an effect of 
globalization.   
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fundamental logic at work that created the need, or incentive, for finance capital to break 
free of its post-war chains; nor are they able to integrate their perspective into a more 
systematic theory of change in modern society.  A more appropriate approach, I argue, is 
to situate financialization within the historical development of capitalism itself, 
conceived as a contradictory system that develops through the dynamics of capital 
accumulation and class struggle.  In a word, a Marxian perspective.   
Like most Marxian analyses of financialization, I trace the origins of 
financialization to the economic crisis of the early 1970s, and the dismantling of the post-
war regime of accumulation.  The proximate cause of this crisis and its relationship to 
financialization continue to be points of vigorous debate.23  In the following section, I 
focus primarily on what I believe are two of the more compelling explanations of 
financialization: The Monthly Review School’s theory of monopoly-finance capital 
(Foster and Magdoff 2009) and Giovanni Arrighi’s (1994) systemic cycles of 
accumulation. My preference for these theories is based, in part, on the fact that they 
some of the earliest theorists of financialization and that they built their analysis on a 
historical framework that revealed finance as a particular solution to a capitalist 
accumulation crisis.24     
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 See Choonara (2009) for one of the more comprehensive reviews of Marxian interpretations of the 
financial crisis.   
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 Kevin Phillips (1993; 1994) deserves credit for his early recognition and historical analysis of 
financiailzation.  Phillips is a former Republican strategist turned fierce critic that published a series of 
books analyzing financialization and the corruption of American power (Phillips 2006; 2008).  Phillips’ 
empirical analysis of financialization has striking similarities to both Arrighi and Sweezy, yet his lack of 





Paul Sweezy and his co-authors deserve particular credit for drawing early 
attention to the rapid growth of finance in the American economy in the second half of 
the 20th century (Baran and Sweezy 1966; Sweezy 1981; Magdoff and Sweezy 1987; 
Sweezy and Magdoff 1988).  In their view, the financial explosion of recent decades is an 
outgrowth of the stagnation tendencies that are inherent in mature capitalist economies.  
Sweezy’s most elaborate exposition of this argument is developed with Paul Baran in 
Monopoly Capital (1966) where they argue that the development of the Giant 
Corporation produced a qualitative shift in the functioning of capitalist economies.  In 
short, they argued that the competitive drive of free markets, which was a basic 
assumption among political economists (including Marx), was no longer an apt 
characterization of modern (read: monopoly) capitalism.  Instead, they argued that under 
monopoly capitalism the form of competition was fundamentally altered, producing a 
general law of monopoly capitalism “that the surplus tends to rise both absolutely and 
relatively as the system develops” (Baran and Sweezy 1966: 72).    
The idea that there is a tendency for surplus to rise under monopoly capitalism 
must be understood in relation to the diminishing investment opportunities in mature 
capitalist economies.  Surpluses can be used in a number of ways, but as capitalists, the 
majority of these surpluses need to be invested in order to achieve ever greater 
accumulation.  Yet under monopoly conditions the very conditions that give rise to these 
enormous surpluses also serve as a barrier to their continued expansion.  In oligopolistic 
industries, firms tend to produce just enough commodities to sell at the current market 
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rate.  This often leads to overcapacity, since firms are not willing to run at full tilt, which 
would flood the market and cause prices to drop.  Instead, firms tend to pull back on 
production in order to maintain price stability.  As a result, Baran and Sweezy argue, 
there is a built in tendency in mature capitalist economies towards stagnation.   
The tendency towards stagnation that Baran and Sweezy identified was just that, a 
tendency.  As with any tendency there are countervailing forces that work against it.  At 
the time Monopoly Capital was published, Baran and Sweezy identified several factors 
countering the tendency towards stagnation in the US economy.  These included 
sustained state expenditures in the civilian and military sectors, the sales effort, and the 
second great wave of auto mobilization and the suburbanization of American cities.  
Another, prospect, which they only hinted at in Monopoly Capital, was the likelihood of 
surpluses being channeled into the FIRE (Finance, Investment, and Real Estate) sectors 
of the economy.   
In the early 1960s the surplus being invested into the financial sectors was 
relatively small.  Yet in the years following the publication of Monopoly Capital, 
Sweezy, now writing with Harry Magdoff, began to note the rising share of profits taking 
place in the financial sector.  During the late 1970s and early 1980s, as the financial 
explosion began to take off, Magdoff and Sweezy published a series of articles on how 
the growth of debt and finance were counteracting the stagnation tendencies of the 
American economy (Magdoff and Sweezy 1987; Sweezy and Magdoff 1988).  They 
argued that the main solution to the dearth of investment opportunities “was to expand 
their demand for financial products as a means of maintaining and expanding their money 
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capital (Foster and Magdoff 2009: 79).  The result was a proliferation of financial 
instruments such as futures, options, derivatives and hedge funds.  Magdoff and Sweezy 
(1977) commonly referred to this process as the “financialization of the capital 
accumulation process.”  
Foster and Magdoff’s recent publication, The Great Financial Crisis (2009) 
applies the theoretical work outlined above to the ongoing process of financialization.25  
They refer to financialization in terms of “monopoly-finance capital,” in order to 
emphasize the “systematic embrace” that exists between the tendency towards stagnation 
and the financial explosion of recent decades (Foster and Magdoff 2009: 19).  In this 
case, they argue that financialization was functional for US capitalism because it 
provided a solution to the problems of stagnation under monopoly capitalism.  Foster and 
Magdoff developed their theoretical framework through a series of essays that 
documented and analyzed the financialization process as it took place.  This included 
their early recognition of the housing bubble and their warnings about an impending 
financial collapse.   
The financialization process was fueled by an explosion of debt in the US 
financial sector.  During the postwar era, banks were primarily involved in loaning funds 
that had been deposited by the public and banks collected interest from others who were 
taking on debt.  During the financialization period, however, banks and financial 
institutions themselves became substantial borrowers.  Between 1981 and 1988 debt in 
the financial sector grew from 22 to 42 percent of GDP and by 2005 the financial sector’s 
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 This work refers to Fred Magdoff, the son of Harry Magdoff who collaborated with Paul Sweezy in their 
early analysis of financializaton.   
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debt to GDP ratio had skyrocketed to over 100 percent (Foster and Magdoff 2009: 45-
47).   
This massive infusion of debt helped fuel a series of financial bubbles in the US 
economy.  The first major bubble inside the US economy occurred in the information 
technology sector (commonly known as the dot-com bubble), which popped in early 
2000 after the Federal Reserve increased interest rates.  The bursting of the dot-com 
bubble flooded the global market with surplus dollars seeking investment.  Much of this 
capital found a home in various financial investments tied to the US real estate market.  
This process – what financial analyst Stephanie Pomboy described as “The Great Bubble 
Transfer” (Cited in Foster and Magdoff 2009: 94) – enabled the US economy to quickly 
rebound from the recession of 2001.  However, this massive infusion of capital set the 
stage for the largest real estate bubble in US history, which popped in 2006 and 
ultimately led to the Great Financial Crisis of 2008-09.  The blowing of financial bubbles 
is a pronounced feature of a financialized economy and when they pop – as most 
financial bubbles do – they can have devastating effects on the broader economy (Foster 
and Magdoff 2009).   
 
Financialization, Hegemonic Transitions, and Systemic Cycles of Accumulation 
 
The analysis of financialization outlined above is focused primarily on the 
development of capitalism in the United States over the course of the 20th century.  
Another early treatment, and perhaps the most ambitious, was developed by Giovanni 
Arrighi in his books The Long Twentieth Century (1994) and Chaos and Governance in 
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the Modern World System (1999).  Arrighi (1994: 4) argues that the recent transformation 
in capital accumulation should be investigated “in the light and patterns of recurrence and 
evolution, which span the entire lifetime of historical capitalism as a world system.” 
More specifically, he argues that financialization is not unique to our current historical 
moment, but that it has been a reoccurring phenomenon through four hegemonic 
transitions in the capitalist world system.   
Arrighi constructs his analysis of financialization upon Braudel’s three-tiered 
conceptualization of capitalism which contains a bottom layer consisting of material life, 
a middle layer of the market economy, and a top layer consisting of finance, which he 
insists is the “real home of capitalism” (Arrighi 1994: 10).  The point of this model is to 
draw attention to the “flexibility” of capitalism and its ability to take different concrete 
forms in various spatial and temporal contexts.  He further elaborates on this notion by 
restating Marx’s general formula of capital: MCM' 
Money capital (M) means liquidity, flexibility, freedom of choice.  
Commodity capital (C) means capital invested in a particular input-output 
combination in view of a profit….Thus understood, Marx’s formula tell us 
that capitalist agencies do not invest money in particular input-output 
combinations…as an end in itself.  Rather, they do so as a means towards 
the end of securing an even greater flexibility and freedom of choice at 
some future point (Arrighi 1994: 5). 
 
Arrighi uses this framework to analyze four successive hegemonic transitions in the 
evolution of the capitalist world system.  These epochs alternate between periods of 
material expansion (MC phases of capital accumulation) and periods of financial 
expansion (CM’ phases) and together they constitute what he calls a “systemic cycle of 
accumulation” (Arrighi 1994: 6).  Each systemic cycle of accumulation is conducted 
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under the leadership of a particular hegemonic state and it is the period of financialization 
that demarcates an impeding hegemonic transition.  From this perspective, the current 
period of financialization marks the decline of hegemonic power for the United States 
and the end of its systemic cycle of accumulation.   
 Arrighi’s analysis of financialization over the longue duŕee provides a major 
theoretical contribution to our understanding of the evolution of the capitalist world 
system.  Yet while The Long Twentieth Century provides evidence of how financial 
expansions tend to occur in the later stages of hegemonic development, it does not 
provide sufficient analysis of the specific crises that produce these financial expansions.  
In Arrighi’s subsequent book, Chaos and Governance (1999), he addresses the causes of 
financial expansions in more detail, arguing that they are the outcome of “two 
complementary tendencies: an overaccumulation of capital and intense interstate 
competition for mobile capital” (Arrighi and Silver 1999: 31).  Here finance capital 
serves as the pivot point in a hegemonic transition in the capitalist world system as 
capital unhinges its ties to one territory and searches for another.   
 There are important differences between the monopoly-finance capital view of 
Sweezy and Foster and Arrighi’s longue durée perspective.  Monopoly-finance interprets 
the current era of financialization as a byproduct of contradictions in the accumulation of 
capital in mature capitalist economies.  Their analysis does not include the possibility that 
previous hegemonic declines in the capitalist world system would have experienced a 
similar period of financialization, because their analysis of monopoly capitalism is 
focused on its development within 20th century American capitalism.  Arrighi, on the 
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other hand, sees financialization as a reoccurring phenomenon that serves the same 
function for Dutch capital in the 18th century as it does in 20th century America.  Another 
difference between the two perspectives is their take on the functional aspects of 
financialization.  The monopoly-finance perspective interprets financialization as a means 
to maintain accumulation in a period of declining investment opportunities.  Arrighi, on 
the other hand, argues that financialization is characteristic of capital reverting to its more 
flexible form in order to escape the bounded territoriality of commodity production 
within a particular hegemonic state. 
With sufficient flexibility, however, it is possible to interpret these seemingly 
antagonistic interpretations of financialization as different features of the same dynamic 
and thus not as different as they may seem.  For instance, Arrighi’s emphasis on the 
competition for mobile capital provides a key link that is missing from the 
Sweezy/Magdoff/Foster analysis of financialization, especially with regard to how 
financial crisis resolve themselves.  In this case, a crisis of financialization is resolved 
when capital takes root in a new territory that provides institutional support and access to 
resources that are necessary for capital accumulation to resume.26 
On the other hand, economic crises can result from multiple factors and by 
emphasizing the particular form of each crisis we avoid the tendency to obscure 
important difference with reference to the broader concept of overaccumulation.  This 
applies to the accumulation crisis of the 1970s and the particular way in which finance 
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 In Arrighi’s Long Twentieth Century (1994) he concluded with a discussion of Japan and the likelihood 
that it would become the next hegemonic state in the capitalist world system.  In time, China’s rapid 
development made it the most likely successor to US hegemony.  Arrighi’s final book, Adam Smith in 
Beijing (2007) discusses this possibility.   
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was able to provide a solution to the barriers that were then inhibiting capitalist growth.  
It also allows us to examine how particular institutions were restructured in order to 
accomplish this task.  This is critical for this dissertation because of my particular 
concern with transformations taking place in the US forest products industry.  In the end, 
both theories trace the rise of financialization back to the accumulation crisis of the early 
1970s and are concerned with the role of financialization in sustaining American 
hegemony in a period of economic instability. 
 While I believe the two perspectives outlined above to be the most rigorous and 
historically informed interpretations of our current period of financialization, they are 
certainly not the only scholars to have taken up the financialization debate.  Dumenil and 
Levi’s (2004; 2011) important contributions to our understanding of finance have 
explored the ties between economic crisis, class struggle, and  the rise of a “finance” 
class in the upper echelons of American class structure.  And Greta Krippner’s (2011) 
recent contribution has revealed many of the important political dynamics that provided 
the necessary opening for the proliferation of the financial sector.  Others have focused 
on the international dimensions of financialization.  Gerald Epstein’s, Financialization 
and the World Economy (2005), is a collection of essays that analyze how international 
financial markets have led to crisis in countries across the globe.  Susan Soederberg’s The 
Politics of the New International Financial Architecture (2005), focuses on the political 
dimensions of international finance and also argues that the financial interests of those 
within the G7 have constructed an international regime of finance that preys on 
developing countries of the global south.  Samir Amin, too, has focused on the class basis 
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of financialization, arguing that the dominant stratum of American capital, or what he 
calls “oligopoly-finance capital,” has been at center of the economic and political 




 The foregoing discussion serves to outline the basic parameters of finance capital 
and its relationship to both capitalism in general and the historically specific phenomenon 
of financialization.  For our current purposes it is less important that we determine the 
specific causes of financialization per se, than it is that we conceptualize it as a particular 
resolution to a specific crisis of historical capitalism.  In this case, it was the 
accumulation crisis of the 1970s that provided the impetus for the transformation of the 
institutional and ideological components of American society in order to establish and 
legitimate ongoing capital accumulation.  To be clear, I am not arguing that the turn 
towards finance was a necessary outcome of the crisis of the 1970s, only that, in the end, 
it did provide a viable means for resuscitating capital accumulation in an era of creeping 
stagnation.   
 The literature on financialization is critical in that it provides a historical 
interpretation of how finance arose in response to a particular crisis of capitalism.  
However, as Krippner (2011: 13) points out, “there are some important limitations of an 
analysis that conceptualizes financialization as a response to crisis at the level of the 
capitalist system as a whole.”  The primary limitation is that it is difficult to identify the 
discrete social actors involved form such a high level of abstraction.  This is a common 
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criticism of structural analysis and one that should not be ignored.  Therefore, it is 
incumbent upon those that tend towards structural analyses to explain how embedded 
social actors respond to the conditions of economic crisis and how these responses are 
articulated through various institutions.  Furthermore, it is critical that we appreciate how 
the resolution of a crisis involves a protracted struggle over both what caused a particular 
crisis and how it should be resolved.  These struggles are manifested in the ideological 
interpretations of crises by embedded social actors that are responding to structural 
contradictions.   
 In the following chapter, therefore, I lower my level of abstraction to analyze how 
the dynamics of capital accumulation that were described above were articulated in the 
behavior of corporate managers.  This analysis will entail a critique and synthesis of the 
economic sociology literature on managerial conceptions of control in corporate 
governance.  The result will be a critical theory of ideological change in corporate 
governance that sees the rise of the shareholder value conception of control as one of 




FINANCIALIZATION, SHAREHOLDER VALUE,  
AND CORPORATE TRANSFORMATIONS 
 
The preceding chapter examined the rise of financialization within the context of 
historical capitalism, emphasizing how it emerged in response to a particular barrier to 
accumulation that arose in the early 1970s.  Financialization, in this sense, provided a 
workable solution for maintaining capital accumulation in the face of creeping stagnation.  
In order to bring the essential elements of this process into relief, it was necessary to 
present a picture of modern society that was highly abstract.  In this chapter, I offer a 
more narrowly focused level of analysis in order to examine how the financialization 
process affected change in various aspects of the modern corporation.  
As we recall, I conceptualized finance capital as a particular social relation of 
production that is fundamental to the composition of advanced capitalism.   I also 
explained how finance capital maintained a necessary, yet contradictory, relationship 
with productive capitalists.   The financialization process, in this sense, can be conceived 
as an increase in the power of finance capital relative to productive capital.  In what 
follows, I examine the relationship between the shareholders and managers of modern 
corporations as a particular manifestation of this general relationship.  In other words, 
shareholders are generally assumed to embody the interests of finance capital while 
managers hold the interests of productive capital.27  By situating my discussion of the 
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 This is not to say that either group will necessarily engage in behavior that is in line with those interests.  
Indeed, this is exactly the point.  For example, just as an investment banker in the 1950s might believe that 
the role of finance is to help and support their industrial clients, so might an industrial manager in the 1990s 
believe that the a manager’s primary responsibility is to create shareholder value.   
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corporation in this manner, I am able to highlight how changes within corporate 
institutions have been shaped by, and constitutive of, the development of capitalism as a 
whole.   
I begin this chapter with an overview of the economic sociology literature on the 
modern corporation.  Here I argue that there is a bias in the literature on corporate 
management that tends to emphasize a one-sided cultural view of change while ignoring 
the material underpinnings of social change.   In order to overcome this one-sidedness I 
attempt to integrate the political-cultural approach to analyzing corporate transformations 
(Fligstein 1990; 2001) with the historical and structural analysis of political economy 
(Baran and Sweezy; Foster and Magdoff 2009; Arrighi 1994).  This integration also 
includes a review of the limited existing research on the financialization of non-financial 
corporations and its various contributions.  In order to formalize my integration of these 
literatures I also introduce the concepts of organization and control to describe the 
critical components of corporate change.  Questions drawn from this framework will then 
be used in Part II of the dissertation to examine how the financialization process led to a 
series of internal transformations in the US forest products industry, and ultimately the 
transformation of timberland ownership.  
 
Economic Sociology and the Modern Corporation 
 
The corporation has long been a central object of analysis in economic sociology.  
Beginning with Berle and Means (1933), and their analysis of the corporate revolution of 
the early 20th century, it has been a central concern of economic sociologists to explain 
 69 
 
the relationship between ownership, control, and the structural organization of modern 
corporations (Fligstein 2001).  A common approach taken by sociologists has been to 
locate and identify a capitalist class and its relative degree of cohesiveness (Zeitlin 1974; 
Useem 1984).  This has led to a protracted debate about “who controls the corporation,” 
and a number of divergent takes on the social and economic functions of the Giant 
Corporation (Mintz and Schwartz 1985; Kotz 1978).28   
In more recent years, economic sociologists developed more dynamic theories of 
corporate behavior that seek to ground managerial decision-making within the structure 
of relations among large corporations and the state.  These perspectives build on the 
notion of the embeddedness (Granovetter 1985) of economic actors and seek to explain 
corporate behavior in reference to their organizational fields (DiMaggio 1985).  
Organizational fields produce what Reinhard Bendix (1956) referred to as “managerial 
ideologies” or a systematic way of viewing the company and its priorities.  In more recent 
years, Neil Fligstein (1990; 2001) developed an analysis of what he calls a “political-
cultural approach” that seeks to ground corporate behavior in the relatively stable 
relations that govern behavior for a period of time.  According to Fligstein, these 
relatively stable relations experience periodic disruptions that force managers to seek out 
solutions to their collective problems.  In recent decades, corporate managers have come 
under the sway of a shareholder value conception of control that measures corporate 
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 The debate over who controls the corporation – whether it be banks, managers, or shareholders is part of 
a much broader literature on corporate power.  See Mizruchi and Bey (2005) for a good overview and 
synthesis of this literature.    
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success primarily in terms of increased returns to shareholders, most importantly in terms 
of share price appreciation (Fligstein 2001; Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000; Davis 2009).   
Economic sociologists have done much to advance our understanding of corporate 
institutions and managerial behavior.  To their credit, they have drawn our attention to the 
ephemeral nature of corporate structures and managerial orientation, providing valuable 
insights into the ideological constraints of actors embedded within definite social 
relations.  But, as Fligstein presciently notes, “The theoretical difficulty is deciding what 
that embeddedness consists of” (Fligstein 2001: 145).   
The trouble with Fligstein and other economic sociologists, in my view, is that 
there is a one-sidedness to their cultural analysis. While elucidating the cultural 
orientations of managers, their perspective overlooks how the material reproduction of 
society, driven by the contradictory dynamics of class struggle and capital accumulation, 
provides both the impetus for changing conceptions of control and some valuable insights 
into their emergent forms.  In contrast, I argue that by situating shifting conceptions of 
control within the context of material changes in the process of capital accumulation we 
gain a richer and more powerful understanding of what drives corporate decision-making 
and institutional change.  Furthermore, this perspective enables us to draw the necessary 
connections between managerial orientation and the broader dynamics of class struggle in 
contemporary society.  In short, my contention is that within any given historical period 
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there is rough correspondence between the social relations of production in general, and 
those that exist within corporate institutions.29 
Economic sociologists, it should be noted, are not alone in their one-sidedness.  
Political economists, and theorists of financialization in particular (with a few notable 
exceptions), often overlook or altogether ignore how ideological shifts accompanied, and 
made possible, various transformations in the political and economic structures of 
modern society.  That is to say, the tendency to downplay cultural and ideological aspects 
of change in structural analyses is often just as salient as the tendency for cultural 
theorists to ignore structural dynamics of modern society.   
An alternative to maintaining the polarization of cultural and structural analyses 
of change is to see them as internally-related aspects of the same phenomenon.  They are 
both necessary components of any meaningful historical change.  This is not to say that 
one may not be more fundamental in explaining a particular historical juncture – this is 
an empirical question – only that a complete analysis of any socio-historical 
transformation should account for both.  In this sense, I argue that financialization and the 
rise of shareholder value ideology are internally-related aspects of the same socio-
historical process.   
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 This idea was incorporated from Samuel Bowles and Herbert Ginits’ Schooling in Capitalist America 
(1976).  In this work they put forth “the correspondence principle,” which asserts that the “social relations 
of education” normally correspond to the social relations of production in capitalist society (see also, Foster 




The Managerial Revolution 
 
 The rise of the giant corporation in the late 19th and early 20th century constitutes 
one of the seminal transformations in the history of modern capitalism.  Arising out of the 
forces of concentration and centralization in the process of capital accumulation, the 
corporation proved to be the most viable institution for carrying out the capitalist function 
in the changing reality of maturing capitalism.  No longer was capitalism to be 
characterized by the aspiring entrepreneur and the small producer operating in a relatively 
competitive market, as had been widely assumed among classical political economists.  
The Giant Corporation marked the coming of Monopoly (or Oligopoly) capitalism in 
which the central economic actor was the Giant Corporations: a vertically integrated 
institution controlling vast sums of capital, containing multiple divisions, and often 
employing hundreds of thousands of workers.     
 The rise of the modern corporation spurred a series of studies seeking to 
understand the significance of this economic institution.  In 1932, Berle and Means 
published their landmark study, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, in which 
they argued that the separation of management from control had profoundly changed the 
character of modern capitalism.  Their argument was that the rise of the giant corporation 
resulted in a concentration of power in the hands of managers and a concomitant decrease 
of power for owners, who had now become diffused among thousands of anonymous 
stockholders.  Berle and Means thought the separation of management from control 
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represented a monumental shift in the capitalist function, one that would continue into the 
indefinite future (Berle and Means 1967[1932]).   
 In years following the publication of Berle and Means study there was broad 
agreement over their basic insight: the rise of the giant corporation had produced a 
marked change in the relationship between ownership and control in modern capitalism 
(Chandler 1977; Mizruchi 2004; Herman 1981).  The consequences of this change, 
however, were highly contested (Ryan 2000).  Berle and Means’ primary concern was 
with the economic implications that stemmed from the separation of ownership from 
control.  Capitalism had long been justified on the grounds that direct ownership of the 
means of production provided the entrepreneur with the individual initiative necessary to 
maximize efficiency, and thus profits.  With the rise of the modern corporation, however, 
it seemed that this foundation had been eroded.  Berle and Means argued that the interests 
of managers were not necessarily in line with the interest of the firm’s owners.  The 
owners of the firm, they assumed, were primarily interested with maximizing profits.  
The managers, on the other hand, were more interested in the long term stability of the 
firm, and their own ability to rise within its internal hierarchy.  In addition, Berle and 
Means argued, the door was now open for corporate managers to address the concerns of 
other “stakeholders,” such as employees and communities.   
Berle and Means were not solely concerned with the economic implications of the 
separation of ownership from control but also expressed concern over the social and 
political ramifications of an increasingly powerful managerial class.  In Mizruchi’s 
(2004: 581) apt description, Berle and Means “wrote of a small group, sitting at the head 
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of enormous organizations, with the power to build, and destroy, communities, to 
generate great productivity and wealth, without regard for those who elected them (the 
stockholders) or those who depended on them (the larger public).”  In the closing lines of 
their book, Berle and Means warned of the growing economic concentration taking place 
in the giant corporations and warned that one day they might supersede the state “as the 
dominant form of social organization” (Berle and Means 1967[1932]: 313).  In the eyes 
of Berle and Means the rise of the modern corporation was not just an economic 
phenomenon, but constituted a revolutionary transformation of American society that was 
on par with the Industrial revolution itself.   
Others were more sanguine about the broader implications that stemmed from the 
separation of ownership from control.  Sociologists, such as Daniel Bell, Ralf 
Dahrendorf, and Talcott Parsons, interpreted this development as a move towards 
increased democracy.  Ralf Dahrendorf, for instance, believed that the separation of 
management from control resulted in a “decomposition of capital,” as widely dispersed 
shareholders replaced the highly visible capitalist of the 19th century.  Others proclaimed 
the giant corporation was the harbinger of “people’s capitalism” in which publicly owned 
corporations would cease to be solely concerned with profits and would now consider the 
needs of both workers and the community.  Dahrendorf, in fact, went so far as to 
proclaim that the rise of the giant corporations represented the transcendence of 
capitalism itself (Mizruchi and Bey 2005).    
As we now know, early predictions about rise of the corporation leading to the 
“decomposition of capital” and the move towards some type of “post-capitalist” society 
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were erroneous - the basic social relation of capitalist society, that which exists between 
capital and wage-labor, remained intact.  What had changed was the form and market 
conditions in which the capitalist function operated.  Furthermore, historical evidence has 
shown that fantastic notions of the “soulful corporation” working towards the common 
good are more accurately understood in the context of corporate public relations 
campaigns than they are having anything to do with reality.  Nevertheless, these 
interpretations were widely spread by the corporate media and intellectual class of era 
(Bakan 2004).   
In 1966, Baran and Sweezy published their seminal work on Monopoly 
Capitalism, providing one of the more substantial revisions of Marxian political economy 
in the 20th century.   Baran and Sweezy built their model of Monopoly Capitalism 
directly from their analysis of the rise of the Giant Corporation and the attendant changes 
that came with this form of business organization.  Although Baran and Sweezy 
recognized and reaffirmed the basic insight of Berle and Means – that the modern 
corporation had indeed led to the separation of ownership from control – they were also 
quick to dismiss some of the more fanciful conclusions that were drawn from this 
recognition.  Perhaps the greatest of these myths was the one which purported that the 
rise of the managerial class meant that business would no longer be guided solely by their 
desire to maximize profits.   According to this argument, which was widely held at the 
time, managers had replaced the self-interested entrepreneurs of early capitalism and 
were now able to address the broader concerns of shareholders, employees, and society in 
general.  In the words of economist Carl Kaysen, “No longer the agent of proprietorship 
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seeking to maximize return on investment, management sees itself as responsible to 
stockholders, employees, customers, and the general public, and perhaps most important, 
the firm itself as an institution” (cited in Baran and Sweezy 1966: 21).   
Baran and Sweezy emphatically rejected the notion that profit maximization had 
ceased to be the guiding principle of corporate managers, arguing that “the economy of 
large corporations is more, not less dominated by the logic of profit-making than the 
economy of small entrepreneurs ever was” (Baran and Sweezy 1966: 28).  They 
described the modern manager as an “organization man,” whose interests and behavior 
were dominated by the interests of the corporation itself.  Furthermore, managers were 
often wealthy themselves, often coming from the upper end of the class structure, and 
owning substantial shares of their company’s stock.  “Far from being a separate class” 
Baran and Sweezy (1966: 35) conclude, “[managers] constitute in reality the leading 
echelon of the property-owning class.” The rise of the giant corporation, according to this 
view, did not result in dissolution of the capitalist function, but on the contrary, marked 
its institutionalization in modern society.   
Over the course of the post-war era, managerial autonomy continued to increase 
as stock ownership became increasingly dispersed among thousands of shareholders.  
One study found that by 1974, 82 percent of the country’s largest nonfinancial 
corporations were under management control, up from 40 percent in 1929 (Herman 
1981).30  Stockholders, left powerless in the wake of diluted stockownership, followed 
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 There are many different thresholds for establishing managerial control.  Berle and Means (1967[1932]) 
used twenty percent as the minimum necessary for minority ownership to maintain control.  See Zeitlin 
(1974) for an overview and critique of various measures of managerial control.   
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the “Wall Street Rule” of selling their stock, rather than challenging unresponsive 
managers (Useem 1993).   
The insulation of management from stockholder control was not an inevitable 
outcome of corporate capitalism, but grew out of the political struggles of the 1930s and 
populist sentiments against concentrated economic power (Roe 1994).   In the eyes of the 
public, the Great Depression was the result of financial speculation and the greed of the 
nation’s moneyed elite.  In response to public unrest, congress enacted a series of reforms 
that sought to limit the power of financial institutions.  Primarily contained in the 
securities acts of 1933 and 1934, these regulations prohibited banks and holding 
companies from owning controlling blocks of stocks and also placed severe restrictions 
on the portfolios of insurance companies, mutual funds, and pension funds. Congress also 
passed the Glass-Steegal Act, which separated commercial and investment banking, 
thereby prohibiting deposit accepting banks from speculating with other people’s money 
(Roe 1994).  In addition to passing regulatory measures reinforcing dispersed shareholder 
ownership, there were also a series of legal restrictions in place that limited the ability of 
shareholders to act collectively (Davis and Thompson 1994).  Together, these regulatory 
measures reinforced managerial autonomy by effectively insulating them from 
shareholder activism.   
 
Managerial Conceptions of Control 
 
The rise of an increasingly powerful managerial class led to the proliferation of 
sociological studies of managerial capitalism during the postwar era.  Sociologists, 
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including Reinhart Bendix (1956), Talcott Parsons (1960), Daniel Bell (1960) and Ralf 
Dahrendorf (1959), wrote of the rise of a managerial class, their distinctive ideological 
disposition, and their growing influence in American society.  Each of these theorists 
premised their analysis of corporate management on the growing separation of ownership 
from control, a trend which most believed to be a permanent feature of American society. 
 But in the early 1980s a series of changes began to take place in corporate 
America that challenged the notion that managers would remain free from stockholder 
control:  A market for corporate control was rapidly developing, forcing corporate 
managers to pay closer attention to their balance sheet so as to not find themselves the 
target of a hostile takeover; a merger movement was washing over the nation in the wake 
of the Reagan administration’s efforts to weaken anti-trust laws; and managers, who had 
once enjoyed a relatively high degree of autonomy, were now coming under increased 
pressure from institutional investors and a reinvigorated shareholder class that was 
demanding higher returns on their investments.  Collectively, these changes were part of 
the historical transformation of corporate America that is now commonly associated with 
the rise of the shareholder value conception of corporate governance (Useem 1993; Davis 
and Thompson 1994; Fligstein 1990).     
 Economic sociologists, and other observers of corporate behavior, were quick to 
provide explanations for the shareholder revolution that was sweeping across corporate 
America.  Neil Fligstein, in particular, developed a theory of corporate control that sought 
to locate corporate behavior in “the long-term shifts in the conception of how the largest 
firms should operate to preserve their growth and profitability” (Fligstein 1990: 2).  
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These conceptions were not based solely on the profit-maximizing and efficiency 
assumptions that we find in economics, but were constructed by managers that were 
attempting to find lasting solutions to the various problems they encountered from both 
within their organization and the organization field in which they were embedded 
(Fligstein 1990; 2001).  According to Fligstein (2001: 115),  
[m]anagers and owners in firms search for stable patterns of interaction 
with their largest competitors.  Once stable patterns prove to be both legal 
and profitable, firms set up organizational field that tend to produce and 
reproduce those patterns.  The principles that guide interaction in those 
fields can be termed a conception of control.  
 
The notion of a “conception of control” is meant to capture the ideological orientation of 
managers as they exist for a definite period of time.  Once the conditions for a given 
conception of control are exhausted, a sort of punctuated equilibrium emerges which then 
sends managers in search of new strategies and novel solutions to the ever-changing 
market environment.  This dynamic theory of corporate control, what Fligstein has called 
a political-cultural approach, has become a leading theory of corporate governance in the 
field of economic sociology.   
 
The Rise of the Shareholder Value Conception of Control  
 
The shareholder value conception of control emerged out of the economic crisis 
of the 1970s, replacing the finance conception of control that had dominated managerial 
decision making since the late 1960s.  The finance conception of control was the product 
of the postwar period when large corporations diversified into numerous, often unrelated, 
product markets.  Managers of these firms viewed their firm as a bundle of assets, which 
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were deployed in order to maximize corporate earnings.  This “balance sheet” approach 
to management led managers to evaluate the firm’s various product lines by their 
profitability and investments were made according to how a particular division would 
play into the already-existing corporate portfolio, much the same as a financial analyst 
would manage an investment portfolio.  Under the finance conception of control firms 
became increasingly large and unwieldy, leading many to question whether firms had 
become too large to be controlled efficiently (Fligstein 1990; 2001).  Indeed, it was the 
size of many US corporations that became a favorite target for critics when the economy 
began to stagnate in the early 1970s.   
The economic crisis of the early 1970s is highlighted as the proximate cause of 
the breakdown in the finance conception of control.  According to Fligstein (2001: 147-
148), this crisis was primarily due to growing competition from abroad, particularly from 
Japan; along with the general economic slowdown coupled with high inflation, or 
stagflation .  In response to these changes in the macro-economic environment, managers 
sought out solutions to their economic malady.  Here, Fligstein (2001: 148) urges us “to 
consider the role of culture in framing the possibilities for strategic action.” He continues,  
For actors to undertake new forms of action, they must decide to rethink 
their interests, develop a plan to operationalize those interests, and have 
the power to enforce that view.  Culture comes into play to provide actors 
with a cognitive frame that offers solutions to the problem of strategic 
action. 
 
Thus Fligstein, as well as others, implores us to think about shifts in managerial 
orientation as a kind of cultural movement that arises in response to the changing 
condition in their relevant fields of action (Fligstein 2001; Davis and Thompson 1994).    
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 The cultural movement that arose in response to the breakdown of the finance 
conception of control was spurred on by ideas imported from agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983; Dobbin and Jung 2010).  In the language of 
agency theory, market relations consist of principles and agents, with shareholders being 
the principles and managers their agents.  Under this conception of the corporation, the 
firm exists primarily to further the interests of the principals (shareholders), and the 
agents (managers) job is works towards that end.  It follows that over the course of the 
20th century, as managers enjoyed increasing autonomy from their shareholders, that the 
principals had lost control over their agents.  As Dobbin and Jung (2010: 2) explain,  
Executives were serving their own interests rather than those of owners.  
They had been building large diversified empires that could shield them 
from downturns in any particular industry, but which maximized corporate 
size rather than profitability.  Profits went to buy new businesses to 
expand the pyramids executives sat atop.    
 
The remedy for this situation, according to agency theorists, was to enact a series 
of measures that would bring the interests of managers back in line with shareholders.  
Their prescription called for a number of changes in corporate governance: first, was the 
need to alter the incentives of executives, by instituting compensation plans that would 
work to align the interests of managers to shareholders.  This could be accomplished by 
moving towards performance-based compensation packages consisting of stock options 
and bonuses (as opposed to fixed salaries), thus giving managers a personal incentive to 
maximize share prices.  Second, was the call for firms to shed unrelated divisions in order 
to focus on their “core competencies,” leaving portfolio diversification to investors.  A 
third prescription was for corporate managers to use debt, as opposed to issuing new 
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equity or internal funds, to fund any expansion programs.  And finally, was the call for 
independent board members that would be able to increase their oversight over 
management.  Together these measures would, according to agency theorists, tie the 
interests of managers more closely to their shareholders and add some much needed vigor 
to the faltering US economy (Dobbin and Jung 2010; Davis and Stout 1992).  In chapters 
five and six I will use these prescriptions adopted from agency theory to analyze the shift 
rise of the shareholder value conception of control in the US forest products industry.     
In the end, Fligstein and his colleagues reduce the rise of the shareholder value 
conception of control to a voluntarist argument that simply says that managers confronted 
an obstacle to growth and that they found the answer in theory coming from then 
unknown theorist in finance at the University of Rochester.31 They concede that the initial 
push for introducing the shareholder value conception of the firm came from the financial 
community, particularly institutional investors; and they acknowledge the lax antitrust 
policies and tax cuts of the Reagan administration as being important as well.  Their 
emphasis, however, is on how managers construct cultural frames that provide solutions 
for strategic actions (Fligstein 2001; Dobbin and Jung 2010).  In doing so, these theorists 
reduce changing conceptions of corporate control to the problem solving activities of 
managers and the novel ideas that arise from their collective efforts to address changes in 
their organizational fields.  Dobbin and Jung, in particular, take this argument a step 
further in commenting on the role of agency theory in introducing the heightened risk in 
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 Michael Jensen, the financial economist that is credited with formulating many of the ideas that became 
associated with the shareholder value movement, was a professor at the University of Rochester when he 
published his work on agency theory.  His work on agency theory and shareholder value earned him a 
prestigious position at Harvard University.   
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corporate America that ultimately led to the financial crisis of 2008-9: “Chalk one up for 
Hegel…” they proclaim “…a theory brought down the economy” (Dobbin and Jung 
2010). 
 
The Role of Institutional Investors 
 
 Underlying these changes in managerial ideologies was a monumental shift in the 
relationship that exists between shareholders and corporate managers.  As discussed 
above, the rise of the giant corporations produced a marked change in the relationship 
between ownership and control.  The dispersal of ownership among thousands of 
anonymous shareholders was the necessary precondition for ushering in the era of 
managerial capitalism, when managers enjoyed a high degree of autonomy from their 
shareholders.32 Once this precondition was removed, however, the door was now open 
for a substantial realignment of the relationship between ownership and control in the 
modern corporation.   
 The separation between ownership and control continued unabated in the decades 
following Berle and Means’ initial formulation (see Berle 1967). Stock ownership 
became increasingly diluted as shares were dispersed among an increasingly large 
number of shareholders.  By the 1970s the managerial revolution had reached its zenith, 
as most large corporations were firmly under management control (Chandler 1977).  In 
recent decades, however, the “atom of property” – to use Berle and Means’ metaphor – 
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 Of course this autonomy was relative in that it was conditioned by their institutional roles within the 
corporation, but in general, managers of the mid-twentieth century were free from shareholder control.     
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that exploded with the rise of the modern corporation was, in a sense, re-fused due to a 
radical change in the ownership patterns of corporate securities (Ryan 2000).   
Over the course of 1980s, institutional investors – such as pension funds, banks, 
mutual funds, and banks – accumulated vast sums of corporate securities.  Institutional 
shareholding had steadily increased during the post-war era, but due to technological 
changes in the processing of information and the Reagan administration’s efforts to relax 
the rules governing the composition of investment portfolios, there was a rapid increase 
in the number of stocks held by these institutions.  According to one study, the market 
value of institutional holdings of shares on the New York Stock Exchange rose from $31 
billion in 1955 to $440 billion in 1980 (Useem 1993: 29).  And whereas individual 
households owned approximately 90 percent of corporate stock in the 1950s, this share 
had dropped to 68 percent by 1970.  By 2000, households owned only 42 percent of 
public stock, while institutional investors owned 46 percent (Crotty 2002).   
 By 1990 many of the nation’s largest corporations found that the majority of their 
shares were now held by institutional investors.  Useem (1993) found that by 1990 the 
1,000 largest publicly traded corporations had, on average, 50 percent of their stocks held 
by institutional investors.  As institutional shareholdings continued to increase, there 
came a sudden recognition that the Wall Street rule of divesting, rather than challenging 
management, was no longer feasible.  Selling off shares might lead to a fall in prices, 
which would ultimately harm the seller and, furthermore, for large investors there were 
limited investment alternatives in an already crowded market (Davis and Thompson 
1994; Ryan 2000).   
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Not only was exit no longer feasible, it was also unnecessary.  Through their large 
institutional holdings, institutional investors had now acquired the means by which they 
could exert power over managers, and bring them in line with the interests of the 
shareholding class.  This is not to say that investors had total control over managers, only 
that their influence had grown substantially (Useem 1993).  Before this power could be 
exercised, however, substantial changes to the existing regulatory regime would need to 
be changed.   
The Reagan administration’s pro-shareholder orientation provided the political 
opening that allowed potential investor control to become a reality (Davis and Thompson 
1994).  The leadership positions in both the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
and the Federal Trade Commision (FTC) were filled with followers of the Chicago 
school’s efficient market hypothesis, which viewed unfettered capital markets and 
property rights (read shareholder rights) as the cornerstones of an efficient market 
economy.  In turn, a number of well-financed shareholder activist organizations formed 
with the intent of overhauling the regulations that hampered their ability to exert control 
over management.  Over the course of the decade investor activism continued to increase, 
as institutional investors increased their use of shareholder resolutions to steer 
management towards the interests of shareholders.  By 1990, these efforts succeeded and 
the chairman of the SEC announced that there would be a major review of the existing 
proxy rules.  Two years later, this review resulted in an overhaul of the proxy rules 
governing shareholder activism (Davis and Thompson 1994).  As a result, institutional 
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investors were able to bring the age of managerial capitalism to an end and usher in a 
new era of “institutional” (Useem 1993) or “investor” (Conrad 1988) capitalism.   
 
Financialization and Non-financial Corporations 
 
 In the previous chapter I defined financialization as the gravitational shift in 
economic activity from the productive to the financial sphere of the economy (Foster and 
Magdoff 2009).  For our present purposes, however, I will narrow my focus in order to 
examine how financialization produced a marked shift in the relationship between 
financial markets and non-financial corporations (NFC).  According to Orhangazi (2008), 
this change has two fundamental components: first, is the increase in financial incomes 
and financial investments on the part of NFCs; and second, the increasing pressure placed 
on managers of NFCs to maximize returns to financial markets in the form of stock 
appreciation and dividend payments. Together, these two changes constitute the primary 
means by which NFCs have been “financialized.” 
 Much of the literature on financialization and NFCs is concerned with detailing 
the effects of financialization on corporate profit rates and the distribution of those 
profits.  That is to say, their focus is on capital flows – both in terms of savings and 
investment and the distribution of surpluses.  This “accumulation centered” approach to 
changes in NFCs reveals a number of interesting aspects of corporate change in recent 
decades.  For instance, the financial assets of NFCs have grown considerably, both in 
absolute terms and as a percentage of tangible assets.  Prior to 1980 the ratio of NFC 
financial assets to tangible assets held constant at roughly 30 percent; by 2000, however, 
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NFCs’ financial assets were equal to their tangible assets.  As one would expect, the 
growth of financial assets produced a rapid rise in the financial incomes of NFCs: both 
interest and dividend incomes of NFCs increased over the past three decades (Orhangazi 
2008).   
The data clearly shows that financial profits became increasingly important and 
eventually integral aspect of corporate America.  In fact, the Wall Street Journal reported 
that by 2000, “[a]lmost 40% of the earnings of the companies in the Standard & Poor’s 
500-stock index in 2000 came from lending, trading, venture investments and other 
financial activity” with corporate giants such as General Motors and General Electric 
making over half of their profits from financial activities (Found in Davis 2009: 105).   
In addition to the direct increase in financial incomes of NFCs was a rapid 
increase in the outflow of corporate profits (Orhangazi 2008; Grullon et al. 2011).  The 
two primary means of distributing earnings to shareholders are through dividend 
payments and stock buybacks.  In recent decades both of these forms of payout increased, 
however, the use of stock buybacks increasingly became the preferred option among 
managers operating under the shareholder value conception of control (Grullon and 
Michaely 2002).33  A stock buyback is when a firm purchases its own stock in order to 
bid up the price of their stock and increase shareholder value.  The level of capital 
outflow taking place in corporate America is astonishing.  According to Lazonick 
(forthcoming: 6),  
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 The preference for stock buybacks is due in large part to the lower tax rate for capital gains in the US 
(see Grullon and Michaely 2002).   
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From 2000 through 2009 S&P 500 companies – which account for about 
75 percent of the market capitalization of all US publicly-listed 
corporations – spent more than $2.5 trillion on stock buybacks, equal to 58 
percent of their net income.  In addition, these companies distributed 
dividends equal to 41 percent of net income over the decade, bringing the 
payout ratio (buybacks plus dividends) to 99 percent.   
 
In other words, almost every dollar of income that was earned in large US corporations 
was returned to shareholders during the first decade of the 21st century.   
This incredible payout rate was supported by the increasing use of debt among 
NFC.  Rising debt is a pronounced feature of a financialized economy (Foster and 
Magdoff 2009).  In the 1970s outstanding debt in the US economy was about one and a 
half times the size of the country’s GDP.  By 2005, outstanding debt would rise to 
become almost three and a half times the size of the nation’s GDP.  The rise in debt was 
most pronounced in the financial sector, however, debt rose in all sectors of the economy 
(private, corporate, and public), becoming the fuel for America’s stagnating economy 
(Foster and Magdoff 2009).   
In the context of changes in corporate governance, there has been a long debate 
about the relative mix of debt and equity in the firm (Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Fligstein 2001).34  It is generally assumed that shareholders prefer debt to equity because 
debt tends to maintain the value of their holdings by not diminishing stock prices or 
diluting their earnings.  Managers, on the other hand, are more inclined to prefer issuing 
equity because this further diffuses ownership and protects them from ownership control.  
However, as Fligstein points out, the interests of managers and owners in this regard are 
not so clear cut, as managers may ultimately lose control of the corporation if they fail to 
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 Equity refers to the value of the firm’s share price multiplied by the number of shares.  
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maintain stock prices and healthy dividend payments (Fligstein 2001: 151-153).  
Nevertheless, as financial corporate managers increasingly relied on debt to fund 
corporate activities; and as a result, the debt to equity ratio of firms rose substantially.   
Another area of research is focused on how the financialization process affects 
profit rates and investment practices within NFCs.  Stockhammer (2004) argues that 
financialization is the primary reason for declining profit rates in the neoliberal era.  
Using aggregate time series data from the US, UK, France and Germany, he shows that 
there is a negative correlation between the rentier income of NFCs and levels of 
investment.  Likewise, Orhangazi (2008) analyzed firm level data and found that there is 
a negative relationship between financialization and capital accumulation.  Orhangazi 
contends that the higher rates of return in financial markets serve to “crowd out” 
investments into production.  Foster and Magdoff (2009), on the other hand, criticize the 
notion that investments into financial markets take the place of potential investment into 
the productive economy.  According to Foster and Magdoff (2009: 107), “the idea of the 
“crowding out” of investment by financial speculation makes little sense…when placed 
in the present context of an economy characterized by rising excess capacity and 
vanishing net investment opportunities.  In fact, Foster and Magdoff argue the opposite: 
that financial speculation has served to stimulate growth in an already stagnating 
economy.  This question of whether or not financialization serves to boost an already 
stagnant economy, or is in fact parasitic of the productive economy, continues to be a 
point of debate.  I will return to this discussion in my analysis of the forest products 
industry.   
 90 
 
 It is clear, however, that the financialization of the NFC has been extremely 
detrimental to labor (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000).  As in times past, firms searching to 
maximize profit rates look first to reduce the amount of labor necessary for production.  
This trend continued, and was accelerated, under the sway of financialization.  Firms 
looking to maximize shareholder returns invested heavily in new technology and spent 
considerable energy reducing both the size and power of their labor force.  As a result, 
the quantity and quality of employment opportunities offering stable employment and 
decent pay was rapidly diminished.  The manufacturing sector was particularly hard hit, 
with millions of blue-collar jobs vanishing due to both deindustrialization and the rising 
productivity of labor (Blueston and Harrison 1982).  This trend is further attested by the 
declining significance of labor unions in the United States.  The percentage of the 
manufacturing labor force that was unionized was 47.4 percent in 1970; by 1983 this 
number was 27.8 percent and by 1994 it had dropped to 18.2 percent (Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan 2000).  By 2010, the unionization rate in the United States had fallen to 11.4 
percent (OECD 2012).   
To date, only a handful of studies have examined how particular industries have 
been affected by the financialization process.  Two of these targeted the automobile 
industry for an industry specific analysis of financialization.  Julie Froud (2002) and her 
various coauthors conducted a financial analysis of the industry that aimed to “add 
nuance and qualification to existing studies of the financialization process.”  Using 
financial metrics such as stock appreciation and shareholder measures of return on capital 
employed (ROCE), they found that the financial under-performance produced major 
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consequences for car assemblers, but these effects varied widely between firms (Froud et 
al. 2002).  Nicole Aschoff conducted an analysis of Delphi Corp., the former in-house 
parts supplier of General Motors, in which she countered arguments about how high 
wage, unionized work-force led to the demise of American auto industry. Her research 
demonstrates instead that the demise was more likely the result of increased pressure 
from the financial community to maximize shareholder returns (Aschoff 2010).  Finally, 
in research on financialization and clothing retailers in the UK, Gibbon found that 
increasing pressure from the financial community has indeed occurred; however, he 
concludes that the relationship between financial institutions’ desire for increased 
shareholder returns and management decision-making is mediated by strategies that are 
particular to the firm (Gibbon 2002).    
To sum up, the literature on financialization and NFCs has shown that the 
relationship between financial markets and NFCs have indeed undergone a radical 
transformation over the past three decades.  During the postwar era, firms operated under 
the principle of “retain and reinvest,” which meant that corporate profits were retained by 
managers in order to be channeled back into expanded production, or used to diversify 
the corporations existing portfolio.   Since the 1980s, however, managers increasingly 
came under the sway of a reinvigorated shareholder class that demanded higher returns 
on their capital investments.  In their effort to maximize these returns, managers turned 
away from the principle of “retain and reinvest” and increasingly adopted the maxim of 
“downsize and distribute” (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000).  Corporate managers, under 
pressure from Wall Street, laid off workers in droves, sold off unrelated product lines, 
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and streamlined their business activities in order to maximize their returns to 
shareholders.  When investments were made they were increasingly financed by debt, 
leaving NFCs leveraged to the hilt and considerably more vulnerable to external shocks 
in the economy.  As a result, inequality skyrocketed to levels not seen since the 1920s 
and financial speculation became the principle driver of an American economy mired in 
stagnation.  This period of transformation culminated in the financial crisis of 2008-09, 
when a speculative bubble in the US housing market produced a “financial tsunami” that 
spread across the US and global economy.   
 
Critique and Synthesis 
 
 It is widely acknowledged that the shareholder value conception of control in 
corporate governance is a financially inspired ideology that serves the interests of the 
financial community (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000; Fligstein 2001; Davis 2009).  To 
date, however, there have been few attempts to integrate the political-economic 
perspectives on financialization with the focus of economic sociologists on the 
shareholder value conception of control.  Despite calls for the integration of political 
economy perspectives and economic sociology (see Mizruchi 2007) these fields remain 
isolated and rarely engage one another.  In this section, I outline one avenue by which 
these two potentially compatible fields can be made to “speak to one another.”  
Furthermore, I argue that by integrating these divergent perspectives we gain 
considerable insight into both the institutional pressures that created the need for a new 
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conception of corporate control and the highly political process in which this new 
conception was forged.   
 In defending his political-cultural approach for constructing a sociology of 
markets, Fligstein (2001: 145) argues that our “efforts should concentrate on specifying 
models of the relations between firms that focus on intra- and inter-organizational 
processes such as the construction of strategic action and the cultural frames by which 
such a construction makes sense.” Fligstein locates the nexus for emergent conceptions of 
control in the social relations that exist within firms or between firms in a given market.  
However, once we concede that emergent conceptions of control tend to affect the 
majority of firms in generally unrelated markets we must conclude that emergent 
conceptions of control derive not from managers in a particular organizational field, but 
from the dominant social relations of society in general.   
I argue that this can be accomplished by locating emergent conceptions of control 
within a political-economic framework that focuses on the essential relations of the 
broader social structure and the central tendencies that derive therefrom.  In doing so, we 
reveal the relationship that exists between the material processes of production and 
reproduction in capitalist society and various changes in the ideological orientation of 
discrete social actors.   This is another way of saying that transformations of managerial 
conceptions of control generally correspond to underlying shifts in the capital 
accumulation process.   
To be clear, I am not proposing that we replace a one-sided focus on cultural 
understandings with an equally one-sided materialism: the point is to see them as 
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internally related features of a dynamic historical process.  This point harkens back to the 
long-standing divide in sociology between structural and cultural theories of social 
change (Dahms 2000).  On one side, there are structural theorists who tend to assume that 
the evolving structures of modern society shape the behavior, ideas, and desires of 
individual actors; while the other side assumes that social structures are mere expressions 
of the cultural and ideological underpinnings of social groups.  This debate found its 
early expression in the seemingly divergent explanations of the rise of Capitalism by two 
of sociology’s funding figures: Marx and his materialist explanation of Capitalism as 
found in the Communist Manifesto and Weber’s pointed reply to Marx in his Protestant 
Ethic.  Here we find the roots of a theoretical divide that, despite numerous attempts at 
reconciling, continues to characterize much of the discipline of sociology.  Indeed, it is 
this division that is on full display in the divergent takes on financialization and the 
shareholder value conception of control.    
 Harry Dahms (2000) proposed one possible means of overcoming this theoretical 
impasse that works well within the current context: as opposed to abandoning structural 
or cultural analysis all together, one can link them on the level of organization.  
According to Dahms,  
If changes in the mode of production, in the market, in what constitutes 
the central factor of production, in the role of technological change, etc. do 
not engender a transformation in the definition of organizational control, 
the changes may remain superficial.  The nature of decision-making 
processes needs to change, along with the kind of interactions among 
business organizations, and between the latter and labor organizations and 
government.  Unless such a change indeed occurred, we have to assume 
that while the transformation at hand may have affected a specific area of 
economic action, it may leave unaffected the operation of the economy as 
a whole.  Accordingly, studies that endeavor to demonstrate that major 
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changes have resulted from a recent trend must be able to show that a 
change in the production process, the central mode of production, the core 
factor of production, or the dominant new technology, will bring with it a 
qualitative transformation that translates into organizational change 
(Dahms 2000: 24-25, italics in original).  
 
Here Dahms is arguing that there is a definite link between changes in the organizational 
forms of capitalist institutions and the decision-making processes that correspond to and 
make possible various transformations of capitalism.  Dahms proposes that we employ 
the concepts of organization and control to highlight the necessary linkages that exists 
between structural and cultural change.   
 By integrating organizational shifts in the relations of production to the forms of 
control we can begin to highlight the internal relation that exists between the macro-
structural processes of financialization and the proliferation of the shareholder value 
conception of control. The concept of organization is sufficiently broad to refer to a 
number of firm characteristics, however, for the purpose of this study I will focus 
primarily on those organizational aspects that relate directly to the relationship between 
managers and shareholders.  As we know, the social relation that exists between 
managers and owners was a critical component of twentieth century capitalism: just as 
managerial capitalism was premised on the relative autonomy of managers stemming 
from widely dispersed stock ownership, so was shareholder capitalism premised on the 
increasing concentration of stock ownership among institutional investors.  By locating 
shifts in the organizational component of large corporations we can identify the 
mechanisms that underlie and reinforce periodic shifts in managerial control.   
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 Integrating the materialist, or accumulation-centered, perspectives of 
financialization with those of the shareholder value conception of control produces 
several advantages for theorizing change in the modern corporation.  First of all, it allows 
us to interpret how changes in the modern corporation relate to broader issues of class 
struggle and power.  The absence of social and political considerations among theorists of 
shareholder value has been highlighted as one of their principle shortcomings (see 
Soederberg 2008; Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000; Seccombe 1999).  By embedding the 
shareholder value conception of control within the broader dynamics of financialization 
we are better able to answer a series of questions: which social actors were in a position 
to influence the shift towards shareholder value?  What were the mechanisms by which it 
was enforced? Who ultimately benefits from these changes?  And finally, what are the 
implications of the shareholder value conception of control for American society and its 
future trajectory?  In short, by integrating these perspectives we provide the basis for a 
critical analysis of managerial conceptions of control.   
 A second advantage of linking these theories is that it helps to clarify some of the 
paradoxes that have confronted theorists of shareholder value ideology.  For instance, the 
fact that the adoption of shareholder value tactics have not been shown to be effective in 
producing what is ostensibly its primary goal, increasing profits, has left some puzzled as 
to why managers would pursue such tactics (see Fligstein and Shin 2007).  But it is not 
just profits and stability that matter in the process of capital accumulation, but exactly 
how those profits are made and to whom they accrue.  Under the shareholder value 
conception of control, profits were increasingly channeled to the financial community as 
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part of the broader gravitational shift in the economy from productive to financial profits.  
Thus we begin to see that the shareholder value conception of control is less concerned 
with producing profits per se, than it is with increasing the flow of value – in the form 
share price appreciation – to shareholders (ie. finance).   
A third contribution is that by paying heed to the shifting dynamics of capital 
accumulation, we can begin to appreciate the logic behind emergent forms of managerial 
conceptions of control.  Successive regimes of capital accumulation develop out of the 
struggles to overcome the barriers to accumulation that arise in a particular crisis.  The 
solution to these crises can take many forms; however, by focusing on the particular 
manner in which a crisis is resolved we can locate key insights into emergent conceptions 
of control.  In this case, the response to the accumulation crisis of the 1970s took the 
form of rising debt and increased financial profits in order to overcome stagnation.  Thus, 
we saw a corresponding shift in the dominant conception of control among corporate 
managers that increasingly privileged the interest of the financial community over others.   
Finally, in integrating shareholder value theory and financialization we are able to 
find a useful avenue for addressing concerns raised about the difficulty of highlighting 
the role of discrete actors within theories of structural change (see Krippner 2011: 13-14).  
Political-economic theories of financialization tend to be highly abstract because they are 
primarily concerned with the structural dynamics of modern capitalism.  In this sense, 
broad abstractions are necessary because they provide insights into fundamental 
dynamics of historical change; however, they are far from sufficient for explaining the 
behavior of social actors operating within particular organizational fields.  Fligstein’s 
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notion of a shareholder value conception of control fills this void by highlighting how the 
structural shift towards financialization was articulated within the changing norms of 
managerial behavior.  Integrating these seemingly complementary theories requires that 
analysts be flexible in their use of abstractions and to acknowledge the limitations of 




 This chapter set out to construct a critical synthesis of the economic sociology 
literature on shifting conceptions of control in corporate governance and political-
economic theories of capitalist transformations. In doing so, I outlined the historical 
development of the non-financial corporation and the monumental shift that took place in 
the early twentieth century when the capitalist function was fractured by the separation of 
management from control.  This fracture led to the rise of a managerial class that stood 
atop and controlled the giant corporations that were so emblematic of 20th century US 
capitalism.  Although their autonomy over decision-making in the firm was relative – 
bounded as they were by the institutional constraints of market – these managers used 
their discretion to build large corporate empires with an eye towards maintaining growth 
and stability over the long term.  This period was marked by a “managerial” conception 
of control in corporate governance.   
 The economic crisis of the early 1970s, and the protracted period of stagnation 
that followed, led to a realignment of the US political-economy around the interests of 
finance capital.  This financialization of the US economy included a rapid increase in 
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financial profits and a concomitant rise in power of financial interests in the political and 
economic institutions of American society.  In non-financial corporations this 
transformation took on two primary forms: first, there was an increase in the proportion 
of total profits that came from financial activities; second, there was increased pressure 
put on corporate managers to maximize the firm’s shareholder returns.  These two 
moments can be conceived as the quantitative (financial profits) and qualitative 
(shareholder value ideology) components of the financialization process as they were 
manifested in the firm.  
 This dissertation is primarily concerned with analyzing the qualitative side of this 
process as it took place in the US forest products industry.35  The rise of the shareholder 
value conception of control in corporate management can thus be understood as an 
ideological and institutional manifestation of the financialization process at work in the 
realignment of managerial priorities towards maximizing shareholder value.     
 In addition to this theoretical conceptualization, I provide an avenue for analyzing 
this relation within various shifts in the organizational component of the modern 
corporation.  In the second part of this study I emphasize two forms of this organizational 
change that are directly related to the relationship between shareholders and managers.  
The first is the ownership structure of the firm.  As I explained, the diffusion of stock 
ownership was critical to the rise of managerial capitalism during the postwar era.  
Likewise, the increasing concentration of stock ownership among institutional investors 
                                                 
 
35
 Due to the difficulty of determining the financial incomes of individual firm’s I was unable to include 
this quantitative component in my analysis of financialization and the US forest products industry.  
Although there is no reason to believe that firms in the industry followed the larger trend, I cannot speak to 
the degree to which financial incomes increased or decreased in the US forest products industry.   
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was a critical development for explaining the shift towards the shareholder value 
conception of control.  This study will therefore include an analysis of stock ownership in 
the US forest products industry to determine the relative level of ownership 
concentration, which in turn will be important for establishing the basis for a shift in 
managerial control.  The second critical aspect of organizational change in the 
relationship between shareholders and managers is executive compensation.  The rise of 
the shareholder value conception of control is directly linked to the rise in incentive-
based compensation for corporate executives; therefore I also examine executive pay for 
a further indication of organizational change associated with the rise of the shareholder 
value conception of control.   
 These two organizational components of the US forest products industry will 
serve to frame and qualify the adoption of the shareholder value conception of control in 
the US forest products industry.  The degree to which managers operated under a 
particular conception of control will be analyzed using historical data on various 
managerial activities, including investment practices, debt financing, and merger and 
acquisition activity.  Particular emphasis will be placed on the role of timberland 
ownership and how strategies concerning timberland ownership reflected the broader 












FINANCE AND MANAGERIAL CONTROL  
IN THE US FOREST PRODUCTS INDUSTRY
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CHAPTER IV  
MONOPOLY CAPITALISM &  
THE US FOREST PRODUCTS INDUSTRY (1945-1975) 
 
 
 “I have no ambition to aid in building up the prestige and authority of Association of Trust and 
Insurance Companies; do not let us forget that finance is the servant of industry and that industry 




The story of the modern US forest products industry begins in the late 19th century, as the 
nation underwent its vast transformation from its early agrarian and small manufacturing 
economy to a full-fledged industrial super power.  The forest products industry was on the front 
lines of this process: as the railroads opened up the continent’s vast interior they provided forest 
product firms with access to a seemingly endless supply of virgin forests.  These forests 
presented themselves as a valuable bounty for entrepreneurs in this budding industry.  In time, 
the forest products industry proved to be one of the most critical components of the United 
States’ industrial economy.     
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the early development of the US forest 
products industry.  An examination of this early period is necessary because many of the key 
dynamics of the industry – such as the persistence of cut-throat competition and unstable markets 
– were critical in shaping the forest products industry of the 20th century.  This period can also be 
understood as the development of the US forest products industry under historical conditions of 
monopoly capitalism (Baran and Sweezy 1966).   
A critical feature of monopoly capitalism was the “managerial revolution” that occurred 
when the salaried managers replaced the owner-operators of traditional business enterprise 
                                                 
 
36
 Sir Eric Bowater was chairman and managing director of Bowater Corporation from 1927 until his death in 1962.  
Bowater is cited in Reader (1981: 216).   
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(Chandler 1977).  Over time the separation between ownership and control continued to grow, 
providing this managerial class with broad discretion over decision making in the firm (Berle and 
Means 1967[1932]; Mizruchi 2004).  In this chapter I provide an overview of the ownership 
structure of leading firms in the forest products industry during this period in order to establish 
the basis for my analysis of managerial decision-making under this managerial conception of 
control.   
Operating under the principles of “retain and reinvest” (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000), 
managers in the US forest products industry plowed their surplus profits back into expanded 
production capacity.  The growth in corporate profits further insulated corporate managers from 
financial influence because it enabled them to finance much of the firm’s activities without 
relying on financial support.  However, as I will show, there were definite limits on the ability of 
managers to invest their surpluses internally.  This gave rise to the so-called surplus disposal 
problem, which refers to the managerial dilemma concerning how to invest surplus profits in the 
face of limited internal investment opportunities (Baran and Sweezy 1966).  Managers overcame 
these limits by turning to a number of alternative means of expansion, including mergers and 
acquisitions, diversification, and increased investment into timberland ownership.    
 
Early Development of the US Forest Products Industry 
 
The forests of North America have been critical to the economy for over four centuries.  
Beginning with the early colonial settlers, the continents abundant forests proved to be an 
extremely important resource, providing building material, fuel, and raw material for countless 
everyday uses.  Because of their abundance, forest products were not immediately targeted for 
commercial gain.  In fact, more often than not, colonists viewed the forests of the Americas as an 
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obstacle standing in the way of expanding settlements and agriculture.  Longing for the 
landscape of their homeland, colonists eagerly turned to felling the forests in order to recreate the 
sprawling agricultural landscapes of fixed fields and open meadows that were characteristic of 
their native land (Cox 2010).   
New England was the site of the nation’s first “Lumber Frontier” (Cox 2010; see also 
Cronon 1983).  The region’s abundant forests and plentiful rivers with open access to good 
harbors gave it a natural advantage for early timber production.  Maine in particular developed 
the most extensive lumber industry of the pre-revolutionary Americas.  In the South, the industry 
also developed rapidly, but the South’s distance from urban centers of New England and the 
considerable difficulty of transporting logs across the marshy coasts of the Carolinas slowed the 
development of commercial forestry.  By the time of the Revolution, the colonial population was 
expanding westward, looking for new settlements and profitable enterprise.  The abundant 
forests quickly turned from an obstacle to a source of profit for early colonists.  In time, the 
forests would become one of the most critical components of the nation’s bourgeoning industrial 
economy.    
The industrial revolution swept across the nation in the decades following the Civil War 
and although many think of coal and steel as fueling the revolution, the forest products industry, 
as much as any other, was at the forefront of this process of industrialization.  Many 
commentators (see Cronon 1983, 1991; Williams 1989) have noted the historical geography of 
the forest products industry: its early development in New England and the coastal South; the 
rapid depletion of the forests surrounding the Great Lakes region of the Midwest and then 
penetrating the rugged mountains of the Southern Appalachia, before moving westward to the 
seemingly endless forests of the Pacific Northwest.  In each case, the industry exploited regional 
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resources (both land and labor) with reckless abandon, reflecting the optimism of an industry that 
relied on a natural resource that was seemingly inexhaustible.  When the forests of a particular 
region began to show signs of exhaustion, the lumberman picked up their operations and moved 
on to exploit the untrammeled forests of the American frontier.  This pattern was characteristic of 
much of the industry’s history throughout the 19th and 20th centuries (Williams 1989).  
During the late 19th century the forest products industry first developed into a full-fledged 
industrial operation.  Prior to this era most logging operations consisted of small teams of 
loggers, working in the forests with only mules and their own brawn, making for an extraction 
process that was painfully slow and extremely difficult.  But industrial technology forever 
changed the timber extraction process as technical innovations in transportation (particularly the 
railroads), machines for felling timber, and mechanical skidders for dragging logs led to a rapid 
increase in the productive capacity of the industry.  As a consequence, the forest products 
industry began to suffer from many of the same ailments that plagued industrial capitalism in its 
nascent, competitive form: chronic overproduction, excessive competition, and a generally 
unstable market (Robbins 1982; Perelman 2006).  As William Robbins (1982: 5) notes, [t]he 
lumber industry provides key insights into the evolution and expansion of industrial capitalism in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.”  
Leaders in the forest products industry, hoping to shield themselves from the anarchy of 
market competition, sought ways to bring order and stability to their market.  Various solutions 
were attempted, including the development of pools and trusts, ongoing mergers and 
acquisitions, and eventually the adoption of the modern corporate form.  At times (particularly 
during war) markets would stabilize and create a period of growth for forest product firms; 
however, most of these were short lived.  As Fortune magazine commented, “whenever 
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consumption rises and prices appear relatively stable, the rush to finance expansion begins 
again...big mills gobble up little mills, and little mills combine to form big mills, and then all of 
them build in a fine competitive frenzy while the money lasts.” (cited in Gordon 1994: 74). In 
the end, numerous tactics were employed by industry leaders in an ongoing effort to rationalize 
the industry and create a stable and predictable environment for ongoing capital accumulation 
Finance capital was at the center of this movement towards incorporation, providing 
investment capital for large firms to incorporate, and making enormous profits by issuing new 
securities.  Although incorporation took place under the auspices of stabilizing markets, the 
move towards incorporation failed to reduce market gluts and instability.  As one commentator 
noted, “New capacity in the paper industry after 1926 bore less relation to the market than…to 
the desire of the bankers in control of the industry to float new securities” (Gordon 1994: 74).  In 
this case, the pressure from finance capital exacerbated the problem of overproduction and 
falling prices by creating incentives for expansion that bore little relation to the reality of market 
conditions.  During this period many of the firms that would come to dominate the forest 
products industry during the 20th century formed: these include such notables as Union Camp 
(1874), Kimberly-Clark (1880), Mead (1882), Westvaco (1888), International Paper (1898), 
Weyerhaeuser (1900), Willamette (1906), Temple Lumber Company (1910), Stone Container 
(1926), Georgia-Pacific (1927), and Champion International (1929).   
The move towards consolidation and incorporation ultimately proved unsuccessful in 
dealing with the instability of the forest products market.  By increasing the scale of industrial 
production the forest products industry did not alleviate the chaos of market conditions, but 
merely reproduced them on a greater scale.  Investments into larger plants with newer, more 
efficient technology and greater production capacity often straddled early corporations with 
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massive amounts of debt.  This debt, along with taxes and other carrying charges, often coaxed 
manager into running their machines at full capacity around the clock, producing a glutted 
market, falling prices, and an ongoing cycle of boom and bust that quickly became the hallmark 
of the modern forest products industry (Robbins 1982).   
In addition to incorporation, numerous trade associations, both regional and national in 
scope, were organized in order to provide a forum for industry leaders to establish more 
cooperative relationships.  In the forest products industry, the most prominent trade association 
of the early 20th century was the National Lumber Manufacturers Association (NLMA).  
Following reorganization in 1918, the NLMA was led by Wilson Compton, who held this 
position for the next three decades.  During this period Compton became a prominent national 
figure, providing a unified front for the industry in Washington, and working to decrease the 
competitive rivalries that plagued the industry.  Under his leadership the forest products industry 
became one of the most important blocks in the nation’s power structure (Forest History Society 
2012).  
 When voluntary efforts to control production failed, as they most often did, the industry 
turned to government for help.  Many industry leaders were skeptical of federal intervention into 
private industry, fearing that any intervention might eventually lead to excessive regulation, or 
even socialism.  However, when voluntary efforts failed to produce the desired results, industry 
leaders turned to government as the option of last resort.  Federal intervention in the forest 
products industry, like most federal interventions of the Progressive Era, was carried out under 
the banner of conservation and purported to be in the public’s interest.37   
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 See Kolko (1963) for an overview of this argument.  
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William Boyd (2001: 171) summarizes this “rather remarkable example of public-private 
cooperation” as consisting of three phases: rationalization, regeneration, and intensification.  The 
rationalization process included a number of measures aimed at creating a more stable 
environment for investment in timber growing, such as fire protection and forest management.   
the establishment of a stable environment.  Regeneration included federal programs, such as the 
Clarke-McNary Act of 1924, which promoted the reforestation of cut-over land, particularly in 
the South.  And intensification refers to increased research into forest genetics and tree 
improvement, which often took place in cooperative programs between industry and public 
universities.  Although these federal programs certainly had positive public benefits – such as the 
promotion of sustainable forest management and the increase in total forest land – their 
underlying motivations was almost always geared towards preserving the status quo and 
establishing the conditions for continued corporate profits (Boyd 2001; Robbins 1982).   
 There is a long history of natural resource-based industries and government collusion in 
the United States and nowhere is this more evident than the relationship between the forest 
products industry and the US Forest Service (Robbins 1982; 1985).  The US Forest Service was 
established in the late 19th century, beginning with the Forest Reserve Act of 1891, which 
authorized the federal government to withdraw land from the public domain as “forest reserves.”  
For most its history, the Forest Service has served primarily in the interest of industrial forestry, 
providing valuable research and data on the nation’s forests.  As Robbins notes, “whether they 
worked for the federal government, as private consulting professionals, or in the lumber industry, 
most professional foresters and others closely associated with the forest products business shared 
a common ideological vision” (Robbins 1982: 8).  Indeed, many professionally trained foresters 
worked in both the public and private sectors, and their shared ideological commitment to the 
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economic imperatives of capitalism made this an easy transition.  In the language of the day, 
theirs was a “progressive” vision of capitalism where both the federal government and big 
business could act in unison to maintain the existing social relations under the auspices of the 
“public’s interest.”   
 Despite their best efforts, lumbermen of the late 19th and early 20th centuries were unable 
to bring stability to their market.  According to Robbins (1982: 9),  
[t]heir inability to cope with the lumberman’s broader problems does not imply 
personal incompetence, lack of effort, or insufficient technical expertise.  Rather, 
the chronic and inherent maladjustments that persisted in the lumber industry up 
to the Second World War reflected the basic contradictions in a system that 
promoted the idea of a freely competitive economy but was unable to achieve 
stability under those conditions.   
 
Throughout the first quarter of the 20th century the industry continued to be plagued by market 
fluctuations that constantly threated to undermine industrial profits.  It was not until the rapid rise 
in demand for war products that the forest products industry finally began to enjoy a degree of 
stability.   
 In the years following the Second World War, a prosperous national economy and a 
newfound level of cooperation enabled the forest products industry to enjoy a period of stability 
and prosperity.  Price wars, which had plagued the industry for much of its industrial past, were 
no longer as pervasive as leading firms in the industry were able to exert sufficient control over 
markets to stabilize prices and usher in a period of stability and growth.  According to Robbins 
(1982: 5),   
The increasingly stable lumber economy in the years after 1945 evolved in the 
midst of dramatically altered competitive conditions, the emergence of larger, 
more efficient and monopoly like operating groups, and the ability of trade 




During this period the modern forest products industry established itself as a seemingly 
permanent fixture of modern corporate America.  In 1956, International Paper, the nation’s 
largest forest product company, became the first in the sector to take a place among the Dow 
Jones Industrials. This entrance into the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) signaled the 
beginning of an era of unprecedented growth and prosperity in the US forest products industry.   
 
The US Forest Products Industry in the Postwar Era 
 
 By the 1950s the US forest products industry was firmly established as one of the most 
profitable and important industries in the nation.  Forest product firms played a fundamental role 
in the prosecution of the Second World War, providing wood products for a wide variety of war-
related needs and benefiting greatly from the technological advances that were made along the 
way.38  According to one study, during the 1950s, the forest products industry experienced “the 
most rapid advancement in technology in any decade in the United States history,” due in large 
part to the technological advancements made in the war effort (Panshin et al. 1962: v). 
 There is no doubt that the industry was crucial to the US economy. Using figures released 
by the Department of Commerce and the Census Bureau, the same study group found that in 
1956 the “wood-using industries” ranked first among all industries in their number of 
establishments, fifth in number of wage earners, sixth in total wages paid, seventh in 
expenditures for new structures and additions, third in expenditures for new machinery and 
equipment, and eighth in value added by manufacture (Panshin et al. 1962).  Panshin and his co-
authors also estimated that during the post-war period, timber accounted for slightly more than 
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 The forest products industry helped fill a number of needs for the US war economy.  For example, furniture 
factories were transformed to build gliders, lumber manufactures built truck bodies, and plywood plants fabricated 
boats (see Panshin et al. 1962).   
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one-fourth the value of all industrial material consumed in the US.  Clearly the forest products 
industry was a fundamental component of the postwar US economy.   
 Throughout this period the US forest products industry enjoyed an unprecedented period 
of growth and prosperity.  As shown in Figure 4.1, total after tax profits in the industry grew 
from a combined total of approximately $1 billion in 1950 to almost $6 billion in 1979.  This 
rapid growth in profits was due to a number of conditions: a growing population was flush with 
savings from the war economy and enjoying rising wages, causing a steady rise in consumption 
levels.  The working class in the United States, perhaps more than anywhere else, came to 
identify consumption with personal success and happiness (Resnick and Wolff 2010).  This 
success was often defined by owning one’s own house, and in the US, housing has been 
constructed primarily with forest products.   In addition, the US federal government continued to 
channel money into national development projects, including affordable housing programs and 
the interstate highway system, which enabled the rapid suburbanization of American cities and a 
rapid increase in demand for consumer products.  
During this period a pattern begins to emerge whereby the performance of the forest 
products industry showed a strong parallel to the health of the US economy in general.  This is 
due to the fact that the two primary sectors of the industry, wood products and paper products, 
are directly tied to consumer markets.  The primary use of wood products in the US is home 
construction and one can tie the fate of the industry quite closely to movements in housing starts.  
The second forest products sector, pulp and paper, is also directly tied to the general health of the 
nation’s economy.  This is especially the case with paperboard, which is the sector that accounts 
for almost half of all paper industry production.  Paperboard is widely used for packing and 




Figure 4.1 Total After Tax Profits in US Forest Products Industry  
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 6.19 
 
 
final purchaser.  For example, most of the goods purchased in the grocery store are contained in 
a cardboard package containing product information and branding images.  These packages 
themselves were shipped in large paperboard packages, which are discarded before the product 
hits the shelf.  The paper industry is clearly tied to the shipment and sales of many of the nation’s 
staple products.   Newsprint is another sector of the paper industry that is directly tied to the ups 
and downs of the economy in general.  As one industry analyst noted, “[i]n as much as 
businesses tend to advertise more in good times than in bad, it follows that the state of the 
general economy is a prime determinant of newsprint consumption” (S&P 1974: P13). 
 Table 4.1 highlights some additional economic characteristics of the industry during the 
postwar era.  The industry enjoyed a steady increase in the value of its shipments, which rose 
from nearly $26 billion in 1963 to over $119 billion in 1980.  Total value added increased from  
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Table 4.1 Trends in General Economic Characteristics of the US Forest Products Industry for 
selected years, 1954-198039 








    
Value of Shipments*    
1963 9,200 16,357 25,557 
1967 11,205 20,970 32,175 
1972 23,816 28,262 52,078 
1977 39,919 52,056 91,975 
1980 47,193 72,650 119,843 
Value Added by 
Manufacture*    
1954 3,242 4,630 7,872 
1963 4,021 7,396 11,417 
1972 10,309 13,064 23,373 
1977 16,223 22,171 38,394 
1980 18,079 29,688 47,767 
New Captial 
Expenditures*    
1954 217 533 750 
1963 395 709 1,104 
1972 931 1,335 2,266 
1977 1,563 3,295 4,858 
1980 2,028 5,226 7,254 
Establishments    
1954 41,484 5,004 46,488 
1963 36,150 5,713 41,863 
1967 36,795 5,890 42,685 
1972 33,948 6,038 39,986 
1977 37,302 6,545 43,847 
Employees in 
Operating 
Establishments**    
1954 646 528 1,174 
1963 563 588 1,151 
1967 554 639 1,193 
1972 691 633 1,324 
1980 698 645 1,343 
                                                 
 
39
 Data compiled from Ellefson and Stone (1984), Table 2.1 Pp 13-14.  
* Million Dollars, **Thousands  
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$7.8 billion in 1954 to $47.7 billion in 1980.  This expansionary period included a steady 
rise in capital expenditures as well, seeing them rise from $750 million in 1954 to over 
$7.2 billion in 1980.  This increase in capital expenditures resulted in a decrease in the 
number establishments in the wood products sector, as larger and more productive saw 
mills increasingly replaced small-scale lumber yards.  In the paper products sector the 
number of establishments increased from just over five thousand in 1954 to over six and 
a half thousand by 1977.  There was a modest increase in employment as well, rising 
from 1.1 million employees in 1954 to 1.3 million in 1980.   
This period of expansion reflects an industry that was enjoying sustained profits 
and, furthermore, that these profits were in the hands of production oriented managers 
with a strong inclination to funnel these surpluses back into expanded reproduction.  
During decades immediately following the Second World War these managers sought to 
expand their firm’s productive capacity with little regard to rate of return on the money 
being spent – expansion was the name of the game.  This focus on expansion, as opposed 
to a rate of return, is also an indication of how managers were able to secure a relatively 
high degree of freedom from financial control.   
Figure 4.2 reveals the steady rise in capacity that took place in the industry during 
the post war era.  From the mid-1950s through 1972, capacity for all grades of paper rose 
at an average annual rate of 3.7 percent (S&P 1973).  In addition to capacity expansion, 
managers also made significant investments into research and design in the hopes of 




Figure 4.2 Total Capacity in Forest Products industry, 1948-1980  
Source: Federal Reserve 
 
By the 1970s, expenditures for pollution control were also becoming significant, as were 
maintenance costs on existing equipment.   
This period of general prosperity for the US forest products industry took place 
under the leadership of a handful of large corporations.  In the following section I 
examine the ownership structure of leading firms in the industry during this period.  Here 
I will show how the relationship between stockholders and managers was structured in a 
manner that gave managers a high degree of relative autonomy in their control over the 




Ownership in the Forest Products Industry during the Post-war era 
 
 As in other sectors of the US economy during the post-war era, the public 
corporation became the dominant institution in the forest products industry.  Other types 
of ownership structures, such as partnerships or sole proprietorships continued to co-
exist, but the bulk of market activity was conducted by large publicly traded corporations.  
Over time the ownership structure of these firms followed the same trajectory as most 
corporations as stock ownership became increasing diffused among thousands of 
shareholders.  This diffusion of ownership provided managers with a considerable 
amount of discretion in the day-to-day operation of the firm.   
The question of how much stock ownership is necessary to exert control and 
exactly how control is exercised is highly debated.  A common benchmark used by 
researchers is to focus on those who own over 5 percent of a given firm’s stock, who are 
commonly referred to as “blockholders” (Holderness 2003; Barclay and Holderness 
1991).  A higher benchmark of ten percent for corporate disclosure requirements was 
adopted by the Security and Exchange Commission as part of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934.  In 1970 Congress changed this requirement from 10 to 5 percent 
in an amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, due to arguments that 5 
percent had now become a sufficient level for a stockholder to exert substantial leverage 
over a company.  In an earlier report, Congress argued that even 1 or 2 percent of a firms 
stock may be significant enough for a stockholder to gain significant influence in the firm 
(U.S. Congress 1968, cited in Ellefson and Stone 1984: 143-144).  The exact nature of 
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the relationship between concentrated stockownership and control continues to be a 
subject of debate (Holderness 2003).   
Ellefson and Stone’s (1984) study of US “wood-based” industries contains the 
most extensive study of stock ownership during the postwar era.   Examining stock 
ownership in 1980 they found that “[i]n two-thirds of 26 companies examined, the single 
largest stockholder controlled less than 10 percent of a company’s outstanding stock.  
Among the top 10 firms in 1980, only five had a single stockholder with more than 5 
percent of the company’s stock.  Based on these numbers Ellefson and Stone conclude 
that there is little evidence to suggest that a significant concentration of stock ownership 
exits for any institution to exercise a significant amount of control over management.  
Management, in other words, enjoyed a relatively high level of autonomy in the forest 
product industry. 
As Ellefson and Stone (1984) note in their analysis of stock ownership in the 
forest products industry, there are five prevalent ownership categories: family interests, 
foreign owners, wood-based corporations, institutional owners, and thousands of 
individual stockholders. Large stockholdings among wealthy families is a vestige of 19th 
century capitalism, often occurring when entrepreneur capitalists, or Robber Barons in 
the common parlance of the day, bequeathed large sums of wealth, in the form of stock, 
to their children and grandchildren.  The Luke family’s interest in Westvaco is a classic 
example in the forest products sector: founded by William Luke in the late 19th century, 
Westvaco rapidly became one of the leading producers of paper products in the US.  Over 
the course of the 20th century, five generations of Luke family decedents would go on to 
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lead the Westvaco Corporation, the latest being John A. Luke Jr. who became CEO in 
1992 and continues to lead the company to this day.40 Yet, in a pattern that is emblematic 
of the challenges facing family dominated firms, the Luke family’s ownership stake in 
the company has slowly dwindled.  In 1962 the family owned 30 percent of the 
company’s stock; by the early 1980s this share was down to just 2 percent.   
This pattern was repeated in several other family-centered firms, including 
Weyerhaeuser, which did not go public until 1963, and Mead.  In other cases, large 
family stockholdings extended beyond the interests of a single firm; the DuPont family, 
for example, owned significant shares of both Kimberly-Clark and Louisiana-Pacific.  By 
the early 1980s family ownership of stock in the forest products industry remained 
significant in many firms, despite their considerable decline over the course of the 20th 
century (Ellefson and Stone 1984: 133).   The question of the family’s influence over 
managerial decision-making, however, is an open question.  In fact, the enduring 
influence of some families, such as the Weyerhaeuser family, might be partially 
responsible for explaining why the firm later resisted pressure to engage in certain 
practices, such as selling of timberlands, in order to increase shareholder value.   
Foreign ownership was another common feature of stock ownership in the US 
forest products industry that was highlighted by Ellefson and Stone (1984).  In 1980, 
sixty-eight US forest product firms were identified as having a foreign entity owning ten 
percent or more of the firm’s securities.  In some cases, the family form and foreign 
ownership combined. For example, the British Rothschild family group stood out as one 
                                                 
 
40
 Westvaco is now MeadWestvaco following a 2002 merger with Mead.  
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of the most common owners of stock in US forest product firms, owning stock in at least 
26 US firms.  Four of these companies, including Boise Cascade, Crown Zellerbach, 
Georgia-Pacific, and Weyerhaeuser, claimed the Rothschild family among their top ten 
shareholders.  Other examples include the Bronfman family of Canada, who were the 
number one stockholder of Scott Paper, and James Goldsmith of France, who had 
acquired over 28 percent of the outstanding stock in Diamond International during the 
late 1970s (Ellefson and Stone 1984).   
Although it was not common for forest product firms to purchase significant 
interests in other firms in the same industry, by the early 1980s, there were several firms 
that held significant shares of their own stock.  Four firms were identified by Ellefson and 
Stone (1984) as being among the top three shareholders of their own stock: Kimberly-
Clark (third), Georgia-Pacific (first), Masonite (second), and Louisiana-Pacific (third).  
Companies owning large amounts of their own shares did not become a common 
phenomenon in the industry for another two decades, after changes in the regulatory 
regime encouraged firms to increase stock buybacks in order to increase shareholder 
value.   
 By the early 1980s, institutional investors were also becoming a major ownership 
category in the US forest products industry.  At the time, however, few institutional 
investors held large block shares in any particular firm.  The tendency at the time was for 
institutional investors to own small amounts of stock in many different firms.  J.P. 
Morgan Company, for example owned stock in 17 different forest product firms, but few 
of these holdings exceeded 3 or 4 percent of any single company.  In their conclusion, 
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however, Ellefson and Stone (1984) predicted correctly that forest products industry, 
following national trends, would see an increase in company stock owned by institutional 
investors.  
 
Monopoly Capital and the US Forest Products Industry:  
The Surplus Disposal Problem 
 
 Rising profits in the decades following the Second World War left managers in 
the US forest products industry in control of a significant surplus of capital. In keeping 
with the managerial conception of control, managers preferred to reinvest their surpluses 
internally in order to expand capacity and increase efficiencies.  This tendency for 
managers to reinvest their profits in expanded capacity often caused total capacity in the 
industry to outpace demand.  As a result, a glut would emerge in the market and prices 
would plummet.  Maintaining the delicate balance between supply and demand was no 
easy task, and despite numerous efforts to coordinate output and stabilize profits, it was a 
constant struggle for managers to bring their own desires for expansion in line with the 
limitations of the market place.  By the mid-1970s, industry analysts were calling for 
managers to rein in their expansionary inclinations (S&P 1974: P9). However, it was not 
until the early 1990s that more financially-oriented managers finally were able to rein in 
capacity expansion. 
As shown in figure 4.2, overall capacity in both the wood products and paper 
products sector rose steadily throughout the post war period.  Capacity utilization rates, 
on the other hand, fluctuated from year to year as managers tried, often unsuccessfully, to 
limit total supply in order to avoid flooding the market and causing prices to plummet.  
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Maintaining high utilization rates is critical for capital-intensive industries such as the 
paper industry.  This need is due in large part to the significant debt that often incurred in 
the process of financing a large pulp and paper mill.  In order to meet payments on this 
debt and to maintain profit rates, managers are compelled to keep utilization rates high.  
As one Standard & Poor’s analyst explained (S&P 1975:P11),  
[h]istorically, paper makers have enjoyed a sellers’ market when operating 
rates are above 94%, at which time prices rise more rapidly than 
costs…When operating rates are between 92% and 94%, the industry 
normally has a more balanced posture, with prices and costs moving at the 
same rate.  At 90% to 92%, costs are moving somewhat ahead of prices, 
and below 90% prices are actually reduced on an average ton.   
 
Figure 4.3 shows the capacity utilization rates for both the wood products and paper 
products sectors.  To the chagrin of these analysts, the paper products sector overall 
capacity utilization rate fluctuated between 85 and 95 percent in the decades following 
the Second World War.  The need to maintain a high utilization rate meant that there 
were definite limits to investments into expanded capacity, less they run the risk of 
overproduction and/or a drop in overall prices.  In the wood products sector the 
utilization rate fluctuates more widely.  This is due primarily to the close correlation that 
exists between the wood products sector and housing starts, which themselves are highly 




   
Figure 4.3 Capacity Utilization in Wood Products and Paper Products sector, 1948-2008  
Source: Federal Reserve 
 
 
The need to maintain high utilization rates in the forest products sector coupled 
with the highly cyclical nature of its markets meant that managers faced tough decisions 
on when to invest in expanded capacity.  The production oriented managers of the post-
war period had a strong inclination towards expanding productive capacity; however, as 
we saw, these inclinations were limited by the reality of overproduction and glutted 
markets.  This gave rise to the surplus disposal problem: how to invest surplus profits and 
grow the firm without letting supply outstrip demand and cause prices to plummet?  In 
the US forest products industry the response took a number of forms, including ongoing 
mergers and acquisitions, diversification, and increased investment into timberland 




Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
 During the postwar era, mergers and acquisitions became a favorite tactic of 
managers looking to expand their corporate portfolios.  As we recall, the industry was 
significantly altered by the merger wave that swept across the US at the turn of the 20th 
century.  During this period, mergers and acquisitions were undertaken in the hopes of 
bringing stability to the industry’s notoriously unstable markets.  Although these efforts 
ultimately failed to deliver the stability that industry leaders desired, they did produce the 
corporate giants that would go on to dominate the US forest products industry during 
most of the 20th century.  And just as the forest products industry mimicked the merger 
waves of the early 20th century, so it would follow the second merger wave of the 20th 
century that took place in the late 1960s.41   
 Mergers are often characterized as either horizontal or vertical: horizontal refers 
to mergers of two or more companies that produce the same or similar products in the 
same market; vertical mergers, on the other hand, refer to mergers that bring together 
different stages of the production process.  For example: a paper company purchasing a 
packaging company would be a vertical integration of the paper process by linking the 
two stages of production within the same parent company.  There is also a third type of 
merger, a conglomerate merger, which is when a firm purchases another firm that 
produces products that are not competitive with each other, but might rely on the same 
                                                 
 
41
 There were four or five distinct merger waves in the United States during the 20th century: 1887-1904, 
1916-1929, 1965-1969, 1984-1989, and the early 1990s to the present.  The proximity of the last two lends 
itself to the argument that there has been an ongoing merger wave in the US since the early 1980s.  For a 
history of merger waves in the United States see Gaughan (2007).  For an analysis of the cause of merger 
waves see Hartford (2005).   
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raw materials.  For instance, it was common for paper manufacturers to purchase 
sawmills and vice versa.  Conglomerate mergers also refer to those mergers that extend a 
firm’s market to different regions.  In reality mergers and acquisitions take on a number 
of different forms, which often defy easy classification (Ellefson and Stone 1984).   
 During the postwar period, the forest products industry was altered by all three 
types of mergers.  In fact, the forest products industry experienced a greater level of 
merger activity than the industrial sector in general.  According to one study,  
In the paper and allied products industry group, the aggregate assets of 
large corporations absorbed by mergers between 1948 and 1968 were 
equivalent to 35% of that group’s assets in 1965.  This was the highest 
ratio for any of the 21 groups in the mining and manufacturing sectors of 
the U.S.  The comparable ratio for the lumber and wood products industry 
group was 13% and that for the two groups combined was 28% (Le 
Master 1977).   
 
The merger wave of the post-war era was largely driven by the leading firms in the 
industry.  LeMaster (1977) found that from 1950 to 1970 there were 424 mergers among 
the leading forest product firms.  The leaders in this group included Georgia-Pacific (85 
mergers), Boise Cascade (80 mergers), Mead (57 mergers), St. Regis (52 mergers), and 
Champion International (46 mergers) (Le Master 1977; Ellefson and Stone 1984: 213).   
The rationale for these mergers and acquisitions varied widely; Le Master (1977) 
identified six general advantages: 
 
1. Advantages associated with increased firm size such as greater control 
over markets and prices 
2. Efficiencies associated with vertical integration through replacement of 
market transaction control between productive stages with managerial 
decision making 
3. Assurance of timber supply 
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4. Qualification for tax provisions of section 631 (a) of the Internal Revenue 
Code 
5. Assurance of markets for products 
6. Stabilization of profits through diversification  
The first and second advantages are common justifications for mergers and acquisitions 
because larger firms have stronger market positions and are often able to discipline less 
vertically integrated competitors.  Furthermore, managers have a distinct interest in 
mergers because larger firms generally pay executives more than do smaller firms.   
 Two advantages display the unique situation of the forest products sector: the 
need for a steady supply of raw materials and the tax advantages associated with owning 
timberland.  As with all natural resource-based industries, the need to secure an adequate 
supply of raw materials is critical.  The trend towards direct ownership of timberland was 
supported by a tax structure that greatly benefited firms that owned their own land.  
Section 631(a) of the tax code allows timber owners to treat the difference between the 
fair market value of cut timber and its cost as a capital gain when the timber is not sold 
but merely transferred to another branch of the same corporation.  This gave timber 
owning firms a substantial advantage over those that purchased their timber on the open 
market.  Furthermore, under this tax regulation, firms were allowed to determine the “fair 
market value” for their timber by themselves. Not surprisingly, this discretionary power 
often resulted in an exaggerated valuation aimed at decreasing the reported gain and 
increasing the effective subsidy for timber-owning firms.   
 The merger wave of the late 1960s had a significant impact on the US forest 
products industry.  The large firms that dominated the industry were able to gobble up 
smaller competitors, allowing them to gain greater control over prices and mitigate the 
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effects of cut-throat competition.  Merger activity in the industry peaked in 1968 and 
1969, with 185 mergers taking place in these two years alone.  By this point, federal anti-
trust lawsuits were becoming a problem for the industry, prompting firms to increasingly 
move towards conglomerate mergers aimed at diversifying the firm’s portfolio (Le 
Master 1977; Ellefson and Stone 1984: 197-221).   
 
On Oligopoly and Concentration  
 
 The degree of oligopoly in the forest products industry has long been a subject of 
debate.  As early as 1906, a congressionally mandated study by the Bureau of 
Corporations described monopolistic conditions in the industry.  In particular, the study 
found monopolistic practices derived from high levels of concentration in timberland 
ownership.42 Over the course of the 20th century, the industry continued to consolidate, 
resulting in larger and larger firms, controlling ever larger segments of market activity.  
Despite this trend towards consolidation, the debate over the relative degree of monopoly, 
or oligopoly, continues to this day.   
Many observers, particularly economists, argue that the industry is a close 
approximation of the model of pure competition, in which no individual firm holds 
disproportionate power over market prices (Zaremba 1963).  Others argue that the 
industry is oligopolistic in character, meaning that a small number of firms are able to 
                                                 
 
42
 In an ironic twist, it was the debt incurred from purchasing these timberlands that led some firms to 
maintain high production levels in the face of declining prices.  Unable to pay the carrying costs out of 
pocket, lumbermen were forced to run their machines at a loss in order to maintain payments on their debt 
(Steen 2004; Compton 1916).    
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dominate market activity (Robbins 1982).  Still others argue that the industry has an 
oligopolistic structure, meaning that it is competitive at the output level, but highly 
concentrated at the input level, leading to various market imperfections (Mead 1966).  
This debate is confounded by the fact that there are various ways to measure industry 
concentration and divergent views on what actually constitutes oligopolistic markets.   
The most commonly used measurement of industry concentration is the 
“concentration ratio” which measures the proportion of total industry sales that are 
collectively attributed to the industry’s largest firms.  Concentration ratios are collected 
by the US Census Bureau and are provided for the top four, eight, twenty and fifty largest 
firms in any given industry.  This measure of concentration is not without fault, as the 
percent of sales by a number of firms is a poor measure of competition.43 This is 
particularly the case in industries that have considerable levels of international 
competition.  Nevertheless, these ratios provide a useful starting point.  
 As shown in table 4.2, the level of concentration varies widely between different 
sectors, with wood products sectors (SIC code 24) generally having lower levels of 
concentration than those in the paper products sector (SIC code 26).  This pattern is due 
primarily to the fact the paper products sector is substantially more capital intensive, 
requiring significant investments into modern pulp and paper plants, and creating a 
formidable barrier to entry for likely competitors.  Logging and sawmills, on the other 
hand, are relatively cheap and range in size from the industrial mills of the large 
                                                 
 
43
 Concentration measures reflect concentrated market conditions, which are then presumed to reflect the 
opportunity for the abuse of market power.  As Ellefson and Stone (1984: 75) note, “concentration by itself 
need not imply misuse of corporate position in the market place any more than lack of concentration 
implies perfect competition and the utopia that supposedly follows.”  
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corporations, to the “peckerwood mills” that are found in most every small town in the 
US.  Specialty products, such as fine papers and newsprint, tend to have much higher 
levels of market concentration  
Table 4.2 also shows that the levels of concentration in the industry tended to 
increase over the course of the postwar period.  This tendency was most evident in the 
wood products sector, although it still did not match the concentration levels that were 
found in the paper products sector.  In paper product sectors, the increase was less drastic.  
As explained above, the merger wave in the industry peaked in the late 1960s, before 
receding slightly in the 1970s.  In this case, the relatively strong anti-trust laws of the era 
placed definite limits on the level of industry concentration.   
 But by the 1970s, industry analysts claimed that the US forest products industry 
was largely saturated and there was relatively little room for new companies to enter the 
field (S&P 1975: P11).  The reason that entry was so difficult is intimately connected to 
the question of timber supply.  Over the course of the 20th century, the most productive 
timberlands were either placed under the protection of the federal government or were 
acquired by established firms.  Another factor was that the paper industry is capital- 
 
Table 4.2 Percentage of Sales for Four Largest Firms in Selected Forest Product 
Industries   
Industry (SIC Code) 1963 1967 1977 1982 
Logging (2411) 11 14 29 30 
Sawmills and Planing Mills, General (2421) 11 11 17 17 
Special Product Sawmills (2429) 17 21 11 25 
Pulp Mills (2611) 48 45 48 45 
Fiber Cans, Tubes, Drums, and Similar Products (2655) 57 51 54 61 
Sanitary Paper Products (2676) 62 63 65 62 




intensive, making it unlikely that a new entrant would be able to find the kind of 
financing that would be necessary to finance a modern pulp mill.  With anti-trust laws 
limiting merger and acquisition activity, managers were compelled to seek out alternative 




 Although mergers and acquisitions continued to be important in US forest 
products industry during the post-World War II era, diversification increasingly became 
the preferred means for managers to expand their corporate portfolios.  Diversification 
serves a number of functions for large corporations operating in mature markets – the 
most important of which is that it provides a solution for managers facing limited internal 
investment opportunities.  Furthermore, it allowed managers to expand into unrelated 
product lines, thus providing balance to the firm’s portfolio by spreading risk across 
various market sectors.   This was particularly important in cyclical industries such as the 
forest products industry.    
There were a number of different strategies available for managers looking to 
diversify.  First, managers could choose to diversify within the forest products industries.  
By the late 1960s, most of the leading firms in the industry had multiple divisions related 
to forest products.  Boise Cascade was indicative of a firm that spread itself widely across 
various sectors of the industry.  Under the leadership of their President, Robert 
Hansberger, Boise Cascade’s corporate activities included operations in wood product 
manufacturing, building materials fabrication and distribution, paper manufacturing, and 
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packaging and office distributing.  Other companies also chose to expand their operations 
to include non-wood products such as metals, plastics and real estate.  In Ellefson and 
Stone’s (1984) study of leading industry firms they found that on average each firm 
operated in seven different industry segments.  Firms such as St. Regis and Georgia-
Pacific were operating in as many as 17 different parts of the industry.    
 A third strategy for diversification was to look outside the industry to completely 
unrelated markets.  In the same study cited above, the authors found that among the 55 
studied firms and specifically those that relied on wood-based operations for at least 
three-quarters of their 1978 revenue, there were 12 firms operating in at least 35 non-
wood industries.  These included real estate, plastic products, chemicals, machinery, 
instruments, primary metals, and stone and concrete products.  The leaders in this trend 
were among the largest firms in the industry, including such notables as Union Camp, St. 
Regis, and Scott Paper Company.  By the late 1970s it was now common for industry 
firms to earn a larger percentage of their revenue from markets unrelated to forest 
products (Ellefson and Stone 1984; Enk 1975). 
Pacific Lumber Company presents an extreme example of this trend towards 
diversification: although by name the company is most directly engaged in the forest 
products industry, over seventy percent of the company’s 1981 sales originated with the 
manufacture of cutting and welding products, while only 25 percent originated with 
forest products.  The other five percent consisted of such varied markets as vegetable 
growing in California and hotel management.  Mead was another prominent of example 
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of this trend: by 1981 less than half of the company’s sales originated from wood 
products.   
Diversification strategies often developed directly out of managers’ desire to gain 
control over the everyday expenses of the firm and to reduce costs.  For instance, in 1948 
Kimberly-Clark decided to establish an airline in order to provide air transportation for 
company executives and engineers between the company’s Neenha, Wisconsin 
headquarters and their mills.  The company airline, then operating under the name of K-C 
Aviation continued to grow and in 1984 became a regularly scheduled passenger airline 
under the name of Midwest Express.  During Bowater’s expansion of the 1950s, their 
president, Sir Eric Bowater, became frustrated by the excessive rates that his firm had to 
pay for shipping and decided that Bowater would purchase their own fleet of ships to 
transport their wood products, thus establishing a subsidiary Bowater Steamship Co. 
(Reader 1981: 248).  This trend towards diversification was not confined to just a few 
firms: indeed, Ellefson and Stone (1984: 23-32) found that among the top 50 firms in the 
industry there were 16 whose revenue from forest products operations represented less 
than 36 percent of their total income.    
Forest product firms were also identified by other large corporations during this 
period as viable targets for their own diversification strategies.  During the post war 
period, giant firms such as Mobil, Time, ITT, and Philip Morris each sought out forest 
product firms as part of their expanding corporate portfolio.  The rationale for 
diversifying into the forest product industry varied, with some seeking vertical integration 
for their publishing lines, while others were looking to diversify their holdings in order to 
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maintain a broader, more diversified corporate conglomerate.  A major attraction for 
potential buyers was the large timberland holdings of major firms, which were often 
considered an undervalued and potentially profitable investment.  The notion that 
timberland was a profitable investment was also becoming widely known within the 




Land ownership has long been a significant aspect of the economic and social 
fabric of American society (Wolf 1981).  This is particularly the case with natural 
resource-based industries, which rely on the land and the products derived therefrom as 
the principle source of their of their business enterprise.  In the forest products industry, 
owning and/or gaining access to timberland, is a perennial concern of managers who 
require an enormous amount of raw materials to keep their mills running.   The strategies 
employed by management to gain access to raw materials tend to change over time as 
managers adapt to the changing conditions of the market and the availability of timber 
supply.  In what follows, I show how timberland ownership strategies are also highly 
affected by broader shifts in managerial conceptions of control.  That is to say, during the 
postwar era, timberland ownership was increasingly motivated by the broader strategy of 
capital accumulation that compelled manager to reinvest surplus profits in order to grow 
the firm and ensure its long-term survival.  
Dating back to the 19th century, land ownership in the US forest products industry 
was a critical component of success for many firms.  In keeping with the general 
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relationship of coordination between the federal government and industry that I described 
above, many forest lands were provided as a “free gift” of nature from the state.  Indeed, 
companies such as Weyerhaeuser, Potlatch, and Boise Cascade built their corporate 
empires on large land holdings that were acquired from federal land grants.  In 1864, 
Congress created the Northern Pacific Railroad Company in order to construct a rail line 
from Lake Superior to Puget Sound.  In order to aid in the construction of this rail line 
Congress also granted the Northern Pacific nearly 40 million acres of land.  Congress 
intended that this land be open to settlement, but the railroad company sold much of the 
land to large corporations.  Fredrick Weyerhaeuser in particular came to own hundreds of 
thousands of acres of timberland that was drawn from the public trust in order to promote 
the development of railroads (Jensen and Draffan 1995).   
Over the course of the 20th century managers increasingly came to believe that 
gaining control over timberland was a necessary component for success in the US forest 
products industry.  This was particularly the case during the postwar era when direct 
control over timberland became a “prominent concern of corporate managers” (Enk 
1975: 41).  During this period, population growth and spreading affluence led to 
increased pressure on the US land base, which in turn led managers to believe that 
securing control over timberland was critical to their firm’s survival.  Commenting on 
this trend in the early 1960s, Panshin and his colleagues (1962: 4, emphasis added) noted 
that  
[T]he realities of economic forces are pointing to the need for permanency 
of timber ownership.  In times past, it has not always been economically 
feasible for mill owners to retain ownership of forest lands.  Now large 
segments of the industry realize that permanent ownership and the 
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management of forest lands on a sustained yield basis offer the only sure 
means of survival.     
 
Gaining access to timber supplies can take a number of forms, including fee 
simple (i.e., direct) ownership, purchase agreements, public sale contracts, and various 
other private agreements between private land owners and forest product firms (Ellefson 
and Stone 1984: 96-97).  Enk’s (1975) study of land use decision making in the forest 
products industry found that during the post-war era there was a dramatic increase in both 
direct ownership and purchase agreements among US forest product firms.  He found that 
between 1961 and 1970 the amount of land controlled by the industry more than doubled 
to almost seventy-nine million acres.  Of the total increase, the majority of this land 
(71%) was under leasing and cutting agreements, while the remaining land (29%) was 
purchased outright by the firm.  Here we are primarily concerned with the latter category 
– that of direct fee ownership – because of the critical role that direct ownership played in 
US forest products industry.44 
Table 4.3 shows ownership statistics for all commercial timberland in the United 
States during the postwar era.  In 1952, the forest products industry owned over fifty-nine 
million acres of timberland in the US, which represented 12 percent of all US timberland 
and 17 percent of the total private timberlands.  By 1977, the industry ownership of US 
timberland had increased to almost sixty-nine million acres, bringing their share of the 
total privately owned timberlands in the US to 20 percent.  This substantial rise in 
                                                 
 
44
 The vast majority of the land controlled under leases and purchasing agreements was in Canada, where 
policy favored the retention of government ownership and the use of control agreements with corporations.  
In the United States, direct fee ownership was much more common.  For a more detailed discussion, see 
Enk (1975: 40-64).   
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timberland ownership reflects manager’s growing preoccupation with gaining direct 
control over timberland as part of their broader corporate strategy.    
Determining the amount of land that is owned by specific firms is no easy task.  
However, a number of studies conducted in the 1970s and early 1980s provide us with a 
good snapshot of which firms were purchasing land, and for what reasons (Enk 1975; 
O’Laughlin and Ellefson 1982; Ellefson and Stone 1984)45.  This research clearly shows 
that the surge in timberland ownership was driven primarily by the industry’s largest and 
most prominent firms. Ellefson and Stone (1984: 109) found that “between 1945 and 
1970, 16 companies amassed over 23 million acres of fee-owned timberland (90 percent 
located in the United States), with the bulk of the increases occurring since 1960.” By 
1969, International Paper, long the nation’s leading forest products firm, held the most 
timberland with over 6.5 million.  Weyerhaeuser was the second leading owner of  
 
 



















1952 499,332 143,721 355,611 59,548 12% 17% 
1962 509,380 143,683 365,697 61,558 12% 17% 
1970 496,404 141,590 354,815 66,980 13% 19% 
1977 482,486 135,722 346,764 68,782 14% 20% 
Source: Birch, Lewis, and Kaiser (1982)  
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 O’Laughlin and Ellefson (1982) liken the accounting of timberland ownership to photographing a 
moving object with a box camera.  Not only does timberland ownership change significantly over time, but 




timberland with over 5.5 million acres.46 By 1979 the top four firms (consisting of 
International Paper, Weyerhaeuser, Georgia-Pacific, and St. Regis Paper) collectively 
owned over 20 million acres, which amounted to 30 percent of all industrially owned 
timberland.  The top 40 largest firms accounted for 84 percent of all industrial owned 
forest land (Ellefson and Stone 1984: 108-109). 
In the early 1980s, International Paper was the largest corporate land owner in the 
nation, holding more than 7.1 million acres.  This would, as Ellefson and Stone (1984: 
108) point out, qualify the company as the 42nd largest state in the nation, slightly ahead 
of Maryland but consisting entirely of valuable timberland. Clearly, such high levels of 
land ownership gave these firms a substantial amount of wealth and power in the regions 
that they were located.47  Claims that these levels of ownership do not constitute high 
levels of concentration (see O’Laughlin and Ellefson 1982) ignore the role that regional 
concentration plays in determining prices and play down the advantage that large firms 
gain through their access to their own timber supply.48  But for now I want to turn our 
focus to the questions of why managers suddenly sought to purchase all this timberland?  
What rationale was at play in the decision to purchase timberland and how did the 
managerial conception of control of the post-war era help shape manager’s perspective on 
timberland ownership?   
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 Although Weyerhaeuser owned fewer acres of timberland than International Paper, their high value 
Western timberland was valued at over twice that of International Paper’s land (O’Laughlin and Ellefson 
1982).  
47
 For more on how land ownership is a source of both power and wealth, see Wolf (1981) and Freyfogle 
(2003).      
48
 See Mead (1966) for an analysis of oligopsony in the Douglas fir market of the Pacific Northwest.   
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The first and most obvious reason for firms to own their own land was to supply 
the necessary raw materials for their mills.  The enormous size and capacity of a modern 
mill requires a large land base in order to provide an adequate and steady supply of 
timber.   This need for a constant source of timber supply is particularly critical to the 
capital-intensive paper industry, which requires the highest possible utilization rates to 
maintain profitability.  In reality, however, even the largest firms rarely provide the 
majority of their timber supply from company owned lands. In his study of timberland 
ownership in the US forest products industry, Clephane (1978) found that among the 20 
largest forest product firms the average self-sufficiency was 43 percent.  Among the 
largest firms in the industry, Weyerhaeuser was the only one that came close to self-
sufficiency, with approximately 88 percent of their supply coming from company owned 
lands.  Several smaller firms had similar ratios, but the majority of firms in the industry 
relied on the open market for the majority of their timber supply (Clephane1978).   
In fact most large firms used their in-house timber supply primarily as a hedge 
against short-term price fluctuations in the market.  For example, when stumpage prices 
were on the rise a large firm owning their own timber supply could choose not to 
purchase on the open market and harvest trees from their own land instead.  When prices 
were low, on the other hand, they could either purchase trees on the open market, or in 
some instances, sell their own trees.  This ability to manipulate the market gave land-
owning firms a considerable advantage over firms that did not own land and was 
certainly an important factor in managerial decisions to purchase timberlands 
(O’Laughlin  and Ellefson 1982).  As we will see in Chapter 6, it also proved to be a vital 
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lifeline for large firms in the early 1990s when environmental concerns led to a 
precipitous drop in logging contracts on federal lands.     
However, a more fundamental reason for the increase in corporate land ownership 
was described by Gordon Enk in his 1975 study on “Land-Use Decision Making by 
Large Corporations in the Forest Products Industry.” Quoting an industry executive, Enk 
found that “…the major change grew from the recognition that (the company’s) essential 
physical asset was not its trees, but rather its land and the quality of its soils.”  That is to 
say the primary justification for purchasing more land was the value of the underlying 
asset and its unique characteristics.  I argue that this change can be understood in large 
part as a particular manifestation of the existing managerial conception of control that 
was in place during this period.   
Timberland became a desirable asset to managers for a number of reasons, the 
greatest perhaps being that it is a low-risk investment that tends to increase in value over 
time (tree growth is not dependent on the health of the broader economy), thus providing 
a hedge against inflation.  Timberland also provides income tax advantages since cut 
timber was treated as capital gains under the tax code.  A final factor driving the increase 
in corporate land ownership was the desire of firms to increase their competitive 
positions vis-à-vis other firms in the industry.  O’Laughlin and Ellefson (1982) recall an 
instance in 1979 in which International Paper purchased a rival company, Bodcaw, for 40 
percent over the appraised value of the firm.  The primary justification provided for this 
acquisition was the desire to increase the firm’s timberland holdings and to keep their 
rival Weyerhaeuser from “intruding into its domain.” Summarizing several studies on 
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corporate land ownership in the forest products industry, O’Laughlin and Ellefson (1982) 
concluded that the emerging strategy was moving away from a short-term focus on 
profits, and giving way “to strategies to use a company’s strength, namely timber 
resources, to ensure long-term success.”  
This emerging awareness among managers that timberland was a valuable asset 
that could serve to expand corporate profits led to the development of internal corporate 
divisions whose goal was no longer to manage the lands for timber but “to utilize the 
company’s land for real estate development and thus increase the return on the 
investment from the property” (Enk 1975: 59).  The first firm to develop such a division 
was Georgia-Pacific which established the Georgia-Pacific Investment Co. in 1955.  
During the late 1960s, eleven other companies established their own real estate divisions 
aimed at maximizing the real estate potential of their land holdings.  Enk’s research 
found that almost all of these companies were actively involved in assessing their land for 
development opportunities.  By 1975, one company, Boise Cascade, had a total of 
twenty-nine real estate development projects underway involving a total of 125,000 acres 
of land (Enk 1975).     
 It was in this environment that the industry began to adopt the real estate norm of 
“highest and best use” in their management of their timberlands – meaning that parcels of 
land should be continually reviewed with an eye towards maximizing the financial return 
on their investment.  For most of the timberland this meant continued management for 
high yield timber product; for others, however, this meant that parcels of land would be 
separated and used to generate income from non-timber producing means.  These 
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developments included exploration for agriculture, mining, and drilling potential.  Other 
parcels of land were set aside for the development of recreation communities, including 
several ski resorts.   
The industry trend towards in-house real estate divisions was limited, however, by 
the public backlash that often accompanied these development projects.  Boise Cascade’s 
development projects in California produced a wave of negative publicity from the 
bourgeoning ecological movement claiming that the company was causing extensive 
environmental harm.  There was also a series of lawsuits brought against the company by 
the California attorney general claiming that the company engaged in false advertising in 
their efforts to sell land.  These suits were eventually settled at a cost of $59 million (Enk 
1975; IDCH 2008).   
Together these experiences caused other companies to exercise caution in their 
pursuit of profits from real estate development in order to avoid the negative publicity 
and risk involved in with such projects.  In fact, public pressure on firms caused many 
companies to develop land use policies that included allowing public access for hunting, 
camping, and fishing. Several companies established open-access policies for all of their 
timberland as part of their broader public relations campaign and their desire to appease 
local stakeholders and build good relationships with communities (Enk 1975).     
The trend towards increased ownership of timberland persisted throughout the 
1970s as forest product managers continued to operate under the “retain and reinvest” 
conception of corporate control.  These firms used surplus profits and debt to expand 
their timberland holdings as part of their broader corporate strategy of diversification and 
 141 
 
expansion.  By the late 1970s it was widely believed that corporate ownership of 
timberlands was a critical component for success in the US forest products industry 
(Clephane 1978).  Just as this statement was being uttered, however, a series of 
transformations were occurring in the US political economy that would quickly 




 In this chapter I analyzed the historical development of the US forest products 
industry during the postwar era, providing evidence of how managers operated under a 
“retain and reinvest” conception of control.  I argue that this conception of control was 
directly linked to the industry’s development as a mature sector operating under the 
historical conditions of monopoly capitalism.  This managerial orientation stressed 
growth and expansion as the ultimate pursuit of the firm.  As we recall, the ability to 
engage in expanded reproduction was limited due to the close relationship between 
capacity utilization and profit rates.  This compelled managers to seek alternative means 
for investing their surplus capital and expanding corporate profits, including growth 
through mergers and acquisitions, diversification into unrelated product lines, and 
increased investment into timberland ownership.  Here we see that there is a direct 
relation between the material realities of capital accumulation under monopoly capitalism 
and the ideological orientation of managers during the postwar period.   
 The next chapter will document how a series of transformations in the US 
political economy associated with the adoption of neoliberal policies and the explosion of 
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the financial sector would destabilize the corporate empires that managers had 
constructed over the course of the 20th century.  Beginning with the hostile takeover 
movement of the 1980s, managers in the forest products industry were forced to contend 
with a reinvigorated shareholder class that demanded more from their capital investment.  
In response, managers eventually came to adopt a new conception of control aimed at 
maximizing shareholder value.  I argue that this new managerial orientation provided the 
justification for a series of decisions that would forever change the forest products 
industry in the United States.  Furthermore, I argue that this emerging conception of 
control was a particular manifestation of the financialization process that then beginning 











“Corporations…belong to shareholders, not managements who believe that the 
 business that employs them has become an institution and they are  
the trustees of that institution.” ~Sir James Goldsmith49 
 
 
Prior to the 1980s, financial capital remained under the regulatory restraints established 
in response to the Great Depression of the 1930s.  This regulatory regime, associated with the 
New Deal, sought to limit financial speculation and to keep the financial sphere focused on 
channeling capital towards investment into production.  It also established regulatory measures 
that reinforced the rise of “managerial capitalism” in the decades following the second World 
War (Chandler 1977).  Under managerial capitalism, ownership of large corporations became 
dispersed among thousands of stockholders while control rested in the hands of an entrenched 
managerial class with reasonably broad discretion over corporate decision making (Berle and 
Means 1967[1932]).  This trend continued well into the 1970s, with managers of large 
corporations becoming increasingly insulated from the shareholder community.  As we have 
seen, in the forestry sector this discretion allowed managers to focus on re-investment in 
expanded capacity, creating its own problems of overcapacity, as well as a range of 
diversification strategies.  
 During the 1980s, however, the privileged position of management in corporate America 
came under attack from the financial community.  Both the hostile takeover movement and the 
sustained period of institutional investor activism that followed sought to undermine the 
autonomy of managers. These trends were, in turn, motived by a number of factors - including 
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 Cited in Fallon (1991: 378).  
 144 
 
the easing of credit limits, innovations in financial instruments, and the relaxing of anti-trust 
enforcement – stemming from the pro-financial orientation of the Reagan administration. The 
result was the development of a “market for corporate control” (Manne 1965) that would 
ultimately pressure managers to reorient their priorities in a manner that would favor the interest 
of the shareholding community (i.e., finance).50   
 The watershed moment for the breakup of the postwar regime of accumulation was the 
economic crisis of the early 1970s.  To reiterate, this crisis was multifaceted and grew out of a 
number of contradictions emerging from within the political economy of the postwar era.  These 
included, among others, a breakdown in the Bretton Woods monetary regime and the Nixon 
administration’s decision to abandon the gold standard (Gowan 1999), increasing competition 
from abroad (Brenner 2006), rising inflation (Krippner 2011), and a stagnating economy (Foster 
and Magdoff 2009).  Together these factors culminated in the accumulation crisis of 1973 and 
led subsequently to a decade of slow growth and high inflation, or “stagflation.” In response to 
these changing conditions, capitalists sought the means to overcome their crisis of profitability 
and usher in a new period of sustained accumulation.  The solution, it turned out, was to be 
found in a turn to financial profits as the primary means to buoy a stagnating economy and an 
accompanying rise in neoliberal ideology that sought to unleash market forces from the fetters of 
the state regulation.  In the United States, this era began in 1980 with the election of the 
neoliberal paragon, Ronald Reagan.   
 The decade that followed was one of dramatic change in corporate America in general 
and specifically in the forest products sector.  Beginning with the Reagan administration’s 
                                                 
 
50
 Henry G. Manne (1965) first employed the concept of a “market for corporate control” to describe the role of 
equity markets in facilitating corporate takeovers.  The actual development of this market did not take place until the 
1980s, following the deregulatory measure enacted by the Reagan administration.     
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decision to fire over 11,000 striking air traffic controllers, signaling an open season on union-
busting for the private sector, and continuing through efforts to deregulate the rules governing 
corporate behavior, the administration provided the necessary opening for a resurgence of 
finance capital.  Thus, while it was the crisis of the 1970s that ultimately led to the resurgence of 
neoliberal ideology, it was not until 1980 and the election of Reagan that a potential financial 
explosion could become a reality.  Similarly, the financialization process and the managerial 
shift towards a shareholder value conception of control did not occur over night, but were 
worked out over the course of the decade.  
As I will show, managers in the forest products industry were slow to adopt this 
shareholder value orientation.  Throughout the 1980s managers continued to focus on expanding 
capacity and increasing revenues from their mills.  The primary means for achieving these goals 
was through increased investment into technology and a clamp down on labor.  Gaining control 
over the labor situation was also a pressing concern for management, as unions were quite strong 
in the industry throughout the 1970s.  The first challenge to managerial autonomy in the industry 
began with the hostile takeover movement of the 1980s, which, as we will see, had a significant 
impact on management and control in the forest products industry.   
But while managers struggled to maintain control over their firms, and to safeguard them 
from hostile takeover threats, there was a more subtle, underlying change taking place in the 
ownership structure of US forest product firms.  Over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, there 
was a progressive shift in the stock ownership structure of the forest products industry as 
institutional investors steadily gained control over the majority of outstanding shares in forest 
product firms.  In addition, the compensation packages for managers were substantially altered in 
favor of incentive-based compensation, giving managers a very real personal interest in 
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maintaining a high rate of return to the investment community.  I argue that together these two 
organizational aspects of US forest product firms were fundamentally linked to the shareholder 
value conception of control that was to wash over the industry in the 1990s.    
 
Managerial Response to Stagnation and Crisis 
 
 The 1970s was a decade of economic crisis, rising inflation and slow growth in the US 
economy (Krippner 2011).  The forest product industry responded to these macro-economic 
conditions by trying to rein in their rate of expansion. During the 1960s the paper products sector 
experienced a sustained period of expansion; growing at a compound annual rate of 3.8 percent 
between 1960 and 1969 (S&P 1978).  This left many firms with excess capacity in the face of 
declining demand when the economy began to sputter in the early 1970s.   Historically, periods 
of overcapacity and weak demand would lead to intense price competition in the industry.  But 
by the late 1970s managers more often chose to curtail production rather than slash prices.   
During the 1970s the forest products industry continued its historical trend of closely 
paralleling the overall health of the US economy.  In fact, analysts came to expect a close 
relationship between growth in Gross National Product and total paper consumption, estimating 
that overall consumption in paper production totaled 53,000-54,000 tons per $1 billion of real 
GNP (S&P 1976).  Thus when the US economy was growing, the industry grew as well, and 
likewise when the economy went into recession, the industry usually followed.   
The critical factor determining how severe these fluctuations were lies in the ability of 
managers to control prices; and prices were largely determined by the relationship between 
production capacity and demand.  Maintaining this delicate balance was no easy task: due to the 
lag-time between the decision to expand capacity and the date at which this new capacity would 
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come online, the decision to expand production capacity was often made during periods of 
general prosperity.  However this new capacity would often come online just as the market began 
a cyclical downturn, leaving managers once again with excess capacity.  Managers were 
compelled to exercise caution in any decision aimed at expanding production capacity while the 
economy continued to be sluggish (S&P 1978).   
Over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, the industry invested heavily in technology 
aimed at increasing productivity and decreasing costs.  As shown in figure 5.1, this period was 
marked by a substantial increase in total investment, particularly in the paper products sector.  
Investment in the paper products sector skyrocketed from $1.3 billion in 1970 to $10.5 billion 
over the course of two decades.  The less capital intense wood products sector rose as well, 
however in a much less dramatic fashion.     
 
 
Figure 5.1 Investment in Private Equipment and Software by Industry  
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 3.7  
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These large increases in overall investment led to a number of technological 
advancements.  Innovations were made in all areas of timber production, including genetic 
research aimed at improving forest productivity and growth rates, improved methods of 
harvesting timber, and computerizing the milling process.  Forest product firms invested heavily 
in genetic and sylvaculture aimed at growing trees that were faster, taller, and straighter, with 
improved resistance to drought and disease.  As a result, timberland owned by US forest product 
firms became the most productive timberland in the world, producing timber yields at a much 
higher rate than unimproved forests. Mechanical harvesters were developed, which rapidly 
diminished the number of loggers necessary for cutting timber and whole-tree chipping methods 
allowed for greater utilization of logging residues that would previously been left unused.  
Computer technology spurred productivity in the mills as well: a modern saw mill uses lasers to 
measure each log as it comes into the mill, then computes the optimum sawing plan for each 
particular log in order to produce boards with the highest possible value (S&P 1977; 1978).   
In addition to technological advancements aimed at increasing productivity and curbing 
the man-hours needed for production, management sought to curtail labor costs by clamping 
down on unions.  Labor is the second largest component of the industry’s cost structure (after 
raw materials), constituting approximately 30 percent of the industry’s total costs (S&P 1985).  
Therefore, bringing labor costs under control was seen as a critical priority for management.  
However, the industry’s high rate of unionization, particularly in the Western region, made this a 
difficult task.  During the 1970s, labor unions were particularly active, demanding higher wages 
and safer working conditions.  In fact, labor costs are often cited as a primary reason for the 
industry’s mass migration from the West to the Southern US during this period (S&P 1983: 85).     
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Firms that remained in the Northwest followed the Reagan administration’s lead and 
began to clamp down on labor unions.  Prior to the 1980s, collective bargaining had been a 
relatively stable process in the industry, with larger companies often establishing uniform terms 
with unions that were then extended to other companies.  In 1983, Louisiana-Pacific decided to 
break with this practice when they broke a strike by hiring outside workers.  Soon union 
members were crossing picket lines in order to save their jobs, and by 1985 most of Louisiana’s 
Western mills were established as non-union.   
Louisiana-Pacific’s success in breaking the strike gave them a cost advantage over their 
competitors and set a precedent for other firms to follow.  In 1985 Potlach succeeded in 
demanding wage cuts from its workers and the next year Weyerhauser also successfully 
negotiated wage cuts with their unions.  The most significant blow to union bargaining power in 
the region came in 1986 when the Western States Wood Products Employers Association broke 
up and announced that companies would bargain individually, often on a mill-by-mill basis 
(Monthly Labor Review 1986).  By the end of the decade, analysts confirmed that the paper 
companies “have gained the upper hand in an industry once known for its tough labor unions and 
heavy labor-management confrontations” (S&P 1989: B78).   
 
Managerial Autonomy Under Attack: The Hostile Takeover Movement 
 
Merger and acquisition activity was relatively scant during the 1970s and the overall 
degree of concentration changed only slightly.  By the 1980s, however, the industry began to 
experience a shakeup due to the hostile merger movement that was then sweeping across the 
nation.  The hostile merger movement arose in the United States due to a number of factors, but a 
critical factor was the fact that many large corporations contained assets on their balance sheet 
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that were worth more than the net capital value of their stock.  This provided savvy investors 
with a prime opportunity to purchase a controlling share in firms, only to strip them of their 
assets and sell them off in pieces.  This threat from the investment community was the first in a 
series of ongoing struggles that would eventually unseat management from their thrones and 
place shareholders atop the power hierarchy of corporate America.   
In the forest products industry, the hostile takeover movement can largely be traced to the 
machinations of a single man: Sir James Goldsmith.  James Goldsmith was an Anglo-French 
financier who began his career in various food manufacturing industries in the United Kingdom.  
His business partner described their philosophy succinctly as the belief “that the sum of the parts 
of most conglomerates was worth a great deal more than the whole” (Fallon 1991: 359). In 
pursuing this philosophy, he soon became notorious for his methods of purchasing corporations, 
then selling off non-core assets in order to focus on the firm’s core business activities.  By 1980, 
after years of scandal and public scrutiny, he turned his back on his investments in Britain and 
France in the hopes of building a new empire in the United States.   In a few short years, his 
name would become synonymous with the corporate takeover wave that swept across the US in 
the 1980s.   
In the United States, Goldsmith was searching for an industry that contained large 
conglomerates with hard underlying assets that could be used to finance a debt-leveraged take-
over (Fallon 1991).  In short order he set his sights on the forest products industry which was full 
of large conglomerates that were in possession of a particularly valuable resource: timberland.  
After reviewing the portfolios of various firms in the industry, Goldsmith zeroed in on Diamond 
International.   
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Established in the late nineteenth century, Diamond had quickly grown into the nation’s 
leading manufacturer of matches.  By the 1980s, the company had diversified into a number of 
unrelated product lines and even though they had sales over $1 billion per year they were 
struggling to turn a profit.  In pouring over their balance sheets, associates of Goldsmith noticed 
that Diamond owned 1.6 million acres of land that was carried on the books at an extremely low 
valuation.  Thinking this must be a mistake, Goldsmith asked his financial advisors to double 
check.  It was true; the company had purchased their land prior to 1900 and never revalued it.  
Goldsmith had found his ideal takeover target.  Soon he initiated the process of acquiring 
Diamond shares on the open market.   
After a protracted struggle with Diamond’s management, Goldsmith emerged victorious 
in his first major takeover bid in the United States.  He subsequently split the company up and 
sold its component parts to cover the debt he incurred in the original purchase, while holding on 
to the timberland assets.  By 1983, timber analysts were estimating the value of his timberland at 
$723 million, bringing his estimated profits from the deal to approximately $500 million.  
Goldsmith was not interested in selling though. Instead, he turned his sights on another forest 
product firm that was heavily diversified and in possession of a large amount of undervalued 
timberland.   
His next target was St. Regis, another large and heavily diversified forest product firm 
holding 3.2 million acres of undervalued timberland.  Once again, management strongly resisted 
Goldsmith’s takeover bid and searched frantically for a “white knight” to come to the rescue.51  
In this case, Champion International, another paper industry titan, stepped in and saved St. Regis 
from a hostile takeover from the outside.  St. Regis’ management, however, fared no better under 
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 A white knight is the term used to describe a “friendly” investor that would come to the rescue of firm’s that were 
under threat of a hostile takeover.   
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control of Champion: after spending millions more to avoid takeover from an outsider, the 
management team at St. Regis was subsequently let go.   
Goldsmith’s disappointment with his unsuccessful bid for St. Regis did not last long and 
soon he turned his sights on Crown Zellerbach.  Crown Zellerbach was a leading firm in the 
forest products industry and had followed the industry’s trend towards diversification during the 
1960s and 1970s.  By the early 1980s, however, the firm was struggling to turn a profit.  
Significantly, they were in possession of over 2 million acres of undervalued timberland.  The 
management team at Crown Zellerbach fought vigorously to fight off this unsolicited takeover 
bid.  In their effort to shield the company from an outsider takeover, Crown Zellerbach became 
the first Fortune 500 firm to adopt the anti-takeover measure that soon became widely known as 
the “poison pill.”   
A poison pill, or “shareholder rights plan,” is a special dividend issued by the board of 
directors to existing stockholders in order to prevent a hostile takeover from being successful 
(Davis 1991).  Once triggered, the typical poison pill works by allowing existing shareholder to 
purchase stock at a deeply discounted rate.  The point is to dilute the value of stock and make a 
takeover prohibitively expensive for the hostile acquirer.  In the short run, shareholders are direct 
benefactors of a hostile takeover bid, because a successful bid typically occurs when a buyer 
offers to purchase outstanding shares at an inflated price.  Therefore, managers that are 
successful in getting them adopted are implied to already hold substantial discretion in the 
governing of the corporation (Davis 1991).  Although Crown Zellerbach was the first in the 
industry to adopt a poison pill, soon others would follow, including Owens-Illinois, Boise 
Cascade, Bowater, Great Northern Nekoosa, International Paper, Southwest Forest Industries, 
and Union Camp (Dils 1990).   
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The poison pill and major restructuring effort were not enough to save Crown Zellerbach 
from Goldsmith, however.  By late July 1985 Goldsmith owned more than 50 percent of the 
company and in heated negotiations with management the decision was made to split the 
company in two.  Goldsmith would maintain control over the forest and oil assets of the firm, 
while the pulp and paper business would be sold off to James River, another leading firm in the 
US forest products sector.    
Goldsmith was now in possession of over 4 million acres of timberland stretching from 
Maine to Oregon, which he held under his American holding company, GOSL Acquisition 
Corporation   (Fallon 1991).  To manage his holding company, he brought in Al Dunlap, a man 
who would in time become notorious for his own managerial strategies aimed at maximizing 
returns to shareholders.  Dunlap began his carrier with Kimberly-Clark, but gained national 
attention with his turnaround efforts at Lily-Tulip, a disposable cup business.  These efforts 
consisted of cutting the senior staff in half, laying off twenty percent of the workers, and selling 
off inefficient plants and non-core business assets (Jay 1989).  These tactics earned him the 
monikers of “Chainsaw Al” and “Rambo in pinstripes.” Dunlap employed the same tactics in his 
effort to restructure the poorly managed properties of Crown Zellerbach. Within a few years the 
earnings from these properties increased six-fold, making Goldsmith and Dunlap millions in 
profits (Fallon 1991).  Dunlap later was hired to lead Scott Paper, another floundering forest 
product firm that was failing to make adequate returns to its shareholders.   
Other hostile takeover bids were also undertaken over the course of the 1980s.  In 1985 
the Belzberg Brothers of Vancouver Canada initiated a hostile takeover of Potlach Corp., which 
ultimately proved unsuccessful when the company was able to repurchase most of its stock.  
Also in late 1985 was the hostile takeover of Pacific Lumber Company by Charles Hurwitz and 
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his Maxxam, Inc. corporation out of Texas.  The Pacific Lumber Company was a long-standing 
family-run corporation based out of the redwoods of Northern California.  The company owned a 
significant amount of timberland in the northern redwoods and was widely recognized as an 
industry leader in sustainable management practices.  Again, it was the value of the timberland 
assets that made Pacific Lumber Company such an attractive target (Harris 1995: 26).  Following 
his successful takeover bid, Hurwitz replaced the company’s sustainable growth policy with a 
policy of clearcutting in order to increase profits and pay off the debt incurred from the 
acquisition.  After destroying much of the company’s land and raiding the worker’s pension 
fund, Hurwitz and his partners drove Pacific Lumber into bankruptcy in 2007 (Cobb 2008).   
In 1986, California investor Paul Bilzerian initiated a hostile takeover bid for 
Hammermill Paper.  In this case, the company was saved by a white knight when International 
Paper stepped in to purchase Hammermill.  The next major hostile takeover occurred in 1989, 
but this time the threat came from inside the industry.  In October of 1989, Georgia-Pacific 
initiated a hostile tender offer for Great Northern Nekoosa that eventually proved successful the 
following year (Dils 1990).   
Analysts at the time were predicting that there would likely be more mergers to follow in 
the near future, pointing to the fact that there were few sites available that could support the 
construction of a large new paper mill (S&P 1990: B64).  They also noted the prohibitive costs 
of building new mills and the fact that acquisition was an easier path to growth in a mature forest 
products industry.  As it turns out, the analysts were correct in their prediction: the 1990s were 




Organizational Change in the US Forest Products Industry 
 
 The hostile takeover movement of the 1980s must be understood as the first broadside in 
an emerging struggle between an increasingly activist-oriented shareholder class and an 
entrenched managerial class.  This conflict had mixed results, with some companies falling 
victim to corporate raiders and others taking evasive maneuvers to safeguard their company from 
outside attacks.  The impact of the hostile takeover movement, however, was felt by all.  
Managers could no longer sit comfortably atop their corporate empires but had to pay increased 
attention to the relationship between their firm’s outstanding equity and the value of their assets.  
That is to say, managers were now conditioned by an active market for corporate control to shift 
their priorities away from long-term profits and growth, towards the short-term goal of 
maintaining sufficiently high stock prices. 
 The shift towards the adoption of what was later identified as a shareholder value 
conception of control in corporate management, however, remained incomplete.  The hostile 
takeover movement of the 1980s was the most overt and recognizable moment in the shifting 
power relation between management and shareholders.  Yet at the same time a more subtle shift 
was taking place in the ownership structure of US corporations.  The once widely dispersed 
shareholder class was rapidly concentrating under the leadership of pension funds and other 
institutional investors.  In addition, managers were seeing their compensation packages altered in 
a manner that would further align their interests with the financial community.  Together these 
two shifts in the organizational structure of corporate America, along with the persistence of a 
market for corporate control, provided the necessary environment for the widespread adoption of 




From Dispersed to Concentrated Stock Ownership (1980-2000)  
 
The previous chapter examined the ownership patterns that prevailed in the US forest 
products industry during the postwar period.  Relying on data collected from corporate proxy 
statements and research by Ellefson and Stone (1984), I found that by 1980 stock ownership in 
the forest products industry was widely dispersed.  As shown in Table 5.1, only five of the top 
ten firms in the industry had a single stockholder with more than 5 percent of the company’s 
stock (also known as “blockholders”) and none of these firms had more than one.  Two of these 
blockholders, Weyerhauser Family Group and Bronfman Family group, were family trusts that 
held investments on behalf of wealthy families.  Boise Cascade’s largest shareholders, Fayes 
Sarofirm & Company, was an investment firm run by the billionaire Fayes Sarofirm and the 
remaining two large blockholders were banks that have since been acquired by larger banks.  
Based on the ownership patterns that prevailed in 1980, Ellefson and Stone (1984) conclude that 
there is little evidence to suggest that a significant concentration of stock ownership existed for 
any institution to exercise a significant amount of control over management in the industry.   
Over the course of the next two decades the stock ownership patterns in the US forest 
products industry underwent a radical transformation.  As we know, institutional investors were 
increasing their share of stock ownership since the early 1960s, but in the 1980s and 1990s their 
ownership share in corporate America skyrocketed.  By 2000, institutional investors became the 
principle shareholders in most of America’s largest corporations.   
As shown in Table 5.2, this also was the case for the forest products industry.  In 2005 
institutional investors held large blocks of stock in each of the top ten forest product firms with 
the sole exception being Plum Creek, which is structured as a REIT that requires them to have 
limited manufacturing facilities.  On average, blockholders controlled over 30 percent of all 
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stock in the leading forest product firms.  Research shows that there is typically an inverse 
relationship between firm size and stockholder concentration, meaning that one would expect 
this level of concentration to increase for smaller firms (Holderness 2009).   
In addition to the considerable change in concentrated stockholding among individual 
institutional investors, there was also a dramatic increase in the percentage of all outstanding 
stock owned by institutional investors.  Table 5.3 lists the percentage of stock held by 
institutional investors for the ten leading forest product firms in 2010.  Remarkably, institutional  
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Table 5.1: Concentrated Stockholdings in Leading Forest Product Firms, 1980 




International Paper N/A 
Georgia-Pacific N/A 
Weyerhauser   
Weyerhauser Family Group  9.8 
Champion International N/A  
Boise Cascade   
Sarofim (Fayez) & Company  6.5 
Kimberly-Clark   
National Detroit Corp.  5.1 
St. Regis N/A  
Crown Zellerback    
Bankers Trust New York Corporation 8.2 
Scott Paper   
Bronfman Family Interests 20.5 
Mead Corporation N/A  
Source: Corporate Proxy Statements (1980).52 
 
                                                 
 
52
 Firms labeled N/A were “not applicable” because there was no single blockholder that owned five 
percent of the company’s outstanding stock.   
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Table 5.2: Concentrated Stockholdings in Leading Forest Product Firms, 2005 
Company and Principal Stockholder Percentage of Stock Owned 
International Paper   
Capital Research and Management Company  11.9 
State Street Bank and Trust Company 6.6 
Lord, Abbet & Co.  5.3 
Weyerhauser    
    Capital Research and Management Company 13 
Wellington Management Company, LLP 6.3 
Smurfit-Stone Container   
    AXA 16.6 
    Wellington Management Company, LLP 12.9 
FMR Corp.  12.1 
MeadWestvaco   
AXA Financial Inc.  9.4 
    Capital Research and Management Company 7.7 
Temple-Inland   
Capital Research and Management Company 12 
Wellington Management Company, LLP 6.5 
Bowater   
    Massachusetts Financial  10.9 
PEA Capital LLC 9.7 
Franklin Resources, Inc.  8.9 
    Wellington Mngmt.  8.1 
    T. Rowe Price 7.2 
Louisiana Pacific   
Barclays Global Investors, N.A.  11.1 
Mellon  Financial Corporation 5 
Greif Brothers   
Michael H. Dempsey 51.4 
    Robert C. Macauley 9.4 
    Virginia D. Ragan 5.4 
Mary T. McAlpin 5.3 
Packaging Corp of America   
    Madison Dearborn Partners, LLC 41.1 
    FMR Corp.  7.7 
Iridian Asset Management LLC 5.1 







Table 5.3: Percentage of Stock Held by Institutional Investors for given Firms, 2010 
Forest Products Firm 
Percentage of stock 
held by Institutional 
Investors 
International paper 81.95 
Mead Westvaco 83.7 
Smurfit Stone (Rock Tenn) 84.29 




Grief Inc.  87.53 
Packaging Corp. of America 88.27 
Plum Creek 66.15 
Source: Mergent Online53 
 
investors had come to control over 80 percent of all outstanding stock in eight of the top ten 
firms. Given that the interests of institutional investors can be assumed to be generally the same 
(ie. short term financial gains), it takes no stretch of the imagination to see how this rapid 
transformation of stock ownership would lead to changes in managerial priorities.   
 Clearly the dispersed ownership structure that provided the necessary precondition for 
managerial capitalism in the mid-twentieth century had ceased to exist in the US forest products 
industry.  By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, institutional investors had 
gained a dominant position in most of the leading forest product firms.  In doing so, they put 
themselves into a position that would enable them to steer management’s priorities towards the 
interests of the financial community. 
 
 
                                                 
 
53
 Data was not available for AbitibiBowater. 
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From Fixed-income to Incentive-based Executive Compensation 
 
 Changes in the ownership structure of the forest product firms were not, in themselves, 
sufficient for changing managerial priorities.  Additional measures were needed in order to make 
managers internalize the interests of the financial community as their own.  As prescribed by 
agency theorists, the primary means to align managers with the interests of shareholders was to 
alter their compensation packages in a way that would tie their own remuneration to how 
effectively they maximized shareholder value (Jensen and Meckling 1976).   
Incentive-based compensation has been a common component of executive pay packages 
since at least the 1950s (Baran and Sweezy 1966). However, during the era of financialization it 
grew from a marginal component of executive compensation to become the primary means of 
executive enrichment.  The transition to incentive-based compensation grew steadily throughout 
the 1980s, but it was not until Clinton administrations tax reforms of 1993 that this movement 
would really take off (Korzenik 2009).  Bill Clinton made the exorbitant salaries of corporate 
executives a major platform of this 1992 campaign for the presidency.  Once in office he ushered 
in a series of changes to the tax code that would supposedly make good on his promises to curb 
the executive compensation.  The administration’s primary means of doing so was to cap the tax-
deduction for “non-performance” executive pay (such as salary) at $1 million.  On the surface, 
this seemed like a well-intentioned effort to reign in executive compensation, but in reality this 
became the primary justification for corporate boards to turn to incentive-based compensation 
packages loaded with bonuses and stock options.  The result was a dramatic increase in executive 
compensation that was predicated on shifting managerial priorities towards increasing returns to 
shareholder.  .    
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In the US forest products industry, the practice of tying executive pay to stock 
performance began to take off soon after the tax reforms of 1993.  In 1994, Scott Paper, a leading 
firm in the forest product industry, hired Albert Dunlap to help rejuvenate the firm and bring it 
back from years of lack-luster performance.  As we saw above, Dunlap had already earned a 
reputation as a ruthless corporate manager in his efforts to revamp Crown-Zellerback and 
Diamond International.  Upon taking the helm at Scott Paper, he introduced the idea of paying 
directors in shares rather than cash arguing that “it sends a signal that the company values its 
shareholders” (Hamilton 1997).  Following Scott’s lead, other forest product firms began to turn 
to incentive-based compensation packages in order to tie the interests of managers directly to the 
well-being of the firm’s shareholders.   
Over the course of the past three decades, incentive-based compensation has rapidly 
increased across the US forest products industry.  As shown in Table 5.4, by 1980 managers in 
the forest products industry were already generating substantial portions of their income from 
stock options and bonuses.  Three of the top firms’ leading executive received over half of their 
income from incentive based compensation in 1980.  The average percentage of incentive based 
compensation for the top executive in the leading forest product firms was 37 percent.  By 2005, 
however, managers in each of the top ten firms, save one, were receiving the majority of their 
income from stock options and bonuses and the average percentage of incentive based 
compensation had risen to 69 percent.   
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Table 5.4 Incentive-based Compensation in the US Forest Products Industry in 1980 and 200554  
  
1980 2005 
Top 10 Companies 
Percentage of incentive-based compensation 
for top executive Top 10 Companies 
International Paper 57 81 International Paper 
Georgia-Pacific 57 75 Weyerhaeuser 
Weyerhaeuser 27 55 Smurfit-Stone 
Champion 37 69 MeadWestvaco 
Boise Cascade 52 83 Temple-Inland 
Kimberly-Clark 61 39 Bowater 
St. Regis 26 90 Louisiana-Pacific 
Crown Zellerback 7 40 Grief Brothers 
Scott Paper 12 74 Packaging Corp. 
Mead N/A 85 Plum Creek 
Average 37 69 Average 
Source: Corporate Proxy Statements
                                                 
 
54
 Incentive-based compensation consists of stock options and bonuses.  The total of stock-options plus bonuses was 
then divided by fixed salary in order to establish the percentage of incentive-based compensation for top managers.     
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Executive compensation in the forest products clearly underwent a substantial shift over 
the course of the past three decades.  Incentive-based compensation packages, consisting of large 
bonuses and dramatic increase in stock options, gave managers a personal interest in maximizing 
share price appreciation.  The use of incentive-based compensation was critical for realigning the 
interests of managers toward those of their shareholders.  I would further add that this shift in the 
relationship between managers and shareholders was part of the broader social transformation of 




 This chapter provided an overview of the US forest product industry during the 
transitional years of the 1970s and 1980s.  During this era managers continued to operate under 
the managerial conception of control that favored growth and long-term stability for the firm.  In 
pursuit of these goals, managers attempted to control their rate of expansion, while at the same 
time investing heavily into labor-saving technology in order to boost productivity. The opening 
provided by the Reagan administration encouraged managers in the industry to follow suit and 
by the mid-1980s, managers in the forest products industry were gaining the upper-hand on 
labor.  These efforts were largely successful and paved the way for relatively prosperous decade.   
 This era was also marked by the hostile takeover movement of the 1980s.  Financiers, led 
by James Goldmith, set their sights on the US forest products industry in order to gain control 
over the undervalued timberland that large firms were carrying on their balance sheets.  A series 
of takeover bids were bitterly resisted by managers in the industry, with variable success.  The 
most important result of the hostile takeover movement was that it placed pressure on managers 
and increasingly forced them to pay close attention to the value of their firm relative to their 
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underlying assets.  In short, it marked the beginning of a shift in managerial control from the 
managerial conception of control of the postwar era to the shareholder value conception of 
control.   
 This shift did not take place overnight, but was the result of a longer process taking place 
in the US economy.  Over the course of the 1980s, the financialization process was gaining 
momentum.  At one level, this process was marked by an increase in financial profits and 
growing power of the financial sector.  However, at the same time, there were more subtle shifts 
taking place in the ownership structure of non-financial corporations.  Over the course of two 
decades there was a substantial shift in the ownership structure of US forest product firms, as 
institutional investors gained control over the majority of stock in leading firms.  At the same 
time the compensation packages of managers in the industry were shifting towards incentive-
based compensation that tied the interests of managers directly to the interests of the shareholder 
(i.e., finance) community.  I argue that these two organizational shifts in the relationship between 
managers and shareholders were fundamental mechanisms in the process that ultimately led to 




THE FINANCIALIZATION OF THE  
US FOREST PRODUCTS INDUSTRY (1990-2008)  
 
 
“It [is] high time these giant cyclical businesses start focusing on shareholder returns instead of 
worrying about revenues and market-share growth” ~Peter Correll, CEO Georgia-Pacific55 
 
If the 1980s was the decade in which managers sustained their first challenge from 
shareholders, the 1990s would become the decade in which the shareholder’s interests triumphed 
over managers.  More accurately, one could say that during the 1990s the interests of 
shareholders became the interests of managers.  It is this cultural transformation that economic 
sociologists have deployed to explain the change itself.  However, as this chapter demonstrates, 
the structural processes associated with financialization created the conditions for the emergence 
and proliferation of shareholder value ideology among corporate managers. 
As we have seen, the hostile takeover bids of the 1980s were bitterly resisted by the 
entrenched managers of the US forest products industry.  Managers adopted various measures to 
prevent their firms from takeover by corporate raiders, including the adoption of poison pills and 
other anti-takeover tactics.  When necessary, help was provided by white knights within the 
industry in a cooperative effort of industry managers against threats from outside.  The efficacy 
of these efforts was uneven, with several firms ultimately succumbing to hostile takeover bids, 
after which they were split up and sold off in parts.  Those that were able to weather the storms 
of the 1980s did so in part because of their ability to maintain relatively high earnings in the face 
of turbulent markets.   
The effect of the hostile takeover movement, however, was undeniable.  Managers could 
no longer take refuge in the security of their positions atop the corporate hierarchy, but were now 
                                                 
 
55
 Cited in Henderson (1999) 
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confronting a market for corporate control that required them to pay heed to their corporate 
portfolios, lest they become targets of a reinvigorated financial community.  Initially, managers 
in the forest products industry resisted the pressure to downsize than had swept across US 
manufacturers over the course of the 1980s.  Over the course of the 1990s, however, a number of 
changes taking place both within the internal structure of the firms and their external 
environment compelled managers to increasingly adopt a shareholder value conception of the 
firm.  I examined two critical changes in the organizational component of the US forest products 
industry in Chapter 5. I showed how the relationship between shareholders and managers was 
transformed through both an increase in the concentrated shareholdings, particularly among 
institutional investors, and a parallel increase in incentive-based compensation for top 
executives.  I argue that these organizational shifts were critical for realigning the interests of 
managers towards shareholders, and finance more broadly.   
There were also significant changes taking place in the industry’s external environment.  
The first and most important was the rapid increase in international competition stemming from 
the structural dynamics of neoliberal globalization.  Increase competition had a significant 
impact on the US forest products industry (Ince 2007).  The availability of large virgin stands of 
timber and the faster growing cycles of tropical timber, combined with cheap land and labor, led 
to a rapid increase of imports into the United States.  This increase in competition was 
compounded by technological changes that were taking place during this period.  Information 
technology and the proliferation of computers led to a decline in paper consumption in the 
United States (Skog et al. 2012). Although warnings about the “paperless office” have not come 
to fruition, technological change has led to significant shift in many of the industry’s markets, 
particularly in certain sectors such as newsprint.  A third factor was the rapid decrease in timber 
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supply available to the industry that followed the Spotted Owl controversy of the early 1990s 
(see Foster 2002, Chapter 10).  The industry blamed environmentalists for bringing ruin to 
timber-dependent communities across the Pacific Northwest. However, as we will see, the 
decline in federal timber supply led to an increase in timberland prices that greatly benefited the 
large timber firms during this period and greatly enhanced the appeal of timberland investments 
among institutional investors.    
In this chapter I provide an overview of the US forest products industry during the 
financialization era.  As the shareholder value conception of control proliferated among 
managers in the industry, the use of financial metrics of success became increasingly prominent.  
I begin with an analysis of the industry using various measures of financial performance that are 
common among financial institutions.  I then examine how industry managers, under pressure 
from the financial community, increasingly adopted a shareholder value ideology as can be seen 
in their tactics, including an increase in shareholder returns in the form of stock buybacks and 
dividend payments (Westphal and Zajac 2001), increased mergers and acquisitions (Davis and 
Stout 1992; Fligstein 2001), laying off employees, and a series of restructuring programs aimed 
at selling off unrelated product lines in order to focus on core competencies.  A central 
component of these restructuring programs was the decision to sell off nearly 50 million acres of 
valuable timberland to the same financial community that was pushing reform in the industry.   
 
Financials for the US Forest Products Industry 
 
 A key aspect of the shareholder value conception of control is that shareholder interests 
gain prominence over competing interests in the firm.  As we saw in the previous chapter, the 
vast majority of these shareholders were institutional investors and other financial institutions.  It 
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is based on this observation that we can assume that shareholder interests are, in large part, 
financial interests.  In order to examine how financial interests viewed the forest products 
industry we begin with an overview of the financial performance of the US forest product 
industry during the era of financialization.  By viewing the performance of the industry from this 
vantage point we can begin to locate periods of instability or decline, which would in turn 
provide clues as to when the forest products industry began to be viewed unfavorably by the 
financial community.   
The financial community tends to privilege certain metrics of corporate behavior over 
others.  The first and most obvious is the share price of a firm.  A firm’s share price is a direct 
gauge of how the market views the value of the firm and its potential for future revenue streams.  
Other, perhaps more important, measures look at total earnings for a company and their return on 
capital, which measures how effectively a firm is employing its available resources.  A third 
financial metric that is important for the financial community is the ratio of debt to equity, which 
signals the extent to which a firm is leveraged against the value of its outstanding shares.  Each 
of these numbers is used by the financial community to examine the relative performance of 
firms, and performance evaluations are then used to determine investment strategies.   
 It is also important to note that within any given industry a substantial variation is certain 
to exist between the financial performances of different firms.  In addition, single measures can 
provide contradictory indications about the relative performance of a firm.  In this chapter, I 
examine multiple measures of financial performance over time so as to include as many different 





Share Price Appreciation and the US Forest Products Industry 
 
The bull market of the 1990s was an extraordinary period of growth in the US stock 
markets, with average share prices rising between ten and twenty percent per year.  As I 
explained in chapter 3, share price appreciation was the primary means by which shareholder 
returns were achieved over the decade, constituting some 80 percent of the total shareholder 
returns (Froud et al. 2002).  Therefore, the quarterly share price of a firm became an important 
metric for gauging how well the firm was doing relative to other publicly traded firms.  Meeting 
the quarterly expectations of the financial community also became a priority for managers as 
they increasingly came under a shareholder value conception of the firm (Fligstein 2001; Useem 
1993).   
Figure 6.1 shows the comparative performance of several leading forest product firms 
from 1992 through 2008.  Comparing the firms to the performance of the Dow Jones is relevant 
because institutional investors gauged the performance of a given firm relative to the stock 
market in general and did not limit their comparisons to firms within the same industry (Froud et 
al. 2002).  While the performance of particular firms varied considerably over time, each of the 
firms listed consistently underperformed when compared to the Dow Jones Industrial Average.  
In the early 1990s, forest product firms performed relatively well, with several firms (notably, 
Weyerhauser and Kimberly-Clark) coming in consistently above the Dow Jones Average.  By 
the mid-1990s, however, the Dow Jones continued to swell, spurred on by the dot-com bubble, 
while the forest products industry consistently lagged behind.  Clutter and his colleagues (Clutter 
et al. 2005) found that the ten year rate of return for the industry was 6.2 percent, which was 




Figure 6.1, Change in Share Price for Selected Firms and Dow Jones Industrial Average.56 
Source: Merchant Online 
 
                                                 
 
56
 This figure was created in Mergent Online, which limits the number of entries to five.  Firms were selected on the basis of their size and availability as a 
sample of the leading firms in the US forest products industry.    
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Managers growing preoccupation with share price had a direct impact on their corporate 
strategies.  In fact, certain shareholder value tactics such as mergers and stock buybacks were 
announced with the explicit hope that they would boost the short-term share price.  When 
managers decided to lay off workers or close mills these actions often boosted share price 
because Wall Street believed that these measures would produce leaner and more competitive 
firms.  And it did not matter whether these shareholder boosting tactics were quick fixes to more 
substantial underlying problems, because shareholders were primarily interested in a short-term 
rate of return.  This short-termism is evidenced in Figure 6.1 by the substantial variation in share 
price that exists from quarter to quarter for many of the leading forest product firms.   
The paper industry continued to lag behind the broader US economy for the remainder of 
the decade.  According to an industry publication (Rudder 2002), by 1998 the paper industry 
represented less that 0.5% of the total market capitalization of the Standard & Poor’s 500 index, 
while Microsoft, the leader of the new information technology industry, alone accounted for 4% 
of the S&P 500.  Furthermore, by the late 1990s, Yahoo! Inc. had a greater market capitalization 
than the combined total of the industry’s top three companies – International Paper, Georgia-
Pacific, and Weyerhaeuser.  Clearly the American economy had undergone a major 
transformation by the closing decade of the 20th century.  The US forest product industry, which 
was once a pillar of the US industrial economy, was now unable to maintain earnings on par with 
the post-industrial US economy.     
 
Profits and Return on Capital  
 
 Share price is not always the best measure of a firm’s performance because the price of a 
company’s share is determined by a number of market factors that can mask the health of a firm.  
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Earnings, on the other hand, provide a more accurate gauge of a company’s economic position 
and their ability to generate surpluses, which (indirectly) provide the basis for changes in a 
company’s share price. There are various measures that can be used to gauge earnings in a firm.   
 The first measure is total after-tax profits.  Figure 6.2 shows after-tax profit for the US 
forest products during the financialization period.  Profits in the paper sector varied significantly 
over this period, but the general trend was downward.  The recession of the early 1990s delivered 
a serious blow to the paper industry and with the exception of the banner year of 1995, the 
industry suffered from declining profits for most of the decade.  In the early 2000s, after tax 
profits dipped into the negative category.  After a series of restructuring programs and massive 
divestitures, the industry was able to increase profits for a short time before plunging again in 
2007.   
Profits in the wood products sector fluctuated during this period as well, however in a 
much less dramatic fashion than the paper sector.  The wood products sector is highly correlated 
with federal interest rates because of its relationship to the housing sector.  This relationship 
benefited the industry greatly when the Federal Reserve lowered interest rates in early 2000.  
Interest rates remained low throughout the early 2000s, which helped spur the massive housing 
bubble that eventually exploded in the financial crisis of 2008-09.   
But a company’s earnings still do not tell us the whole story.  Total costs can increase 
along with profits and lead to an overall reduction in earnings.  The return on capital (ROC) is 







Figure 6.2 Profits After Tax in US Forest Products industry, 1980-2008 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, TABLE 6.9 
 
by the book value of invested capital and is a commonly used metric of earnings that is used by 
financial analysts.57   
 Figure 6.3 shows the ROC in the US paper industry from 1970 to 2004.  The substantial 
fluctuation in returns reflects the highly cyclical nature of the paper industry and its susceptibility 
to shifts within the larger economy.  The forest products industry maintained a relatively stable 
level of returns over the course of the 1970s before dipping to 3.7% ROC during the recession of 
the early 1980s.  The industry’s earnings steadily increased throughout the 1980s before 
witnessing a sharp decline in 1991.  This decline was exacerbated by the excess capacity that the 
industry had added in the exuberance of the late 1980s.  When the recession began in the summer 
of 1990, the US paper industry found itself once again with an unfavorable supply/demand  
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 Return on Equity (ROE) is similar measure, however, whereas ROC measures returns against all capital invested 
(including loans and bonds), ROE measures returns against the total value of all outstanding shares in the firm. Both 
measures aim to capture the ability of a firm to generate profits relative to the capital they had to work with.  




Figure 6.3 Return on Total Capital, US Paper Industry, 1970-2004 
Source: Miles (2005) 
 
balance.  On average, each decade after 1970 witnessed a lower rate of return on capital than the 
decade before (Rudder 2002). 
Throughout the 1990s the industry continued to suffer from relatively low earnings, with 
the sole exception being the banner year of 1995 when price hikes in the pulp and paper sector 
reached record heights.  These price hikes were due primarily to two factors: First was the 
relative shortage of timber on the market following the environmentally motivated federal ban on 
logging in the Pacific Northwest.  This timber shortage had a significant impact on stumpage 
prices and greatly benefited industry firms that owned substantial timberland holdings.  
Secondly, was the decrease in capacity expansion undertaken in the industry in the early 1990s, 
which helped bring supply and demand back into balance (S&P 1996: B82). In early 1996, 
however, profits began to tumble once again; bringing profit levels back to the lows of the early 
1990s and trailing other manufacturing industries in general. The upswing of 1995 turned out to 
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be the shortest the industry had experienced in recent decades and what followed was a downturn 
as extreme as any in the industry’s long history (Rudder 2002).   
Declining returns on capital was becoming a liability for forest product managers.  As 
one industry analyst explained in 2001:   
For many years, paper industry CEOs did not pay enough attention to the 
distinction between "capital" and "assets." Instead, they spent their time managing 
assets while investors watched the returns on their capital plummet. In other 
words, companies spent too freely and didn't pay enough attention to what the 
investments were earning. Currently, the emphasis is shifting, and every paper 
industry CEO knows that "Return on Capital" is what stockowners are really 
watching. In fact, most CEOs now watch it closely, too (Connelly 2001). 
In hindsight, we know that the 1990s turned out to be a turning point for the US forest 
products industry.  During this period, the historical link between expansion of the nation’s GDP 
and growth in the forest products industry was broken.  As explained in the previous chapter, for 
much of the post war period there was a reliable estimated increase in paper product 
consumption of between 53,000 and 54,000 tons per $1 billion of real GDP.  In 1996, real GDP 
increased by about half a trillion dollars to $7.8 trillion, or 2.5 percent, but the paper industry 
was no longer able to keep pace (Rudder 2002).  As profits fell, so did the value of the industry’s 
shareholdings, and soon managers began looking to the prescriptions coming from the 
shareholder value movement in order to turn things around.  
 
Investment, Capacity and Debt  
 
 The early 1990s was also a watershed moment for total investments in the forest products 
industry.  The spending spree of the late 1980s left the industry with a severe excess capacity 
problem and a glutted market when the US economy entered into recession in the early 1990s.  
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The industry’s condition was exacerbated by the substantial increase in foreign competition that 
was taking place during this period. Shareholders were growing impatient with managers in the 
industry and called on them to rein in spending. Managers responded by bringing an over fifty- 
year period of expansion to an end.   
 As shown in figure 6.4, total investments in private equipment and software in the paper 
industry peaked at $10.5 billion in 1990 and despite several upticks (1994-1995 and 2004-2006), 
investment levels never returned to their pre-1990 levels.  The wood products sector fared better 
than the paper sector during these turbulent years, buoyed in large part by low interest rates and a 
booming housing market.  Investment into the wood products sector remained relatively stable 
throughout the 1990s, before peaking at $3.7 billion in 2006 on the eve of the housing crash.  
Firms with higher exposure to the wood product markets, such as Weyerhaeuser, Georgia-
Pacific, and Louisiana-Pacific, performed better than those that were tied primarily to paper 
(S&P 1996). 
 Declining investments in the industry brought an end to over half a century of steady 
increases in total capacity.  Capacity expansion was the preferred means of investing profits by 
managers operating under the postwar managerial conception of control.  Despite reoccurring 
bouts of excess capacity and over-production resulting from the industries notoriously cyclical 
markets, managers continued to expand capacity throughout the 1980s.  As shown in Figure 6.5, 
capacity expansion in both the paper products and wood products sectors leveled off over the 




Figure 6.4 Total Investment in Fixed Assets   





Figure 6.5 Total Capacity in Forest Products industry, 1950-2005 
Source: Federal Reserve 
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order to improve the industry’s pricing structure.  After reducing capacity in the late 1990s, the 
wood products sector was able to continue expansion in the early 2000s, thanks in large part to 
low interest rates and the surge in housing.   
 This discussion of declining investments and capacity speaks to one of the central 
questions in the literature on the financialization of nonfinancial corporations.  Several studies 
have argued that the increase in financial investments have “crowded out” investments into 
production (Orhangazi 2008; Stockhammer 2004).  Orhangazi (2008), for instance, argues that 
the decline in productive investments during the era of financialization diminishes the capital 
available for investments into expanded productive capacity.  Foster and Magdoff (2009), on the 
other hand, point to the excess of capacity in US manufacturing and the fact that many US 
industries are already have low and declining utilization rates.  They argue that it makes little 
sense to argue that finance takes the place of productive investment when most industries already 
suffer from overcapacity.   
The evidence from the US forest products industry seems to support the position of 
Foster and Magdoff (2009).  Overcapacity is a reoccurring ailment in the paper products sector 
and the declining utilization rates accompanying the decline in overall investments does not lend 
support to the “crowding out” thesis.  At the same time, however, managers in the industry have 
a long history of over investing into expanded capacity and, if nothing else, the increasing 





Figure 6.6 Debt to Equity in US Paper Products Sector 
Source: Miles (2005) 
 
Furthermore, those who argue that there is a crowding out effect overlook the possibility that 
increased financial investments were financed, in large part, by debt.58   
 Figure 6.6 reveals the dramatic increase in debt to equity ratio in the leading US forest 
product firms.  By 1990, the average ratio of debt to equity for the leading forest product firm in 
the industry surpassed one hundred percent, meaning the value of total debt in the leadings firms 
had surpassed their total equity.  The industry’s debt to equity ratio remained at high levels for 
the remainder of the decade, before exploding to over 120 percent in 2002, largely as a result of 
the merger movement that was taking place in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  Financial interests 
tend to prefer the use of debt, as opposed to equity, in financing a firm’s operations because 
issuing equity would further dilute the value of the existing shares of company’s stock (Kotz 
                                                 
 
58
 Shannon Williams is responsible for pointing out to me the possibility that increased shareholder returns could 
have been funded in large part by increased debt.   
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1978; Fligstein 2001). In this sense, the rise in debt to equity is yet another indication that 
managers were adopting a financially oriented perspective that privileged the interests of their 
shareholders.     
 
From Retain and Reinvest to Downsize and Distribute 
 
 The financial measures provided above provide a backdrop for our discussion of how the 
shareholder value movement spread across the US forest products industry. Two decades of 
chronic instability, the persistence of diminishing returns and declining profits ultimately forced 
managers to search out novel strategies to revive their flailing industry.  Research has shown that 
shareholder value tactics are most likely to be adopted in industries with low profits (Fligstein 
and Shin 2007).  Furthermore, as I have shown, by the late 1990s institutional investors now held 
a controlling share in most US forest product firms, and managerial compensation was tilted in 
favor of incentive-based compensation packages that tied manager’s incomes directly to the 
value of the firm’s stock.   
 The shift towards a shareholder value conception of control is evidenced by a number of 
changes that took place in financial balance sheets of firms in the US forest products industry.  In 
general, these changes can be understood in the context of Lazonick and Williams description of 
the shareholder value ideology as a shift from “retain and reinvest to downsize and distribute” 
(Lazonick and Williams 2000).  Whereas the conditions of managerial capitalism lent themselves 
to rising profits and increased investment into expanded capacity and diversification, shareholder 
capitalism tended towards decreased investments into capacity and an increase in distribution 
payments to shareholders.   
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The adoption of the shareholder value conception of control did not take place overnight, 
nor did was it adopted uniformly across the forest products industry.  In fact the process was a 
gradual one that spread unevenly across the industry.  Nevertheless, by the late 1990s, it was 
clear that the need to deliver on shareholder value was playing a central role in the reshaping of 
the forest products industry (Mili 1998).    
 
Stock Buybacks and Dividends 
 
 In an era of diminishing profits, managers in the US forest products industry increasingly 
turned to stock buybacks in order to boost their firms’ share price.  By purchasing their own 
shares on the open market, managers reduced the number of shares held by the public and thus 
increased the value of the firm’s share price.  This method is favored in industries where there 
are few opportunities for internal growth and became a preferred means for managers seeking to 
increase returns to their shareholders (Grullon and Ikenberry 2000).  The evidence shows that 
stock buybacks were the increasingly favored channel for distributing earnings back to 
shareholders in the forest products industry.  In 2001, an analysis of stock buybacks in the US 
paper industry found that of the 25 US paper companies surveyed, only three lacked a stock 
repurchasing program whereas a decade ago just a handful of companies had such a program 
(Connelly 2001).   
 Stock repurchasing programs often accompanied the more general restructuring programs 
that spread across the industry in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  Mead Corporation announced 
one of the earliest stock buyback programs in the industry following the announcement of their 
restructuring program in 1992.  Over the next four years Mead repurchased a total of 8.7 million 
of their own shares valued at $459 million (IDCH 2006).  In 2006, as part of their major 
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restructuring program, International Paper announced that it intended to purchase $3 billion 
worth of its own shares, approximately 20 percent of the company’s total outstanding shares.  In 
2006 and 2007, Weyerhaeuser conducted one of the largest share buybacks in its history, 
spending $800 million in a repurchasing program that sent its stock price soaring to a record high 
of $86 per share in March of 2007.   
Many firms used the cash from large asset sales to finance stock buybacks.  For example, 
in 1994 Kimberly Clark announced that it would use the proceeds from the sale of its Newsprint 
mills to fund a stock repurchasing program (Dallas Morning News 1994).  Other companies, 
such as Williamette, Boise Cascade, and MeadWestvaco used the proceeds from their sale of 
timberland to finance large stock buybacks aimed at increasing returns to shareholders.  
Commenting upon the announcement of a $400 million stock buyback program following the 
sale of their timberlands, MeadWestvaco chairman and CEO said, “We are delivering on our 
commitment to return to shareholders the excellent value we generated from these forestland 
sales.  We expect to continue to drive shareholder value by generating sustainable earnings and 
cash flow growth” (MWV 8-K, 2007).  With limited investment opportunities available, 
managers found stock buybacks to be one of the few options available for buoying their firm’s 
share price.   
Stock buybacks were not the only means by which managers channeled capital back to 
shareholders; dividend payments also remained as an important channel for funneling capital 
back to the financial community.  Over the course of the financialization period stock buybacks 
increasing replaced dividend payments as the preferred means of increasing returns to 
shareholders (Grullon and Michaely 2002).  In the forest product industry, however, dividends 




Figure 6.7 Ratio of Total Dividends to Value Added in US Forest Products Industry 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 6.20 
 
value added in both the wood and paper product sectors.59  The rate of dividend payments in both 
the wood and paper products sectors grew over the course of the last several decades.  In the 
paper sector, the ratio of dividends to value added remained below 10 percent for most of the 
1980s, but by 1990, when the forest products industry began to stagnate, the payout ratio 
continued to climb, staying above 10 percent for the remainder of the decade. 
The substantial increase in both stock buybacks and dividend payments reveal a 
management in the forest products industry that is increasingly preoccupied with maintaining 
high returns to shareholders.  Critically, these increased returns to shareholders took place in the 
face of declining returns and rising debt, suggesting that any increase in shareholder returns were 
most likely financed by debt and may have had little relation to the financial health of the firm.  
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 Value added is a measure of the gross output of an industry less its intermediate inputs (BEA), and thus provides 




That is to say, the evidence provided above suggests that managers in the US forest products 
industry loaded their firms down with debt in order to maintain increased returns to shareholders.   
 
Mergers & Acquisitions  
 
 In the previous chapters I detailed two other waves of mergers and acquisitions that took 
place in the post war era.  The first was the merger wave of the late 1960s, when US firms 
engaged in a frenzy of acquisitions aimed at diversifying and broadening their corporate empires.  
During this period, mergers in the forest products industry were not “substituted for internal 
growth strategies in general,” but were more often “of the conglomerate product-extension type” 
(Ellefson and Stone 1984). In other words, mergers did not replace investments into expanded 
production capacity, but accompanied them in an ongoing effort to expand corporate portfolios.   
The second wave of mergers and acquisitions came in the 1980s as a result of the hostile 
takeover movement.  This movement was spurred on by the cheap credit and relaxed antitrust 
enforcement of the Reagan administration.  Critically, the hostile takeover movement came from 
outside corporate boardrooms, from corporate raiders that used junk bonds and debt to finance 
corporate takeover with the intention of breaking up the conglomerates and selling off their 
assets for a quick profit.   
The merger movement of the late 1990-2000s was distinct from both of the previous 
waves in two important ways:  first, whereas during the 1980s, most hostile takeovers came from 
corporate raiders outside the industry, during the 1990-2000s they predominately came from 
within the industry; and second, during the late 1990-2000s mergers became the principle means 
for firms to grow, as investment into expanded productive capacity all but ceased in the industry.    
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Growth in the industry now came through increasing the firm’s market share and market 
power by merging with one’s major competitor.  In the face of declining returns, chronic 
overcapacity, and a glutted market, the US forest products industry turned to consolidation and 
the reshuffling of existing assets in order to reestablish growth in their stagnating industry.  
Taking over existing mills became the preferred means of capacity expansion because while it 
did increase the capacity of a firm involved, it did not add to overall capacity in the industry.  
The result, as shown in Figure 6.8, was an unprecedented period of mergers and acquisitions that 
utterly transformed the US forest products industry, bringing an end to many of the industry’s 
mainstays for the past century (Diamond, Chappelle, and Edwards 1999; Miles 2005; Mei and 
Sun 2008a).   
The first hostile takeover bid from inside the industry came in late 1989 when Georgia-
Pacific initiated a hostile takeover bid of Great Northern Nekoosa Corp.  This was a turning 
point for an industry that had long been known for a high level of cooperation between 
competing firms.  A report in the New York Times described Georgia-Pacific’s takeover bid as 
“a stunning development” in an industry “which has long been dominated by a dozen major 
companies that generally dealt with one another on a friendly, almost gentlemanly basis” (Berg 
1989).  The battle for Great Northern raged on for several months with law suits and slander 
coming from both sides.  In February of 1990, after twice increasing the offering price – from 
$58 a share to $63, and then to $65.75 – Georgia-Pacific succeeded in their takeover of Great 
Northern, acquiring the firm for a $5 billion cash buyout, the largest merger of its kind in the 
history of the US forest products industry.  With this acquisition, Georgia-Pacific became the 
world’s largest forest product firm, briefly surpassing International Paper, with estimated 




Figure 6.8. Mergers and Acquisitions in excess of $1 Billion in US Forest Products Industry, 1995-2008 
Source: Rudder (2002) and  Miles (2005). 
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Industry analysts predicted that there would be an industry-wide wave of 
consolidation following Georgia-Pacific’s acquisition of Great Northern (Hoffman 1991); 
however, the recession of 1991 undermined any potential deals for a time.  In fact, 
sagging prices and a high debt overhang forced Georgia-Pacific to sell over 80 percent of 
the mills they acquired to Bowater just 18 months after they were acquired.   
The merger wave of the 1990s really began to explode in the years after the 
industry’s rebound in 1995 and continued unabated for the next 10-15 years.  Between 
1995 and 1997 mergers and acquisition increased from 26.0 to 36.9 percent based on 
annual dollar increases (Diamond, Chappelle, and Edwards 1999).  In 1995, many firms 
in the industry found themselves with a surplus of cash due to the record profits of that 
year, and with the lessons of the late 1980s excesses still fresh in their mind, they turned 
to purchasing existing machines instead of building new capacity.  Consolidated Papers, 
Appleton Papers, Chesapeake, and Kimberly-Clark all purchased existing papermaking 
facilities over the course of the year.  Kimberly-Clark’s purchase of Scott Paper for $9.4 
billion was the largest merger of the year.  This merger raised a number of anti-trust 
concerns within the Justice Department, ultimately forcing Kimberly-Clark to sell off 
their facial tissues and baby wipes businesses in order for the merger to go through 
(Bloomberg 1995).  In addition, Madison Dearborn Partners, a private equity firm that 
specializes in leveraged buyouts, began its long foray into the US forest products industry 
when it purchased a mill in Hyde Park, Massachusetts from the bankrupt Patriot Paper 
Corp (Rudder 2002).   
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After a brief respite in 1996, the industry experienced two significant mergers the 
following year, both of which were friendly mergers aimed at increasing the market share 
and reducing competition.  The first involved a $5.8 billion merger between Fort Howard 
Corp. and James River Corp., forming a single company under the name of Fort James 
Corp.  Fort Howard entered the deal after employing advisors from Morgan Stanley to 
devise a way to “maximize value” for shareholders (Bagli 1997).  After the merger, Fort 
James Corp. was now the second largest tissue producer in the world (behind Kimberly-
Clark) and one of the top 10 consumer product companies (Rudder 2002).  Less than two 
weeks later, another major merger occurred when Wausau Paper and Mosinee Paper 
joined to form Wausau-Mosinee Paper Corp., making it the nation’s largest producer of 
specialty papers.  Commenting on this merger, an industry analyst remarked that “both 
stocks have tread water lately and this is a way to increase shareholder value” (Reuters 
1997).   
The move towards consolidation continued in 1998 when Stone Container merged 
with Jefferson Smurfit to form Smurfit Stone Container Corp., then the world’s largest 
manufacturer of paperboard and paper-based packaging.  Another “mega-merger” 
occurred when Bowater acquired Montreal based newsprint and market pulp producer 
Avenor for $2.5 billion, outbidding Bowater’s primary competitor Abitibi-Consolidated 
(Rudder 2002).  Less notable deals continued to take place as firms shuffled around their 
existing production facilities in order to “extract merger-related cost savings and 
synergies” (Banham 1999).   
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International Paper began its move towards consolidation in 1999 when it merged 
with Union Camp in a stock-for-stock deal worth an estimated $7.9 billion.  Industry 
analysts were clear on the motivations behind the merger: the need to increase 
shareholder value (Banham 1999).  The following year, International Paper made another 
large purchase when they acquired Champion International for $9.6 billion, solidifying 
their leadership in the printing/writing paper and market pulp sectors.  International Paper 
also served as a white knight when it stepped in to purchase Shorewood Packaging for 
$600 million after a prolonged bidding war with Chesapeake Corp.  These acquisitions 
secured International Paper’s position as the world’s largest forest product company.   
The decade came to an end with one final mega-merger when Georgia-Pacific 
agreed to purchase Fort James Corp for $7.5 billion, plus $3.5 billion of debt (Rudder 
2002).  Fort James had been struggling since its inception three years earlier and Miles 
Marsh, the CEO of Fort James, said that this merger represented a “fine opportunity” for 
the company’s shareholders (The Ottawa Citizen 2000).  This merger established 
Georgia-Pacific as the world’s leading tissue producer, surpassing their rival Kimberly-
Clark.   
 The shakeup in the US forest products industry continued to surge in the early 
years of the new millennium.  Two of the nation’s longstanding firms, Mead and 
Westvaco, merged in early 2002 in what was described as a “merger between equals” 
(Pidgeon 2001).  The new company, MeadWestvaco, became the nation’s fourth largest 
paper company with about $8 billion in annual sales.  Commenting on the merger, John 
A. Luke, Jr. President and CEO of Westvaco added, “[w]ith this combination and the 
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powerful business it creates, we are well positioned to deliver higher returns to 
shareholders” (Pidgeon 2001). 
Weyerhaeuser made its foray into the merger movement in early 2002 when it 
initiated a hostile takeover of their rival, Willamette Industries.  Weyerhaeuser’s first bid 
consisted of a public offer of $48 per share, which was roundly rejected by Willamette’s 
management.  Weyerhaeuser’s final bid of $55.50 per share plus the assumption of $1.7 
billion in debt proved successful.  The total takeover, valued at $7.8 billion was the 
largest transaction in the industry since Georgia-Pacific’s merger with Fort James in 
2000.  This acquisition placed Weyerhaeuser as North America’s second largest forest 
products company (Rudder 2002).   
In 2005 the largest acquisition in the history of the industry took place when 
Georgia-Pacific was purchased and subsequently privatized by Koch Industries for $21 
billion including debt.  Under the terms of the deal, Koch paid $48 per share to Georgia-
Pacific’s shareholders, a 39 percent premium on their current value.  This acquisition was 
the largest purchase to date by the family owned conglomerate and made Koch Industries 
the nation’s largest privately held company by revenue.  Interestingly, Koch Industries 
decision to purchase and privatize Georgia-Pacific was carried out because of their belief 
that highly cyclical, commodity-dependent industries such as forest products were “better 
suited as private companies than in the public markets because they face less pressure to 
hit quarterly targets” (Whiteman 2005).   
During this period there was an emerging trend towards financial investors 
becoming key buyers of large forest product firms.  Madison Dearborn Partners was the 
 192 
 
leading firm in this regard, having “consummated approximately $15.5 billion of 
management buyout transactions since 1993, several of which are now public companies, 
including Packaging Corp. of America and Buckeye Technologies” (Miles 2005).  In 
2004, Madison Dearborn also purchased the paper and forest products sectors of Boise 
Cascade, after the latter rebranded itself as OfficeMax following its purchase of the office 
retailer a year earlier.  Cerberus Capital was another financial firm that purchased mills 
from existing companies in order to sell off assets and establish new firms.  In 2005, 
Cerberus Capital purchased mills from Mead Westvaco and Consolidated Papers and 
they formed a new company under the name of New Page.   
Mergers and acquisitions continued to pick up pace between 2005 and 2008.  In 
late 2007, the Canadian based Abitibi-Consolidated merged with Bowater in what was 
described, like MeadWestvaco, as a “merger between equals.” The new company, called 
AbitibiBowater, controls about 55 percent of North American newsprint capacity and 17 
percent of the global newsprint market.  Early the next year, Weyerhaeuser announced 
that it was selling its containerboard, packaging and recycling businesses to International 
Paper for $6 billion in cash, which would more than double International Paper’s 
containerboard capacity and make it the world’s largest producer of containerboard.  This 
announcement by Weyerhaeuser was preceded by another large transaction in which the 
company sold off its printing papers business in a deal with Domtar (S&P 2008).   
To sum up, the mergers and acquisitions of the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
radically altered the landscape of the US forest products industry.  Industry titans dating 
back to the 19th century were swallowed up and/or merged with competitors in an 
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unprecedented reshuffling of ownership.  At least half of the top ten firms in 1990 were 
merged under new names and/or acquired by a competing firm by 2008.  These mergers 
produced substantial increase in the market valuation of firms and were therefore 
successful in achieving their principle aim of increasing shareholder value (Mei and Sun 
2008b).   
 
Concentration and Oligopoly in the US Forest Products Industry 
 
As a result of this historic merger wave, the levels of concentration reached record 
heights in an industry that has long been characterized as oligopolistic.  Table 6.1 shows 
the relative concentration ratios for the top four firms in selected industries based on their 
value of shipments.  In the paper industry as a whole, the concentration level for the top 
four firms rose from 18.5 percent in 1997 to 24 percent in 2007.  This increase in 
concentration has produced a rapid growth in oligopoly market power in the paper  
 
Table 6.1. Share of Value of Shipments Accounted for by Top Four Companies for 
Selected Forest Product Industry Sectors 
Industry (SIC Code) 1997 2002 2007 
Paper Manufacturing (322) 18.5 25.8 24 
Pulp mills (322110) 58.6 61.1 53.9 
Newsprint Mills (322122) 43.9 53.9 58.1 
Sanitary paper (322291) 63.1 56.3 62.2 
Wood product manufacturing (321) 10.5 10 9.1 
Sawmills (321113) 16.8 17.5 14.6 
Hardwood veneer and plywood (321211) 30.5 33.1 30.4 
Source U.S. Census Bureau (2007) 
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products sector, providing industry leaders with greater control over production and 
prices in the industry (Mei and Sun 2008a).   
This concentration is particularly evident within specialized sectors of the 
industry because large firms have divested various divisions in order to focus on their 
“core competencies.”  In the pulp mills sector, the share of value added accounted for by 
the top four firms increased to 61.1 percent in 2002, before sliding back to 53.9 percent in 
2007.  Newspaper is now one of the more concentrated sectors of the US forest products 
industry.  By 2007, the top four firms in the newsprint sector accounted for over 58 
percent of market activity.  These levels increased substantially in 2007 following the 
merger of Abitibi-Consolidated and Bowater, which left the newly formed Abitibi-
Bowater in control of over half of the total newsprint market (CBC News 2007).   
 The merger wave does not seem to have led to similar levels of concentration in 
the wood products sector.  In the sector as a whole, the value of shipments accounted for 
by the top four firms actually decreased slightly over this period from 10.5 percent in 
1997 to 9.1 percent in 2007.  This continues to reflect the less capital-intensive nature of 
wood products manufacturing and the fact that small mills continue to account for a 
substantial portion of market activity.  For the forest products industry as a whole, 
however, the merger wave of the 1990s and 2000s led to a substantial increase in overall 






Restructuring, Core Competencies, and Labor 
 
 The mergers and acquisitions that took place between 1995 and 2005 were 
symptomatic of the rising influence of the shareholder value conception of control in the 
management of US forest product firms.  Once completed these mergers were often 
followed by a series of restructuring programs aimed at increasing efficiencies and 
streamlining production processes.  Translated, this meant that underperforming mills 
would be shut down or sold-off, while employees would be laid off by the thousands.   
These restructuring efforts were undertaken by managers at various times, depending on 
the circumstances of particular firms within the industry.  Most often they occurred after 
a prolonged period of declining profits or immediately following a merger or acquisition.  
In fact, many large firms explicitly hired financial analysts at some of the nation’s largest 
financial institutions for advice on how best to “maximize shareholder value” (Farley 
1997) 
Perhaps the first major restructuring effort undertaken with the explicit intention 
of increasing returns to shareholders occurred in 1992 when Steven Mason took the helm 
of Mead Corporation.  Mead had been suffering from several years of declining returns 
and Mason was charged with turning the company around.  Mason immediately 
announced a three-year performance improvement which included the immediate 
dismissal of about 1,000 employees aimed at increasing productivity.  Mason also 
announced that Mead would be selling off several of its non-core product lines, including 
its imaging and insurance business.  The largest divestment occurred in 1994 when the 
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company sold Mead Data Central unit, which included the LexisNexus information 
service, to the Anglo-Dutch publishing giant Reed Elsevier for $1.5 billion.  Commenting 
on this sale, Mason declared that “we’re interested in shareholder value” (Bloomberg 
1994).  The proceeds from this sale were used to pay down debt and make stock 
repurchases (IDCH 1998).   
The most symbolic restructuring of a US forest product firm along the dictates of 
the shareholder value conception of control occurred in 1994 when the board of Scott 
Paper decided to hire Al Dunlap to take over management of their floundering company.  
As we recall, “Chainsaw Al” gained notoriety during the 1980s for his ruthless approach 
to corporate management of several US forest product firms, most notably when James 
Goldsmith hired him to manage Crown Zellerbach after his successful takeover bid.  
Dunlap embodied the shareholder value ideology, with his emphasis on streamlining 
corporate management and focusing on core competencies of the firm.  His management 
tenure at Scott Paper set a precedent for the industry that many would soon follow.   
 In 1994 Scott Paper was a century-old $5 billion “stumbling giant” of the US 
forest products industry (Perkins 1999).  Like many in the industry, Scott had embarked 
upon a flurry of expansion during the late 1980s, leaving the firm with an excess of 
capacity, coupled with stagnating sales and declining market share.  Scott’s CEO, Phillip 
Lippencott, attempted a number of strategies aimed at turning the ailing company around, 
but each proved unsuccessful.  In a moment of desperation, the board of Scott Paper 
turned to Al Dunlap to revitalize their failing company.   
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 Dunlap immediately set out to institutionalize his shareholder value ideology of 
corporate management.  His plan consisted of four parts: first he fired the existing 
management team and brought in a team of trusted associates from his days with Crown 
Zellerbach.  Second, he began a series of asset sales aimed at refocusing the firm on their 
core strength in the paper products sector.  These included selling off the firm’s coated 
paper division, a power plant in Alabama, and its health and food services unit.  In order 
to change the corporate culture, he also decided to sell off the corporate jet and the 
company’s 55 acre headquarters camp in Philadelphia, moving the headquarters into a 
leased office building in Florida (Rudder 2002; Perkins 1999).   
Next, he oversaw the “largest proportionate restructuring” of a US corporation to 
date.  Sam Perkins (1999: 5) described these efforts in a report on Dunlap and corporate 
restructuring:  
More than 11,000 employees were eliminated from Scott’s payroll.  The 
headquarters staff was reduced by 71%, salaried management by 50%, and 
hourly employees by 20%.  Many functions, such as Washington 
lobbyists, real estate, HR and IT were either eliminated entirely or 
outsourced.  Additional cost reductions came from ending the use of most 
outside consultants ($30 million) and putting services such as auditing out 
to bid ($1.5 million annual savings).  Further, Dunlap ended a tradition of 
Scott contributing $3 to $4 million a year to community organizations, 
terminated the practice of matching employee contributions to United 
Way and reportedly canceled the last $50,000 of a long-term commitment 
to the Philadelphia Museum of Fine Arts.  
 
Scott Paper’s CFO Basil Anderson later commented on the restructuring, noting that “the 
focus on shareholder value allows you to make better judgments on those kinds of 
expenses” (Perkins 1999: 5).  The final step in Dunlap’s four part plan included a number 
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of investments in strategic sectors and a reinvigorated marketing campaign aimed at 
improving Scott’s market share.   
 In the year after Dunlap was hired, his efforts at restructuring Scott Paper seemed 
to have been a success, at least when measured in terms of shareholder value.  Operating 
income increased substantially and, most importantly, the price of Scott Paper’s shares 
rose from $38 when Dunlap took over, to $60 at the end of 2004 and then to $90 the 
following year.  Wall Street cheered his management style and lauded him as a “turn-
around champion.”  Former employees, of course, had a different view of his 
accomplishments, but for Dunlap’s financial constituency, his efforts were a resounding 
success.  In the summer of 2005, Dunlap sold what was left of Scott Paper to Kimberly-
Clark for a $47.7 billion stock swap and Dunlap himself walked away from the deal with 
a $100 million compensation package for his efforts.   
 Dunlap was essentially the ideal-typical manager operating under the shareholder 
value conception of control.  He had a strong disdain for incompetent managers of 
corporate America, referring to them as “America’s Aristocracy” and denouncing them 
for their lavish abuses of corporate power.  Shareholders were the only constituency that 
mattered for Dunlap and he strived to instill this belief in those around him.  He also 
began the practice of compensating board members solely with stock, becoming at the 
time only the second company in the US to do so.  If there ever was a personification of a 
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manager operating under a shareholder value conception of control, it was “chainsaw” Al 
Dunlap.60   
 Restructuring efforts in other firms may have been less drastic – they were 
certainly not carried out by such a charismatic figure as Dunlap – but they were similar in 
many regards.  Georgia-Pacific began a restructuring program under the leadership of 
A.D. “Pete” Correll in the mid-1990s.  Correll was seen as a leader in the shareholder 
value movement and was quoted as saying “it was high time these giant cyclical 
businesses start focusing on shareholder returns instead of worrying about revenues and 
market-share growth” (Henderson 1999).  Correll’s efforts began in 1994 when he 
launched a number of initiatives aimed at making Georgia-Pacific “the most cost-
efficient company in the industry.”  This restructuring program led to the closing of 
almost half of the company’s distribution centers and a “Mill Improvement Program” that 
cut costs and increased efficiency at the firm’s 14 large pulp and paper mills.  In 1996, 
Correll announced a hiring freeze and an early retirement program for salaried employees 
while he continued to close down under-performing plants and began the process of 
selling-off timberland assets.  The next year Georgia-Pacific announced that timberland 
assets would be spun off into a separate operating group with its own common stock 
under the title of the “Timber Company.”  
                                                 
 
60
 Dunlap celebratory status on Wall Street was later ruined when he was fired and subsequently found 
guilty of committing accounting fraud as the chief executive of Sunbeam.  This also led investigators to 
investigate irregularities during his tenure with Scott Paper.  Dunlap settled these charges with the SEC for 
an agreement to pay a $500,000 fine and a lifetime ban from serving as an officer or director of any public 
company (see Norris 2002; 2005). 
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 Correll’s efforts to restructure Georgia-Pacific took a contrary turn in the late 
1990s when it was decided that the company would a make a number of large purchases.  
These included the purchase of Unisource, a leading distributing company based out of 
Indianapolis.  This purchase enraged shareholders who would “have rather have them 
return money to shareholders than put it into distribution,” and as a result, the firm’s 
stock plummeted (Fineman 1999).  However, Correll soon after announced that Georgia-
Pacific would be exiting the timberland market for good when he announced a $4 billion 
dollar sale of their remaining timberlands to the timberland investment firm, Plum Creek.  
Soon after Georgia-Pacific acquired Fort James Corp. and announced that it would be 
selling its newly acquired Unisourse at a loss in order to cover some of the debt incurred 
in this large acquisition (Cassidy 2002).     
 Other firms across the industry continued to cut non-essential operations and 
reduce employees.  In 1998, Willamette announced that it would be selling-off its 
timberland holdings in order to reduce debt and resume its $25 million stock 
repurchasing program (Bloomberg 1998a).  Following its mergers, Smurfit-Stone 
announced the closures of a number of plants and cutting of 3,600 jobs, or 10 percent of 
its work force (Bloomberg 1998b).  Weyerhaeuser also consolidated its core business in 
the late 1990s when they ended their services in mortgage banking, personal care 
products, financial services, and information systems consulting.  The investment 
community typically greeted the announcement of these restructuring programs with a 
spike in investment, sending a signal to other managers that “shrinking to grow” was the 
mantra of the day (Verespej 1997).   
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International paper announced its major restructuring program in 2002 aimed at 
exiting non-core businesses and selling or closing existing assets.  During this year, the 
company sold both its OSB facilities and its decorative products division.  In 2005, 
International Paper announced a new three part restructuring plan aimed at “improving 
the company’s returns, strengthening its balance sheet, and returning cash to 
shareholders” (S&P 2006).  This plan included selling off its coated papers, beverage 
packaging, kraft papers, wood products, and virtually all of its 6.8 million acres of US 
timberland.  Together, these divisions accounted for approximately 30 percent of the 
company’s sales in 2004 and nearly 40 percent of its profits.  International Paper would 
now concentrate solely on its uncoated papers and consumer packaging lines.  On the day 
International Paper announced this restructuring plan their shares rose $1.56 or 5.1 
percent to $32.22 on trading of 22.8 million, the highest volume in the company’s history 
(The Globe and Mail 2005).  Clearly, the investment community’s desire to invest in 
companies with well-defined and focused strategies was pressuring managers to conform 
to the dictates of the shareholder value ideology.    
By 2005, the US forest product industry had undergone a thorough 
reconfiguration as firms bought and sold various assets and product lines in order to 
solidify their own positions within particular market segments.  International Paper’s 
purchase of Union Camp extended its leadership in the uncoated-free sheet area and 
brought it up to second in the containerboard sector.   In the newsprint sector, the merger 
between Abitibi and Bowater gave them over half of all newsprint capacity in North 




Figure 6.9 Full-time and Part-time Employees in US Forest Products Industry 
(Thousands), 1990-2009 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 6.5 
 
paperboard and packaging sector is dominated by MeadWestvaco and Smurfit-Stone.  
Georgia-Pacific, which was now a private company operating within Koch industries, 
held on to its position as the world’s leading tissue manufacturer while continuing to have 
significant operations in pulp and wood products sectors.   
The effect of the shareholder value ideology was devastating for labor in the US 
forest products industry.  Most restructuring plans were accompanied with mass layoffs, 
often affecting thousands of employees at a time.  Figure 6.9 shows the dramatic decrease 
in employee for both forest products sectors.  Over a third of all employees in both 
sectors lost their jobs between 1990 and 2009.  In both sectors, the layoffs rose 
dramatically in the years following 1999, corresponding to the merger wave and 
restructuring that took place in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  The pressure to maximize 
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shareholder value left employees increasingly vulnerable as mass layoffs and mill 
closures became a central tactic in manager’s desire to increase the shareholder value of 




 In the previous chapter I explained how the managerial decision to acquire vast 
timberland holdings was driven not merely by the need for greater quantities of raw 
materials, but grew directly out of manager’s desire to diversify and expand their 
corporate empires – a rationale that is directly associated with managers operating under 
the retain and reinvest conception of control of the post war era.  Likewise, the 
managerial decision to sell-off corporate timberlands can be seen directly in line with the 
structural dynamics of financialization and the proliferation of the shareholder value 
conception of corporate control.  Whereas existing research has tended to explain this 
transfer of ownership in piecemeal fashion, citing a litany of causes and influences (see 
Binkley, Raper, and Washburn 1996; Clutter et al 2005; Hickman 2007), I argue that the 
transfer is best understood as part of the broader structural context of financialization.    
As we saw in Chapter 5, the financial community began to show interest in 
timberlands in the early 1980s.  During this period financial actors, led by James 
Goldsmith, targeted forest product firms in order to gain control of these undervalued 
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assets.61  Managers resisted this intrusion by corporate raiders and adopted a number of 
measures aimed at reducing the likelihood that they would become a takeover target.  
They did, however, begin to reevaluate the strategic role of their timberland holdings.  
(Binkley, Raper, and Washburn 1996).   
Disposing of these timber holdings was not as easy it might seem.  First of all, 
selling to a rival firm was not an option because it would put the selling firm at a 
competitive disadvantage and most likely prevent access to timber supply in the future.  
Secondly, firms require that their timber supply come from land that is relatively close to 
their existing mills because transporting it over long distances is not cost effective.  And 
finally, other firms in the industry were under the same pressures and were no longer 
looking to expand their timberland assets.  What they needed, therefore, was a buyer with 
a large amount of investment capital that could own and manage the land while 
continuing to provide the market with ample timber supply. 
The passage of the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 
1974, along with other state level regulations, relaxed the rules governing the investment 
practices of many public pension plans.  As a result, institutional investors began to 
diversify away from their traditional reliance on low-risk, fixed-income securities such as 
government and corporate bonds.  Initially institutional investors were investing heavily 
in the stock market, but before long they turned to commercial real estate and other assets 
                                                 
 
61
 Actually, financial institutions had been noticing the investment potential of timberland since the 1970s, 
when several firms began issuing agricultural loans to American farmers while using the farm’s timber as 
part of the collateral base of the farm (Binkley 2007).   
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in order to diversify their rapidly expanding portfolios (Binkley, Raper, and Washburn  
1996).   
Timberland became an attractive investment class to investors for a number of 
reasons.  First was the fact that investments in timberland seemed to offer fairly high 
returns when compared to other investment options.  Second, investors believed that 
timberland investments could help spread risk in large portfolios because they had low 
correlations with other assets classes such as stocks and bonds.  And third, timberland 
returns tended to be highly correlated with the rate of inflation, which provides investors 
with a hedge against inflation (Hickman 2007).  As the realization of the investment 
potential of timberland began to spread, two institutions emerged in order to 
accommodate the financial community’s growing demand for timber assets.    
The first was the Timberland Investment Management Organization (TIMO), 
which is an institution that buys and manages timberland on behalf of various clients, 
such as insurance companies, pension funds, endowments, and foundations (Hickman 
2007).  Thus, TIMOs do not actually own the land, but buy and manage it for these 
various financial intuitions.  TIMOs typically purchase timberland for a short time period, 
usually between 10 and 20 years, and unless there is a specified option to extend, the 
timberland will be sold at the end of this period (Hickman 2007).     
As with the financialization process in general, the role of debt appears to have 
been critical in the purchasing of many of these timberlands.  Binkley (2007) recalls a 
case in which, a new TIMO, Timberstar, purchased a significant amount of timberland 
from International Paper and raised 72 percent of the capital through a public bond.  This 
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means that the company only had to invest 28 percent of the total equity, while 72 
percent was raised in debt markets.  The use of debt in this case does not appear to be an 
exception; on the contrary, there has been a substantial increase in the amount of debt in 
most large timberland acquisitions (Clutter et al. 2005).   
The second institution was the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT), which own 
and manage real estate related assets (timberland in this case) on behalf of private 
investors (Hickman 2007).  REIT’s are corporations whose special tax designation allows 
them to invest in real estate while receiving a vastly lower tax rate than typical 
corporations.  As part of the rules of this designation, they are required to distribute 90 
percent of their income directly back to investors.  REITs had been in existence since the 
early 1960s, but it was not until the passage of the Real Estate Investment Trust 
Simplification ACT (REITSA) of 1997 that timber-REITs were established.  The 
REITSA of 1997 changed the rules governing the conversion from a vertically integrated 
timber company to REITs and allowed for institutional funders to invest directly in 
REITs.  Today there are several REITs, including Plum Creek, Potlatch, Rayonier, and 
Weyerhaeuser that are traded on the NY Stock Exchange, thus allowing investors to 
purchase directly in timberland.   
The timberland holdings of TIMOs and REITs are spread across the United 
States, but the largest concentrations occur in the regions where the forest products 
industry is most prominent, such as the pine plantations of the Southeast, the conifer 
plantations in the Pacific Northwest, and the mixed hardwoods in the Northeast 
(Hickman 2007).  There is also a growing interest in international timberland 
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investments, particularly in South America, where significant investments continue to be 
made (Mendell 2006).   
 In the United States, the demand for timberland investments coming from TIMOs 
and REITS needs to be understood within the context of forest product managers who 
were beginning to rethink the role of timberland ownership in their corporate strategies.  
Although managers initially resisted the idea of divesting their timberland in the 1980s, 
by the early 1990s, the adoption of the shareholder value conception of corporate control 
was beginning to spread across the industry.  Years of relatively weak financial 
performance had caused the industry to fall out of favor with the financial community 
(Yin et al. 1998).  As the balance of power – in both corporate boardrooms and the nation 
more broadly – shifted towards the financial community, managers came under increased 
pressure to sell off non-core assets. Other reasons cited in the decision of managers to 
sell-off timberland include the higher tax-rate for corporate timberlands and the need to 
reduce debt that was acquired during the merger movement of the period (Hickman 
2007).   
Figure 6.10 shows the net acres and value of this transfer of timberland 
ownership.  Here we see that the transfer of timberland began to occur in the 1980s and 
accelerated slightly over the course of the 1990s.  Investors that got into timberland 
investment early were unexpectedly rewarded when the Forest Service sharply cut back 
timber harvesting from federal lands in the aftermath of the Spotted Owl controversy 
(Rinehart 2010).  The removal of federal forests decreased the total timber supply by half 
in the Western United States and led to a sharp increase in timberland prices, even in 
 208 
 
non-Western timber producing regions.  Rinehart (2010) estimates that this spike in 
timberland prices resulted in a cumulative rate of return of 26.75 percent for early 
investors.   
The sharp increase in timberland prices and their impressive rate of return for 
early investors made timberland even more attractive to potential investors.  Over the 
course of the 1990s, managers that that were coming under the sway of the shareholder 
value ideology began to notice the rising value of these timberlands as well.  The real 
explosion of timberland sell-offs, however, occurred during the 2000s, when managers 
acting under “marching orders from Wall Street” decided to sell off their timberland 
assets (Rinehart 2010: 13).    
 
 
Figure 6.10 Transfer of Timberland Ownership by Acre and Value 




The timing of the decision to sell-off timberland within particular firms can be 
traced directly to the corporate restructuring plans that I described above.  Corporate 
managers looking to increase returns to shareholders in a struggling industry found that 
they could accomplish this by selling off non-core assets.  For example, Peter Correll, the 
CEO and shareholder value champion of Georgia-Pacific, first spun-off the company’s 
timberland assets into a separate unit in 2007 before deciding to sell-off their timberland 
assets wholesale to Plum Creek two years later in a deal valued at $3.8 billion (Johnson 
2000).  Another example is Boise Cascade, which sold all of its timberland holdings to 
the private equity group Madison Dearborn as part of its transformation to Office Max in 
2004.  The markets usually rewarded the sell-off of timberland with a sharp increase in 
their share price.  When Temple Inland announced their decision to sell of their 
timberland in 2007, their shares rose by $8 (Rinehart 2010).     
In 1980, International Paper was the largest private landowner in the United 
States with approximately 7.1 million acres of timberland.  By 2008, the nation’s largest 
private land owners was Plum Creek, a REIT that now owns over 7 million acres of 
timberland spread across 19 states.  Plum Creek got its start in 1989 as a limited public 
partnership that was formed in order to buy 1.4 million acres of timberland from 
Burlington Resources, land that was again originally part of the late 19th century railroad 
land grants (Jensen and Draffan 1995).  In 1999, Plum Creek became the first wood 
products company to transform themselves into a REIT in what one commentator labeled 
as “one of the greatest business coups in history” (Skinner 2009).  This militaristic 
language presumably refers to the tax savings that firms enjoy once they convert to a 
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REIT.  Whereas traditional subchapter C corporations are taxed at federal income rate of 
40 percent, REITs enjoy a special tax status that allows them to be taxed at only 15 
percent.  In return, REITs are not allowed to have more than 20 percent of their assets in 
manufacturing.   
 Plum Creek’s conversion to a REIT was followed immediately by their purchase 
of Georgia-Pacific’s Timber Company and their 4.7 million acres of timberland.    In the 
weeks prior to this purchase the IRS had issued a ruling that allowed companies to spin 
off real estate to REITs tax-free (Sikora 2001).  Therefore, Georgia-Pacific was able to 
sell their timberlands to Plum Creek for $3.8 billion while paying zero taxes on these 
profits.   
Interestingly, the transfer of timberland ownership did not take place under the 
leadership of the industry’s largest firms.  International Paper, the leading firm in the 
industry with the largest timberland holdings did not sell the majority of their timberland 
until 2006.  As shown in Figure 6.11, International Paper began selling off timberland as 
early as 1997.  They continued to sell off parcels of land for most of the next decade; 
however, the majority of their timberland (5.8 million acres) was sold in 2006 following 
their announcement of their major restructuring program.  Weyerhaeuser became the last 
major firm to restructure when it announced its decision to convert to a REIT in early 
2010 (Chasan 2010).  The managers at Weyerhaeuser actively resisted the pressure to sell 
off their timberland.  In 2008, they successfully lobbied the federal government and 
received a $182 million tax break that was tucked inside a larger farm bill (Blumenthal 




Figure 6.11 International Paper Timberland Sales, 1997-2006 
Source: Rinehart Timberlands Transaction Database62 
 
however, it did not help the 1,500 employees that were laid off less than two months later 
(Chasan 2010).   
It is difficult to know exactly why larger firms were more reluctant to sell off their 
timberland.  Perhaps it was because they were the firms that owned the most timberland 
and reaped the greatest benefits from continued ownership.  Or it could have been the 
relative degree of shareholder influence within these firms and/or their respective 
corporate cultures.  Weyerhaeuser, for instance, built its corporate empire upon the large 
land holdings that they acquired from federal land grants in the late 19th century (Jensen 
and Draffan 1995).  Over the course of the 20th century Weyerhaeuser came to own 6.4 
                                                 
 
62
 Jim Rinehart is an expert in timberland investment that was among the first to predict the large-scale 
transfer of timberland ownership (See Rinehart 1985).  The data on International Paper was taken from 
Rinehart’s timberland transaction database that he has maintained since 1989 and was kind enough to share 
with me.      
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million acres of land, consisting of some of the most valuable timberland in the nation.  
In the end, however, even managers in Weyerhaeuser could not withstand the mounting 
pressure from shareholders.  Upon making their conversion to a REIT, Weyerhaeuser 
transferred approximately $5.6 billion to their shareholders in a special dividend 
(Donville 2010).    
 Weyerhaeuser’s restructuring as a REIT marks the culmination of one of the more 
pronounced periods of land ownership restructuring in recent US history.  Prior to 
Weyerhaeuser’s restructuring, Rinehart (2010) estimated that over 43 million acres of 
timberland valued at $39.7 billion has changed ownership type between 1983 and 2009.  
With the addition of Weyerhaeuser’s timberland to these figures in 2010, we are dealing 
with a land transformation in the range of 50 million acres.  As Rinehart (2010: 17) notes, 
“[t]his represents a stunning transfer of assets and wealth, especially considering that 




 The foregoing discussion reveals that managers in the US forest products industry 
increasingly adopted a shareholder value conception of control and that this ideology was 
used to motivate and justify corporate decision-making in recent decades.  At first, 
managers in the industry resisted the challenge from shareholders; however, by the mid-
1990s the shift in stock ownership and executive compensation, coupled with years of 
stagnant growth produced the necessary conditions for the shift in managerial strategies.   
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 In this chapter, I showed that during the 1990s the forest products industry 
consistently underperformed in several important financial measures of corporate 
success, causing the industry to grow out of favor with Wall Street. Managers responded 
by pulling back investments and ending an over half-century of capacity expansion.  Yet 
in the face of falling profits, managers were still able to maintain increased payments to 
shareholders in the form of stock buybacks and rising dividend payments.  These 
payments were presumably funded in part by debt, which rose substantially during recent 
decades.     
 This period was also marked by one of the industry’s most substantial merger 
waves.  This merger wave completely reshaped the industry and led to the disappearance 
or merger of many of the industry’s long-standing firms and an increase in overall 
concentration.  Following these mergers, managers often engaged in a series of 
restructuring programs aimed explicitly at increasing shareholder value.  These 
restructuring programs included divesting non-core assets and a further increase in 
concentration as firms consolidated their position within particular subsectors of the 
market.  The period also witnessed a massive layoff of employees in the industry as part 
of ongoing managerial efforts to reduce costs.   
 A critical component of the industry’s restructuring during this period was 
management’s decision to sell-off nearly 50 million acres of timberland that they had 
acquired over the course of the 20th century.  These timberlands are now owned and 
controlled by financial institutions, known as TIMOs and REITS, which manage them 
directly and with a focused strategy of maximizing financial returns.  Although this 
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transfer is stunning in and of itself, I argue that the transfer of timberland ownership is a 
concrete example of the financialization of the US political economy.  The 
financialization process entailed a substantial realignment of the relationship between 
financial and productive sectors of the capitalist class.  Within the firm, this 
transformation included a restructuring of the material relationship that exists between 
shareholders and managers, and the proliferation of shareholder value ideology among 
corporate managers.  Outside the firm, this process included a dramatic increase in 
institutional investors controlling vast sums of capital and seeking out profitable 
investments.  Together, these two internally-related processes produced one of the largest 







THE GREAT FINANCIAL CRISIS AND BEYOND:  
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION  
 
 
 “Intensive study of a particular sector of the economy first led to the isolation of 
what appeared to be the main active forces in determining the organization of 
producers.  It was then a natural step to attempt to observe the action of those forces 
in the economic process as a whole.”63  
 
 In this dissertation, I began with the vast transformation of timberland ownership 
and asked what compelled managers to increase their timberland holdings over the course 
of the 20th century, only to sell them off in rapid succession in recent decades?  In the 
course of investigating this puzzle I soon realized that the various factors cited in the 
literature – rising timberland values, pressure from shareholders to increase returns, the 
need to reduce debt in the forest products industry, tax advantages associated with 
financial ownership of timberland, etc. – were each related to broader transformations 
associated with the financialization of the US economy.  I also recognized that there was 
an under-theorized relationship between the proliferation of the shareholder value 
conception of control in corporate governance and financialization.  From these initial 
observations, I soon became convinced that the transfer of timberland ownership was best 
understood, and theorized, in terms of the logic of the system as a whole.   
  As the quote from Paul Sweezy suggests, it was a seemingly natural progression 
for me to make the move from my observation of changing timberland ownership to an 
examination of managerial changes in the modern corporations and then from that point 
to examine these dynamics within the economic process as a whole.  What is remarkable 
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 Sweezy (1938: 150).   
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is that so few make the journey from the particular to the general in our analysis of 
contemporary society.  The failure to do so often results in a one-sided analysis of 
contemporary society that ignores the historical specificity of capitalist social relations 
and the unique dynamics that spring therefrom.   
 In this concluding chapter I review and discuss the general conclusions of this 
study.  The conclusions are organized according to the two primary vantage points that 
were employed in this analysis: financialization and the shareholder value conception of 
control.  Before addressing these vantage points, however, I believe it is vital to pause 
and examine the effects of the Great Financial Crisis of 2008-2009 on the ongoing 
development of the US forest products industry.   
Because the effects of the Great Financial Crisis are so significant – on both the 
US economy and the forest product sector – I chose to end the analysis in this dissertation 
in 2008.  This decision is further supported by the critical role that economic crises play 
in my periodization of US capitalism.  However, in this conclusion I want to provide an 
overview of what has happened to the industry in the years since the crisis and examine 
how the crisis continues to affect the forest products sector up to the final moments of 
revising this dissertation (and beyond).  This updating is also critical because one cannot 
adequately address the effects of financialization on the US forest products industry 
without taking into account the consequences that ultimately stem from this form of 




The Great Financial Crisis and the US Forest Products Industry 
 
During the summer and fall of 2008 the bottom fell out on billions of dollars’ 
worth of mortgage backed securities. These mortgage-backed securities, combined with 
historically-low interest rates, had helped fuel the largest housing bubble in United States 
history.  When the housing bubble popped in 2006 it left the financial sector holding 
billions of dollars of overvalued assets. Panic began in the summer of 2008, when Bear 
Stearns announced that it required a bailout because of losses coming from the $10 
billion it held in “sub-prime mortgages.”   The panic continued to build over the course of 
the summer, culminating in the fall of Lehman Brothers in early September 2008 and the 
government bailout of the financial sector that followed.  The Great Recession that 
followed the financial crisis officially ended in June of 2009, however today, in early 
2012, the US economy continues to suffer from high unemployment and a general 
condition of stagnation.   
 As I have explained in earlier chapters, the US forest products industry is highly 
sensitive to the health of the broader US economy.  It should come as no surprise then to 
learn that the Great Recession has had a severely negative impact on the industry.  The 
downturn was particularly severe for the wood products sector.  A recent study of the 
wood products industry claims that the collapse of the housing market and the recession 
that followed produced “the worst housing and wood products market since the Great 
Depression” (Woodall et al. forthcoming).  Figure 7.1 shows the total annual housing 
starts in the United States from 1990-2011.  Here we see that total housing starts 





Figure 7.1 Annual Housing Starts in the United States   
Source: US Census Bureau 2012 
 
 
over 50 years.  Although industry analysts continue to see signs of recovery right around 
the corner, housing starts remain sluggish and full recovery is nowhere in sight.64  This is 
difficult news for an industry that relies on residential construction for nearly half of its 
total lumber output (S&P 2009).   
The report by Woodall (forthcoming) and his coauthors goes on to show that in 
the wake of the financial crisis, production output in the softwood lumber market has 
dropped to levels not seen since  the late 1940s.  They also highlight the significant 
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 In a report filed in response to the release of the February housing starts data, financial analysts 
concluded that a recovery in the housing sector will be “long and slow” (see Russolillo 2012).   
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impact that the downturn has had on labor, finding that between 2005 and 2009, over 1.1 
million jobs were lost in the six sectors that are most directly related to the US forest 
products industry.  This includes 218,677 and 89,507 jobs for the wood products and 
paper products respectively.  In a stunning contrast, Woodall and his authors point out 
that in the US auto manufacturing sector – which received significant media attention and 
a government bailout to the tune of $80 billion – total employment declined by 24 
percent, or 444,000 workers, over the same period.  The fact that these forest industry 
jobs are spread across almost every region of the United States makes these figures even 
more startling (Woodall et al. forthcoming).   
 Although the paper products sector fared better than wood products, they also 
continue to be plagued by the ongoing stagnation in the US economy.  Since 1999, 
overall paper consumption in the United States has continued to decline (Skog 2012).  
The industry has responded by continuing to reduce overall capacity.  For example, In 
October 2009, International paper announced that it would be permanently shutting down 
eight paper machines in four different locations, totaling 13 percent of the company’s 
North American paper capacity (S&P 2010).  Other leading firms, such as Sunoco and 
MeadWestvaco also announced capacity reductions during this period (Goldstein 2009).  
These capacity reductions have benefited the paper sector and enabled them to increase 
prices, despite decreases in demand (S&P 2010).     
 Nevertheless, several firms in the industry ultimately declared bankruptcy in the 
years following the financial crisis.  Smurfit-Stone filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 
early 2009 in what Pulp and Paper Week declared as the “largest bankruptcy filing in the 
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history of the North American paper and forest products industry” (cited in S&P 2010).  
The company cited weak demand and tighter lending standards as the principle factors in 
their decision to file.  Their condition was exacerbated by high debt, which rose to $5.6 
billion by late 2008.  Smurfit-stone emerged from bankruptcy protection in July, 2010 
after agreeing to a restructuring plan that included a guarantee that all existing lenders 
would be paid in full and the issuance of $1.2 billion in new debt (Whiteman 2011).   
The newly formed AbitibiBowater also filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2009 
less than two years after its inception, following the merger of Bowater and Abitibi-
Consolidated.  This merger created the world’s largest newsprint producer with a nearly 
fifty percent market share in the newspaper sector.  However, as an industry insider 
described it to me, this was equivalent to “attempting to rescue two drowning ships by 
tying them together.”  In the face of declining newsprint demand and an extremely high 
debt burden of $8.8 billion, the company declared bankruptcy in April of 2009.  
Abitibibowater emerged from bankruptcy in December of 2010 after a restructuring 
program that included a reduction of their debt to nearly $1 billion, largely by allowing 
creditors to exchange their claims for equity in the firm.  This restructuring program also 
included the closure of a number of mills – reducing the firm’s total number of mills from 
18 to 34 – and the “slashing” of jobs in the firm (Austen 2010).  
 In the face of protracted economic stagnation, the industry continues to 
consolidate through ongoing mergers and acquisitions.  In March of 2008, Weyerhaeuser 
sold its containerboard, packaging, and recycling business to International Paper for $6 
billion in cash in a transaction that affected 14,300 employees.  The Weyerhaeuser 
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acquisitions more than doubled International Paper’s North American containerboard 
capacity and made it the world’s largest producer of containerboard with a market share 
of approximately 30 percent.65  By early 2009, Seattle Times was reporting that that 
“Weyerhaeuser is in a financial crisis so deep that the largest U.S. lumber producers turn 
down the heat in its offices to save money” (Robinson and Donville 2009).  Despite 
restructuring efforts, in late 2009 Moody’s rated Weyerhaeuser’s proposed new notes at 
Ba1, a rating on par with junk bonds.66  
In the summer of 2011, International Paper continued to fortify its dominance 
over the industry when they offered to purchase their rival, Temple-Inland.  The 
managers at Temple-Inland resisted the offer and took a number of steps to prevent a 
takeover, including adopting a poison-pill.  John Faraci, the chief executive at 
International Paper responded by taking the bid hostile and appealing directly it to 
Temple-Inland’s shareholders.  After a several rounds of negotiations, International Paper 
eventually clinched the deal by raising its offer 5% to a total of $3.7 billion and assuming 
$600 in Temple-Inland debt (DeLaMerced and Cane 2011; S&P 2012). 
A second major acquisition took place in 2011 when Rock-Tenn Co. completed 
its purchase of Smurfit-Stone, which had been free from bankruptcy protection for less 
than a year.  In this case, a group of shareholders were vocal in expressing dismay over 
the initial offer, believing that it undervalued the assets of the firm.  These shareholders 
lamented the fact that Smurfit-Stone CEO, Patrick Moore, would receive a bonus totaling 
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 Smurfit-Stone, the second largest producer of containerboard, held a 19 percent market share, giving 
these two firms control over nearly half of the global containerboard market (S&P 2010).  
66
 Information on Moody’s rating of Weyerhaeuser was originally found at Weyerhaeuser’s Wikipedia page 
(Wikipedia 2012).  For Moody’s announcement see Moody’s (2009).  
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$19 million if the deal took place.  In a letter they said it is “not hard to imagine the 
incentives that pushed Mr. Moore, and possibly the board, towards accepting this 
transaction with an eager buyer” (Whiteman 2011).  Despite resistance from some 
shareholders, managers agreed to sell the firm for $3.5 billion.  Within days of 
completing this acquisition, managers at Rock-Tenn announced the closure of three 
Smurfit-Stone mills and promised there would be more to come (Johnson 2011).  The 
purchase of Smurfit-Stone gave Rock-Tenn an estimated 20 percent share in the North 
American linerboard market.  This put them in second in the linerboard market behind 
International Paper, which dominated the market with a 40 percent share following their 
takeover of Temple-Inland (S&P 2012).     
As a result of this ongoing trend towards consolidation, the US forest products 
industry now has an unprecedented level of concentration.67  In the most recent survey of 
the industry by Standard & Poor’s (S&P 2012) they summarized the current levels of 
concentration, citing a report from Pulp & Paper Week:  
[t]he top four containerboard producers in 2007 accounted for 57% of total 
capacity. With the acquisition of Temple-Inland by IP, the top four 
producers would now have 73% of total capacity. As of year-end 2010, the 
most concentrated sector was coated recycled board, where the top four 
producers had an 87% share, while they had 72% and 69% shares, 
respectively, in the uncoated free sheet sector and the tissue market. 
However, according to Pulp & Paper Week, the containerboard industry, 
with a capacity of about 38 million tons per year, is much larger than these 
other categories, with uncoated free sheet the next largest at about 12 
million tons per year.   
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 At the time of writing, in March, 2012, Abitibibowater (now operating as Resolute Forest Products 
following a name change) has begun a hostile-takeover bid of Fibrek Inc., a firm that specializes in pulp.  
The board of directors at Fibrek unanimously rejected the unsolicited offer and has adopted a poison pill 
order to fend off a possible takeover (S&P 2012).   
 223 
 
As the industry continues its trend towards increased consolidation and oligopoly, 
there has also been an ongoing transformation in the two organizational components of 
the firm that I highlighted in this study.  The first is an ongoing increase in the level of 
stock ownership concentration in the US forest products industry.  By 2010 the level of 
concentrated stock ownership in the US forest products industry was reaching new 
heights.  Control over large shares of the industry came under the control of a single 
institution: Blackrock Inc.  Founded in 1988, Blackrock grew quickly through a series of 
acquisitions to become the world’s largest and most powerful institutional investor, 
controlling over $3.5 trillion in assets in 2010.  Included in Blackrock’s vast portfolio is a 
sizable ownership share in seven of the top ten of the US forest product firms: 
International Paper (8.6), Mead Westvaco (15.4), Weyerhauser (5.9), Domtar (7), 
Temple-Inland (10), Packaging Corp of America (7.7), and Plum Creek (6.3).68  The 
ability of a single institution to gain such overwhelming control over an industry is a 
striking example of how the ownership structure of corporate America has changed in 
recent decades.  It also suggests that this trend has not decreased in the years following 
the financial crisis of 2008-09.   
There is also evidence that compensation packages for managers in the US forest 
products are continuing to rise.  In 2010, International Paper’s CEO, John Faraci, was 
featured in The Institute for Policy Studies Executive Excess report, which examines the 
intersection between extravagant CEO pay and corporate tax dodging (IPS 2011).  In 
2010, Faraci received a 75 percent pay increase, bringing his total compensation to $12.3 
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 Ownership data compiled from 2010 corporate proxy statements filed by firms with the SEC.   
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million for the year.  In that same year International Paper received a $249 million dollar 
refund from the federal government, due in large part to their exploitation of a loophole 
that allows them to earn tax refunds for their use of a timber byproduct known as “black 
liquor” for fuel.69   
In reality the financial crisis and the Great Stagnation that followed only added 
insult to injury in an industry that was already floundering on the eve of the financial 
crisis.  Ironically, it was the housing bubble itself that supported the forest products 
industry in the years leading up to the crisis (at least for firms that maintained strong 
positions in the wood products sector).  But when the bubble popped – as bubbles always 
do – it sent the industry into a spiral that continues to wreak havoc on the industry.   
 
Conclusions and Discussion  
 
  The analysis of the US forest products industry in this dissertation speaks to 
several of the fundamental questions that continue to be debated in the literatures on 
financialization and the shareholder value conception of control.  This analysis also 
contains important insights for the US forest products industry and its ongoing 
development.  Many of these questions were highlighted in Part I of the dissertation and 
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 As part of a 2005 highway bill, the US congress created a tax credit to incentivize the use of alternative 
fuels.  Following a revision of this tax credit in 2007, the forest products industry was able to include their 
use of “black liquor” for tax credits.  Black liquor is a byproduct of the kraft process used to produce pulp 
that contains a substantial amount of the energy contained in wood.  The industry has long used black 
liquor as fuel to generate steam and produce electricity for their mills. However, following the modification 
of the highway bill in 2007, the industry began to use this loophole to receive billions of dollars in federal 
tax returns (S&P 2009).  This practice has led some to criticize the industry because of the fact that the use 
of this alternative fuel tax credit has actually led to an increase in of carbon-emitting fossil fuels 
consumption in the industry (Dead Tree Edition 2009).   
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were mentioned in passing during my analysis of the industry in Part II.  Here I discuss 
the relationship between financialization and the US forest products in greater detail.    
 
The Financialization of the US Forest Products Industry 
 
 Because financialization is a condition that stems from the dynamics of the 
economy as a whole, it does not necessarily follow that those same affects will take place 
in a particular sector.  A word of caution is therefore necessary in interpreting 
conclusions found in this study as saying anything about the conditions of 
financialization in general.  As Ollman (2003: 87) notes, “[h]ow a particular branch of 
industry…appears and functions involves a set of conditions that fall substantially short 
of applying to the entire capitalist epoch.”70 The financialization process did not emerge 
from within the US forest products sector, but was a product of the general development 
of US capitalism.  Nevertheless, we can observe the degree to which various claims made 
about financialization in general were present in the US forest products and make some 
preliminary conclusions from them.   
Within the financialization literature we are confronted by two primary questions: 
the first relates the question of whether financialization is the cause or consequence of 
economic stagnation in the US economy.  This debate revolves around those who view 
financialization as an outgrowth of the tendency towards stagnation that serves to 
compensate for a dearth of profitable investment opportunities in production (Foster and 
                                                 
 
70
 This quote comes from Ollman’s analysis of Marx’s abstractions of generality (see Ollman 2003: 86-99).  
The notion that we should not confuse general characteristics with particulars is similar to the ecological 
fallacy of inferring details about individuals from the study of a group to which they belong.   
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Magdoff 2009) and those who believe that financial investments “crowd out” investments 
that otherwise would have been put to more productive uses (Orhangazi 2008; 
Stockhammer 2004).   
In the US forest products industry the evidence shows that investments did in fact 
decline during the period of financialization.  Did this curtailment of investment occur 
because managers could invest more profitably in the financial sector than they could in 
their own industry?  I was unable to include an analysis of financial profits in the forest 
products industry for this study, so I am unable to show definitively that capital – that 
otherwise would have been invested into production – has been diverted to finance.  
However, in light of the industry’s protracted struggle with overcapacity, it makes little 
sense to argue that capital was diverted towards finance that otherwise would have been 
invested into production.  The surge of investment into expanded capacity in the closing 
years of the 1980s served as a final wake-up call to the industry.  During the 1990s, 
managers largely refrained from making investments into expanded capacity and instead 
focused on increasing efficiencies and returns to shareholders.  There is no convincing 
reason to believe that the money distributed to shareholders would have otherwise been 
invested into expanded production capacity when the industry was already suffering from 
excess capacity and declining utilization rates.  To the contrary, the evidence shows that 
pressure from the financial community and the spread of shareholder value ideology 
convinced managers to finally overcome their propensity to over-invest.  In this sense, 
the experience of the US forest products industry provides supports – at the sectoral level 
– to  the argument of Foster and Magdoff (2009) that financialization served to boost 
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economic activity in a mature sector that was already plagued by chronic overcapacity 
and glutted markets.71  
This brings us to a second and closely related question of the real source of the 
increase in shareholder returns.  During the financialization period, a rise in total returns 
to shareholders occurred at the same time as there was a decrease in overall profits.  
Some of these profits continued to be invested into production in order to increase 
efficiencies and otherwise contribute to further profits. However, the rapid rise in debt 
suggests that shareholder returns were also financed to a significant degree by taking on 
ever greater levels of debt.  Therefore, in keeping with financialization as a whole, there 
was a tendency in the US forest products sector to use debt as a lever to boost economic 
activity.   
These two conclusions – financialization did not channel investments away from 
production and rising debt enabled managers to increases returns to shareholders – might 
lead one to the further conclusion that financialization was, in fact, functional for the US 
forest product industry. In other words, it could be argued that financialization enabled 
managers to avoid overcapacity and increase capital flows to the firm’s shareholders.  
This argument that financialization was functional for maintaining profits in a stagnating 
sector is further supported when we consider the broader effects of the housing bubble.  
Low interest rates and the growing demand for investments into subprime mortgages 
helped fuel one of the largest residential construction booms in modern history.  This 
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 Foster and Magdoff’s analysis is based on the US economy as a whole.  See Foster and Magdoff (2009: 
128-134) for their analysis of declining capacity utilization in the US over the course of the financialization 
period.   
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surge greatly benefited the wood products sector and enabled to maintain healthy 
earnings during this period.  In this sense, financialization did in fact provide a direct 
boost, albeit a temporary one, to the forest product industry with the increased demand 
for wood products needed for housing construction.   
A final and particularly important question related to financialization that stems 
from this dissertation is the question of whether the transfer of timberland ownership has 
produced a bubble in timberland prices.  Because debt-fueled financial bubbles are a 
pronounced feature of a financialized economy (Foster and Magdoff 2009), the rapid 
increase in timberland prices in recent decades has led some observers to suggest that 
there is a bubble in US timberland.  For instance, in August of 2009, Andrew Bary 
(2009), a financial analyst writing for Barron’s, suggested that “US timberland may be 
one of the world’s most overvalued asset classes.”  Bary supports his claim by pointing 
out the glaring discrepancy between the rapid increase in timberland prices in recent 
decades and the accompanying drop in the stumpage price for logs and other forest 
products.  Bary claims that in the event of this bubble bursting, timberland owners may 
see the value of their timberland decline by as much as 50 percent!   
Other analysts have also warned that timberland might be experiencing its own 
“irrational exuberance” (Washburn 2001, cited in Rinehart 2010).  Jim Rinehart (2010), a 
leading expert in timberland investment, took up this topic in a recent publication, “US 
Timberland post-recession: Is it the same asset?”  Rinehart shows that the removal of 
federal timberlands as a source of supply following the listing of the Spotted Owl on the 
Endangered Species list led to a rapid increase in timberland prices, allowing early 
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investors to reap giant windfalls in the range of 26 percent cumulative return between 
1986 and 1992.  These gains bolstered the attractiveness of timberland as an investment 
within the financial community and led to increased interest in timberland investments 
throughout the 1990s, despite falling revenues in the forest products industry.  This trend 
increased after the bursting of the dot-com bubble in early 2000, which sent institutional 
investors desperately in search of alternative investment outlets (Rinehart 2010). In sum, 
over the course of the 2000s, timberland prices took on the form of a classic real estate 
bubble: low interest rates produced a surplus of capital that increased demand for 
investment and sent prices sky-rocketing. At the same time stumpage prices continued to 
decline in a mature industry that was suffering from poor market conditions.   
In the wake of the financial crisis, therefore, Rinehart predicted a decline in 
timberland portfolio values in the range of 20 percent.  Other timberland analysts 
generally agree and predict a decline of 10 to 20 percent, with one TIMO executive 
predicting closer to 30 percent.  But at the time of writing, Rinehart says that the drop 
was smaller than predicted, somewhere in the 5 percent range.  Rinehart (2010) 
concludes his analysis of post-recession timberlands with the prediction that in the face of 
ongoing economic hardship in the US forest products industry we can expect a further 
decline of 10 to 15 percent.72  This decline, according to Rinehart (2010) will bring an 
end to the abnormally high returns that characterized early investments and bring returns 
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 Rinehart argues that much of the decline has failed to reveal itself because timberland valuations are 
based on appraisals that tend to be “sticky” on the high side (see Rinehart 2010: 3).  Due to the slowdown 
of timberland transactions in the wake of the financial crisis it is difficult to know the true value of these 
timberlands and how the market will react when these timberland investments reach maturity in coming 
years.   
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back to more modest level of 6 to 10 percent – nowhere near the 50 percent drop in prices 
predicted by Bary (2009).   
The decline in timberland returns raises a number of questions about the future of 
US timberlands as an investment class.  As Rinehart (2010: 44) notes, “much of the 
immediate development value of timberland has already been monetized,” meaning that 
valuable parcels were spun-off by investors seeking the “highest and best use” of their 
land.  This leaves the forest products industry and alternative timberland uses – such as 
biofuels, carbon credits and income derived from ecosystem services – as the primary 
sources of demand for timberland in the future.  Today it is difficult to tell which of these 
potential markets might enable timberland investments to continue to deliver returns 
because each of these developments is speculative and contingent on a number of 
external developments.  But in the end, if an emerging markets fails to develop, this could 
potentially leave certain timberland investors holding a “hot potato” of overvalued 
timberland.    
In sum, this dissertation provides support to several claims that are made in the 
literature on financialization.  First, there is no convincing evidence to show that 
financialization led to a decline in overall investment in the US forest products industry.  
Although investment did decline in this sector, it was more likely due to the fact that the 
industry was suffering from excess capacity and declining demand.  Secondly, the 
financial returns that did take place in the US forest products sector were made possible 
by a rapid increase in debt.  This supports the conclusion that debt was a powerful tool 
for boosting economic activity in a sector that was suffering from declining returns.  And 
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finally, it appears that the transfer of timberland ownership resulted in a bubble in 
timberland prices as a result of the rapid growth in investment demand coming from 
institutional investors looking to expand their investment portfolios.    
 
Shareholder Value and the US Forest Products Industry 
 
  In this dissertation I integrated the shareholder value conception of managerial 
control within the broader structural transformations of financialization in order to 
highlight the interrelation between these two processes.  I also argued that the cultural 
one-sidedness of much of the economic sociology literature tended to ignore how 
material dynamics of capital accumulation create both the need for a new conception of 
control and help shape its emergent form.  In this conclusion I want to first discuss the 
effects of the shareholder value conception of control on the US forest products industry.  
I will then explain why my integration of the shareholder value literature within the 
context of financialization reveals a number of insights that are obscured by a one-sided 
focus on culture.  
In chapter 6 I demonstrated how the shareholder value ideology spread across the 
US forest products industry over the course of the 1990s and became firmly established 
as the dominant conception of managerial control by the early 2000s.  I also showed how 
this cultural transformation was undergirded by organizational shifts in the relationship 
between managers and shareholders – including increased concentration of share 
ownership among institutional investors and increases in incentive-based compensation 
for managers – that shifted the power relation in US forest products industry decisively in 
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favor of shareholder interests.  As a result, managers became increasingly preoccupied 
with maintaining shareholder returns and turned to a number of shareholder-favored 
tactics in order to increase those returns.  These tactics included a historic merger wave 
that substantially altered the landscape of the industry and brought concentration levels to 
historic highs.  Following these mergers, managers often instituted vast restructuring 
plans with the explicit intention of increasing shareholder returns.  
In many ways, these restructuring programs were devastating for the US forest 
products industry.  They included divesting “non-core” assets, particularly timberlands, 
and a reshuffling of industry assets that further increased oligopoly in various market 
subsectors.  The result has been a massive downsizing in the labor force, as one in three 
employees in the industry was laid off between 1990 and 2009.  The spread of 
shareholder value also increased the risk and vulnerability of US forest product firms by 
reducing the diversity of income sources in this inherently cyclical industry and 
increasing the indebtedness of firms.  This vulnerability came to a head in the 2008 when 
the financial crisis exerted an enormous shock upon the forest products industry, causing 
widespread loses for most and bankruptcy for some.73 Based on these considerations, we 
can conclude that the shareholder value conception of control is, on the whole, harmful to 
the US forest products industry.   
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 It is interesting to recall the rationale that was offered in the 2005 purchase and privatization of Georgia-
Pacific by Koch Industries.  A source close to the deal commented that “Koch believes such commodity-
dependent, cyclical businesses such as Georgia-Pacific are better suited as private companies than in the 
public markets because they face less pressure to hit quarterly targets” (Whiteman 2005).  This statement 
suggests that the forest products industry – as well as other natural resource-based industries – are 
inherently risky and therefore ought not to be operated with an eye towards short-term returns to 
stockholders.   
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A full consideration of the effects of shareholder value, however, should also 
include a measure of the success of the movement on its own terms.  As Fligstein and 
Shin (2007: 421) note, from the perspective of agency theory, shareholder value tactics 
were a success in that they “pushed managers in poorly performing industries to 
rationalize their production, lay off redundant workers, make technology investments, 
and thereby take advantage of whatever opportunities their industry had.” As we saw, 
each of these goals was accomplished by managers in the US forest products industry.   
However, as Fligstein and Shin (2007) show us, the shareholder value conception 
of control did not succeed in returning failing industries to profit.  This failure was also 
the case in the US forest products industry, where earnings continued to stagnate over the 
course of this period. Fligstein and Shin (2007: 420) wonder “why firms pursue mergers 
and layoffs if they not subsequently help profits?” Their unsatisfying conclusion is that 
these practices might just be “ritualistic and imitative and do not produce efficient 
outcomes.” 
The cultural perspective thereby turns a blind eye on the material realities of 
financialization.  Recall that in this dissertation I conceptualized financialization as a shift 
in the relationship between the financial and productive sectors of the capitalist class that 
was defined by the gravitational shift towards financial profits in the economy.  From this 
perspective the shareholder value conception of control is not simply a means to increase 
corporate profits, but is most directly concerned with the enrichment of a particular sector 
of the capitalist class.  To this end, managers engaged in a series of activities aimed at 
increasing returns to shareholders.  Furthermore, these returns were not necessarily drawn 
 234 
 
from profits, but were most likely the result of share price inflation driven by financial 
maneuvers and rising debt.  In short, financialization and shareholder value are not about 
making things, but taking them.   
 I would further argue that a one-sided cultural perspective on shareholder value 
tends to obscure another reality that underlies the shareholder value conception of 
control.  An emphasis on “shareholders” lends itself to democratic connotations, 
especially in the US where over half of the population now owns stocks.74 But when we 
realize that the majority of these shareholdings are controlled by institutional investors 
and large financial institutions we begin to reveal the real interests that lie behind the 
shareholder value conception of control.  Even renowned Marxist, David Harvey, has 
fallen victim to this misrepresentation: in commenting on the power of CEOs, Harvey 
(2005: 33) claims that “[t]he power of the actual owners of capital, the stockholders, 
has…been somewhat diminished.”  He goes on to point out that “[s]hareholders have on 
occasion been bilked of millions by the operation of the CEOs and their financial 
advisors.”  There is no doubt that some shareholders end up on the losing end of these 
processes.  However, the shareholder value conception of control is not an ideology of 
the average investor, but is the byproduct of a financial sector that has become obsessed 
with short-term financial gains.  In the US forest products industry, managers pursued 
shareholder value by selling off assets and loading their firms down with debt.  As a 
result, firms have become far less stable than they once were and some became unable to 
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 Fifty-four percent of the US population had stock market investments in 2011 (Jacobe 2011).  The vast 
majority of these stocks are controlled by institutional investors in the form of mutual funds and other 
retirement funds.   
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survive when hit by the financial crisis.  In this sense, some shareholders lost big as a 
result of manager’s pursuit of shareholder value.   
Another immediate benefit of this synthesis of financialization and shareholder 
value is that we can begin to draw some lessons about the underlying causes of the 
shareholder value revolution and perhaps some insight into their future development.  
The shareholder value conception of control emerged in response to the economic crisis 
of the early 1970s.  Just as financialization was the solution to the barriers to 
accumulation in general, so was the shareholder value a solution to the problems 
confronting managers in large corporations.  In this sense, I argue that there is a general 
correspondence between the dominant social relations of production in modern capitalism 
– conceived as a tripolar class relation between financial capitalists, managerial 
(productive) capitalists, and working class – and those that exist within corporate 
institutions.   
The importance of situating the shareholder value conception of control within 
this framework is highlighted by considering some recent criticisms of this ideology.  
William Lazonick (forthcoming), a longtime critic of shareholder value ideology, argues 
that “shareholder value is destroying the US economy.” After presenting a devastating 
case on the effects of the shareholder value ideology on the US economy, Lazonick puts 
forth several mild policy prescriptions such as banning stock buybacks, and indexing 
employee stock options to other measures of success besides stock-price movements.  In 
my opinion, such suggestions serve primarily to legitimate the one-sidedness of cultural 
perspectives by locating the problem confronting the US economy as primarily one of 
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distorted incentives among managers. What Lazonick and others overlook are the 
contradictions that first created the need for a new conception of control, and then helped 
shape its emergence.  That is to say, this cultural emphasis downplays the class dynamics 
that underlie the shareholder value ideology.  In doing so, they also obscure what would 
be necessary to alter it. Because shareholder value works to promote the interests of a 
powerful financial sector, any changes to alter it will be bitterly resisted.  In the absence 
of a struggle of sorts by the working class or some other section of the popular classes 
there is no reason to believe that these policies could even be adopted, let alone the 
questions of whether they would address the fundamental problems.  Perhaps certain 
shareholders might join this struggle in order to create a more just and stable approach to 
corporate governance.  The exact manner that such a transformation would take cannot be 
determined in advance, however, the take home point here is that any lasting solution will 
entail a power struggle in society between those who do and do not benefit from the 
shareholder value conception of control.    
In the end, however, even in lieu of a popular backlash to the dominance of 
shareholder value in publicly held corporations, we can be relatively certain that 
shareholder value will someday be replaced.  Capitalism has shown itself to be a system 
of contradictions that develops through periods of stability and crisis.  These crises 
emerge in response to particular barriers to accumulation that capitalism confronts over 
the course of its historical development.  Overcoming these barriers requires a 
transformation of the material and ideological structures of society in order to establish 
stable conditions for continued capital accumulation.  “The bourgeoisie,” Marx and 
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Engels (1978[1848]: 476) tell us, “cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the 
instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the 
whole relations of society.”  
The financial crisis of 2008-09, could have been the signal crisis of the 
shareholder value conception of control.  Marxian theory tells us that it is during crisis 
that capitalist social relations are most likely to be transformed, because it under these 
conditions that struggles over how the crisis is to be resolved are most acute.  For now it 
may be too soon to tell what is to become of the shareholder value conception of control.  
In the forest products industry, and elsewhere, there are signs that some shareholders are 
growing weary of manager’s pursuit of short-term gains.75 However, it seems to this 
author that in the wake of the financial crisis the financial sector has dug in its heels and 
is doing everything in its capacity to maintain its grip on the institutional levers of the US 
political economy.  This can only mean that the real signal crisis of financialization and 




 The conclusions in this dissertation point in the direction of a number of potential 
avenues for future research.  These questions fall under two broad categories.  The first 
are theoretical questions that stem from my synthesis of financialization and the 
shareholder value conception of control.  The second line of questions relate specifically 
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 A web group claiming to represent the interests of individual shareholders was recently formed under the 
web address www.shareholdersfightback.com  
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to the transfer of timberland ownership and the implications that stem from this change.  
In this final section I survey a number of unanswered questions from both of these 
categories in order to provide a glimpse at the potential research opportunities that lie 
ahead, for both myself and the research community more broadly.   
 
Towards a Political Economy of Corporate Transformations 
 In this dissertation I constructed a framework for integrating political economic 
theories of capitalist transformations with economic sociology’s emphasis on shifting 
conceptions of managerial control.  The course I pursued provides one means of 
accomplishing this goal by conceptualizing the relationship between shareholders and 
managers as a particular manifestation of the broader social relations that predominate in 
any given historical period.  There may be other ways of conceptualizing and organizing 
this subject matter that prove more fruitful.  However, the task that this framework sought 
to accomplish remains an important subject of social scientific inquiry.  If we are to 
understand the dynamics of historical change in the modern corporation then we need to 
be able to account for the both the material and ideological aspects of corporate 
transformations.  In fact, according to Dahms (2000: 25, italics added), “the definitive 
criteria for determining whether there has been a qualitative change in capitalism is 
whether it has brought with it a qualitative transformation of the dominant form of 
economic organization, and the prevailing definition of organizational control.”  Future 
research should strive to incorporate these two interrelated aspects of socio-historical 
change.   
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I would also add that future research would benefit by theorizing corporate 
transformations within a framework that explicitly addresses the historical dynamics of 
capitalism.  This is important for several reasons: first, the modern corporation itself is a 
product of the historical capitalism.  That is to say, the corporation emerged in a 
particular historical period in response to particular contradictions that were emerging in 
a nascent industrial capitalism.  To paraphrase Ollman (2003: 13), understanding the 
historical development of the corporation requires that we know something about how it 
arose and developed and how it fits into the larger system of which it is a part.   
Secondly, corporate transformations are clearly linked to the periodic crises that 
confront historical capitalism and should therefore be specifically situated in those 
historically-specific conditions that create the impetus for shifting conceptions of 
managerial control.  Capitalist crises emerge when the process of accumulation confronts 
a particular barrier to its ongoing quest for ceaseless accumulation.  The particular 
manner in which this barrier is overcome will provide important clues for scholars of 
corporate transformations.  By paying attention to these shifts in the process of capital 
accumulation – and the social relations they reflect – we gain valuable insights into 
emergent conceptions of control.  We also benefit from an understanding of who benefits 
from these changes.   
Future research should continue the process of developing and refining this 
political economic theory of corporate transformations.  One way this can be 
accomplished is through intensive study of additional sectors of the economy.  The 
differences and similarities that may exist between various sectors of the economy are 
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extremely important for understanding of a particular corporate transformation.  How 
have the processes of financialization and shareholder value affected other areas of the 
economy?  Are there important differences between mature industry like the forest 
products industry and emergent industries such as those related to information 
technology?  Another distinction that may also be important is the difference between 
natural resource-based industries and non-resource-based industries.  I began this study 
with the intention of developing a theory of socio-ecological transformations that were 
rooted in the development of historical capitalism.  For various reasons, I was not able to 
fully develop this line of thought in this dissertation.  In the future, this will provide an 
important line of research.   
   
The Consequences of the Transformation of Timberland Ownership  
 A second area of future research concerns the consequences and fate of the 
millions of acres of timberland that changed ownership type as a result of the 
financialization process.  A number of concerns have been raised by foresters, academics 
and policy analysts about the possible economic, social, and environmental implications 
of this transfer of timberland ownership (Bliss et al. 2009; Fernholz 2007; Little 2006; 
Gunnoe and Gellert 2011).  
Many of these concerns are related to the relatively short investment horizon that 
accompanies these timberland investments, which typically range from 10 to 15 years. 
Central in this regard is the increased use of “highest and best use” management 
strategies that seek to maximize the financial return of the timberland asset (Bliss et al. 
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2009).  Since TIMO managers are not primarily concerned with supplying local mills, 
they may seek out alternative land uses, such as real estate development, in order to 
maximize returns on their investment.  This may increase forest fragmentation, a leading 
threat to forest biodiversity, and present numerous challenges for forest managers and 
local communities.  Future research is needed to document the extent to which these 
developments are actually taking place.   
 Another major concern is the effect that these new timberland owners will have 
on small landowners and local communities.  The industrial timberlands that this 
dissertation focused on represent just a fraction of the over 423 million acres of total 
private timberland in the United States.  To be sure, these are among the most productive 
and valuable timberlands, however, there continue to be millions of small land owners, 
particularly in the South, that may be impacted by this changing land ownership 
structure.  Accessing exactly how these small land owners are being affected and what 
can be done to promote the interests of small landowners is an urgent task.  In addition, 
local communities often have strong cultural relationships to these industrial timberlands 
and there is increasing evidence that many of the new institutional land owners are 
restricting public access to these timberlands.  As a result, communities have begun to 
fight back, engaging in various acts of protest and vandalism aimed at these new 
institutional landowners.   
Finally, there is growing anxiety about the question of what will become of the 
forest products industry and the countless communities that depend on it if these 
timberlands are no longer valued for their ability to produce raw materials for mills.  A 
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diminished forest product industry would spell disaster for communities that currently 
rely on the industry for employment. Despite massive layoffs in recent decades, the 
industry continues to provide employment for nearly 736,000 people across the United 
States, or roughly 6 percent of total employment in US manufacturing (BEA 2010).  The 
industry’s importance for employment, along with the fact that timber is a potentially 
renewable resource that, if managed properly, can continue to play an important role in 
the US economy, indicate that forest products should remain an important industry in the 
future.  The question of whether the industry will remain, and in what form, is open, but 
it is important to ask questions about what kind of forest products industry would most 
directly benefit American society and what must be done to make this a sustainable 
industry that works for the American people, not the other way around.   
 Many in the forestry sector see the structural developments affecting the industry 
as inevitable outcomes of a seemingly naturalized historical development (see, for 
example, Ince et al. 2007).  As a result they are primarily concerned with overcoming the 
barriers to capital accumulation by expanding the realm of value creation from 
timberland.76  These alternatives include various land uses, ranging from payments for 
maintaining forests as a carbon offset, the development of biofuels, or payments for 
various types of ecosystem services (see Rinehart 2010).  Some of these potential 
alternatives (such as Biofules) may provide employment opportunities, but none seem to 
be capable of providing the level of employment that has historically been provided by 
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 See McMichael (2009) for a broader critique of how such attempts to overcoming barriers to 
accumulation by extending the realm of value creation serve to intensify the contradictions of capitalism.  
Also see Correia (2010) for a critique of this practice as it relates to forest certification practices in the US 
forest products industry.     
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the forest products sector.77  Instead of proposing defense measures that merely react to 
the changing conditions of US capitalism, industry analysts might take a minute to 
question the very dynamics that are destroying the industry they promote.  These are not 
inevitable processes that are inscribed by some low of nature, but are specifically linked 
to the contradictory development of capitalism itself.  Addressing the more deleterious 
aspects of these historical transformations requires that we take the time to ask questions 
about exactly why these structural transformations are taking place, and, even more 
importantly, whose interests they serve.   
 In the opening pages of this dissertation I commented on an article published in 
The Forest Products Journal blaming poor managerial decision-making for causing many 
of the ailments that have beset the forest products industry (Michael and Ray 2008).  In 
this light, it is worth asking whether the decision by manager to sell-off millions of acres 
of valuable timberland constitutes another poor decision. The analysis presented here 
requires that we ask a poor decision for whom?  The evidence provided in this 
dissertations indicate that this transfer of timberland was harmful to the industry because 
it removed yet another support beam that was a source of profit and stability in an 
industry that is inherently cyclical.  Future research may also show that this decision was 
bad for the employees and communities that rely on the land for a source of their 
economic and spiritual livelihood.  This research might also show that the transfer of 
timberland has negative environmental outcomes as well if timberland is parcelized and 
developed.  However, in the end, the managerial decision to sell-off industrial 
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 See Bailey, Dyer, and Teeter (2011) for an analysis of the potential economic benefits that a 
biofuels industry may hold for the logging sector and rural regions in Alabama.    
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timberlands does seem to have been a good decision for both the managers that sold them 
and the financial institutions that were able to secure and monetize the value of this 
timberland through a debt-financed acquisition process that sent timberland prices sky-
rocketing.   
 The future of these timberlands and the US forest products more generally 
remains uncertain.  The short-term prospects of a protracted stagnation and high 
unemployment do not bode well for an industry that is highly dependent on the health of 
the broader US economy.  In the short-term, industry analysts and promoters will 
continue to seek out alternative means of extracting value from these lands in order to 
maintain the imperatives of capitalist markets.  In the long-term, however, it would 
behoove all those that care about the industry, its workers, and the land to pause and 
consider some more fundamental questions about the logic and desirability of a social 
system that is driven, on the pain of extinction, to pursue ceaseless accumulation as an 
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